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ENGLISH REVIEW

JUNE, 1925

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Correspondence

Osteopathy

[*We published in May a letter from Dr. Arthur J. Cramp, director of the Bureau of Investigation of the American Medical Association, 535 North Dearborn Street, Chicago, criticizing the article by Major J. B. Paget on Osteopathy which had appeared in February.—Ed. E. R.*]

To the Editor of THE ENGLISH REVIEW.

SIR,—Dr. Cramp has made out as good a case as is possible against osteopathy, but, with all his skill, I submit that he has failed to disprove its value as an aid to the healing art.

He says:—"Major Paget's dictum: It will always be found that a person with a straight and normal backbone suffers very little from chronic ill-health," will be "news to the medical profession, who generally have the impression that 'straight' backbone is not normal, and that a normal backbone may not have the remotest casual relation to 'chronic ill-health.'" By a straight backbone I meant a backbone that has no lateral curvature or one that does not curve inwards or outwards *abnormally*. Of course, no normal backbone is straight in the sense that a gun-barrel is straight.

The medical profession can hardly be unaware that this has a relationship to good health. When Dr. Cramp says that it is a large assumption that the hours of study claimed by osteopaths in fundamental subjects are as stated, he is merely throwing doubts on one of the medical schools in the United States (osteopathy), to which that particular school might well reply with a *tu quoque*; but I agree with him that the value of training depends not so much on the hours of instruction as on the reliability of the subject-matter taught and the ability of the instructor to impart knowledge. This remark would apply equally to instruction in golf or the Chinese language.

I further agree with him that medical knowledge cannot be taught by one who has not a medical training. Osteopathic training concentrates chiefly on anatomy, and I maintain that the average osteopath knows at least as much about anatomy as the average medical practitioner.

A friend of mine, Dr. T. Mather Thomson, an osteopath, some time ago went to the United States to study under Albert Abrams, and, "to keep the kettle boiling," he decided, while studying under Abrams, to practise as an M.D. He therefore qualified for the particular State in which he was, and made 100 per cent. marks in anatomy.

Dr. Cramp says: "Osteopathy is not officially recognised in England—fortunate country!" It would be more accurate if he said: Fortunate medical men!

Dr. Cramp points out that different standards are required in different States to qualify for the degree of M.D., but he omits to state that osteopaths have only one standard, which, judging by the result of their work, is a satisfactory one, as the following seems to show. In

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the last big epidemic of influenza and pneumonia, medical practitioners in Chicago lost 14½ per cent. of the influenza patients and 26 per cent. of their pneumonia cases. Doctors of osteopathy lost less than ½ per cent. of their influenza patients, very few of their cases developed into pneumonia, and of those that did they lost less than 10 per cent.

He goes on to say that a time may come when we shall have special examining boards for Christian science practitioners, doctors of Voodooism and Seventh Sons of Seventh Sons. The last two forms of practitioners are unknown in this country, but I take the doctor's word that the time may come when we may expect them to be registered in the United States. Christian science I have heard of, and that great American humorist, Mark Twain, studied the subject and came to the conclusion that there was no Christianity and very little science about it. The sect had their revenge—Mark Twain died a Christian scientist! Dr. Cramp further states that osteopathy in the United States is nearly moribund. How comes it, then, that yet another college of osteopathy has just been opened in California at a cost of five million dollars?

I have more faith in the American nation than to think that all the propositions they send to us are fraudulent—like some of their oil schemes. I will conclude with one concrete case of what osteopathy did recently for a man I know; he went to the late Sir James Mackenzie, suffering from heart disease. Sir James said that medical science could do nothing for him. He went to an osteopath, who, after only a few treatments, cured him. He then asked Sir James to re-examine him. Sir James said it was useless and that it was waste of time and money; he, however, insisted, and Sir James complied with his request. The result of the examination astounded Sir James; he said, "A miracle has happened; your heart is normal." My friend replied, "There has been no miracle; I have been cured by an osteopath." Sir James was so impressed that he wished to consult the osteopath, but, unfortunately for osteopathy, he died before he could give his verdict to the world.

I am, etc.,

J. B. PAGET.

The French Canadians

To the Editor of THE ENGLISH REVIEW.

SIR,—The article on "The French Canadians" by Mr. A. G. Bradley in your "Empire Supplement" for May is itself quite "sadly inaccurate" and calculated to harm the cause of practical Imperialism which you have at heart. The loyal and intelligent people of French Canada with their splendid chain of schools, colleges, and universities are not "reactionary" but Conservative, not "unsophisticated" but clear-minded, not "priest-ridden" but Christian and Catholic. They are not all "peasantry," and they don't speak "seventeenth-century French patois." The French which they speak, though it has some charming archaisms and some ugly Anglicisms, is quite good, even if it lacks the "Pareesian accent!"

Mr. Bradley must know full well that his recruitment figures relating to the Great War are at least disputable. In the opinion of many

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the proportion was far higher than he states. If it wasn't higher still, the fault is perhaps on the heads of certain blundering politicians, who, ignoring or despising the psychology of the "inferior race," refused to allow the formation of more than one distinctly French-Canadian unit. Yet the 22nd, which they did permit, proved its value and its valour to a notable degree.

As it was my privilege to serve as Chaplain in the Canadian Army for nearly five years, and to have been intimately acquainted with the French-Canadian element, I beg leave to inform Mr. Bradley that these "unwarlike people" were amongst the bravest of the brave.

Let Mr. Bradley tell us the proportion of native-born English-speaking Canadians (not of Britishers in Canada—quite a different proposition) who enlisted, and we shall have a more accurate estimate of comparative loyalty.

The cohesion and solidarity of French Canada is a most valuable asset to our great Dominion. To sneer at it, and to insult it, is to tempt it to a disaffection which would be disastrous.

I am, etc.,

(Rev.) IVOR DANIEL,
R.C. Chaplain, 11th Can. Bgde.

Bryn Dedwydd,
Conway, N. Wales.
May 6, 1925.

France's Debts

To the Editor of THE ENGLISH REVIEW.

SIR,—Surely the article (France's Debts) by Mr. B. S. Townroe in your May issue is not correct in its table of indebtedness. Mr. Townroe gives France's debt to us as roughly £434,000,000. Is the figure not roughly £560,000,000? He also laments the failure of Russia, as we all do. But France only lent to Russia (roughly) £160,000,000 as against our loan of £568,000,000. We are owed roughly by our Allies, £1,800,000,000; France only £355,000,000. Thus we lent five times as much as France. In terms of taxation, our productivity stands at about the same ratio. Why is only Britain to be regarded as the milch-cow of the war?

I am, etc.,

AUSTIN HARRISON.

[The discrepancy between the totals given by our contributor in May and those stated by Mr. Austin Harrison appears to be explained by the fact that the latter has added interest accrued, or estimated. While this is, of course, a quite legitimate addition, the precise form of accountancy is beside the point of the article, "France's Debts." Its object was to lift the consideration of the problem above the level of mere book-keeping and to suggest that the sacrifice of human life, and colossal devastation, not even yet fully repaired, suffered by France, should be weighed against the counting-house claim for dollars. England in her relative poverty, has offered to do so. The attitude of America, super-saturated with wealth, was accurately described in the article "Shylock Defends Himself," also published in our last number.—ED., E.R.]

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

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

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THE
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JUNE, 1925

Current Comments

THERE is no doubt that the Empire possesses in the personality of the Prince of Wales an asset of which it would be difficult to overrate the value. His previous tours in the Dominions were highly successful achievements in the direction of promoting Imperial unity and maintaining personal contact between the dynasty and the oversea nations of the British family, but in South Africa the heir to the throne appears to have scored a crowning triumph. The situation in the Union previous to his visit was distinctly disquieting in many respects, and the growth of what might be termed an opportunist republicanism seemed to be making rapid headway. From the moment of his arrival a remarkable transformation occurred, and although at the time of writing the Prince has still to visit the high veld strongholds of Nationalism, there is no reason to doubt that the reception accorded to him in the Cape Province, which itself contains many Nationalist centres, will be repeated.

The Prince in South Africa

The panorama which will unfold itself to the Prince during his tour is described in our Empire Supplement (p. 832).

FEW statesmen of modern times have left their mark more distinctly on the political development of the British Empire than Lord Milner, whose death, although he had reached a ripe age, was probably accelerated by the strain borne by him during the Great War. Lord Milner's part in moulding the destinies of South Africa at one of the most critical periods in the history of the sub-continent would alone have entitled him to an enduring place in the annals of the British commonwealth of nations. It is the fashion in certain quarters in this country, where ignorance of the facts of the situation that existed before the outbreak of the Boer War is only equalled by willingness to believe that the British case must invariably

Lord Milner

be bad, to blame Lord Milner for that unfortunate, but inevitable, trial of strength. Of that slander history will undoubtedly acquit him, and his rapid reconstruction of the devastated country will stand as one of the chief monuments to his career whatever the final verdict may be in regard to his Chinese labour policy. Subsequently in attempting with Lord Roberts to awaken the nation to the dangers of unpreparedness in the face of the threatening storm, he was championing a cause which could only triumph when the British people found themselves face to face with disaster; but Lord Milner was never a man to be deterred by considerations of political expediency, as he plainly showed in the case of the Chinese labour episode. Later, as a member of the War Cabinet and as Minister of War, Lord Milner rendered what were, perhaps, his greatest services to the State. It was at his suggestion that the Imperial War Cabinet came into being, a constitutional step of the greatest significance, and he played a leading part in securing that unity of command on the Western Front, which was so essential to the successful conduct of the war. Recent events suggest that the recommendations of the Commission which he headed as to the future status of Egypt were based on an over-optimistic reading of the situation against which his residence in that country thirty years earlier should have guarded him, although it is true that the Commission proposed that the independence of Egypt should only be conceded after acceptance by a national assembly of the various reservations. A leaning towards guild socialism, which came into some prominence towards the close of his career, was no doubt to some extent a resurgence of ideas imbibed during his Oxford days when he was on friendly terms with Arnold Toynbee, with whose idealistic economic philosophy he was deeply imbued.

The Budget

Mr. Winston Churchill would no doubt have been disappointed if his Budget had aroused neither controversy nor sensation. He has at any rate the satisfaction of knowing that no Budget since the famous Lloyd George Budget of 1909 has created so much excitement. In this excitement the sensational Press has played its part, but at the same

time Mr. Churchill's proposals were of a kind that could not pass unnoticed. The unsensational reduction of the income tax by sixpence was accompanied with unexpected increase of the death duties balanced by relief to super-tax payers. Little has been said about this aspect of the Budget, but there are some Conservatives who have doubts as to this rearrangement. It is very curious that some relief is given to every class of taxpayer except the citizen whose income lies between £1,500 and £2,000 a year. If he enjoys the sixpence reduction, he suffers from the increased death duties without any other compensation, for that increase begins on estates between £12,500 and £18,000, which are precisely those that this division of the middle classes is wont to leave or inherit. Moreover, the man whose salary lies between £1,500 and £2,000 is deprived of a part of the relief offered to earned incomes, since the increase of that relief from one-tenth to one-sixth stops short with incomes of £1,500. Since the war the middle classes have been the principal sufferers from the national crisis, and they bore the brunt of the war to a very great extent. It seems unfortunate that this section should have been omitted from any serious benefit in the Budget.

The duty on silk seems to be an example of the disadvantages which arise in these days from a Free Trade Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Churchill was so anxious to prove that he had not bated a whit of his Free Trade principles, that he discovered an import tax which has aroused as much criticism from Protectionists as from Free Traders. Taxation of raw materials and an excise duty on a young industry would never have appealed to a Chancellor who believed in Protection. There is doubtless some truth in Mr. Churchill's contention that a new tax is never popular and that an old tax is no tax. A portion of the Press has worked up the case against the duties with no excessive regard for facts, but it cannot be denied that the whole textile trade has been seriously alarmed at a time when confidence is more than ever essential. There seems to have been a want of co-ordination between the Treasury and the Board of Trade on this matter, for the latter department must have known how intimately silk, whether natural or artificial, is connected with both cotton and wool fabrics.

Widows' Pensions

THE proposals establishing a scheme of widows' pensions have had a considerable political effect. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Neville Chamberlain, between them, have stolen the Opposition thunder with a vengeance. The Socialist Party has been extremely uncomfortable throughout the discussion of this measure, and Mr. Snowden's popularity among his colleagues, which was never very great, has distinctly slumped. For a Socialist Chancellor he would not countenance a non-contributory scheme, knowing that it was impossible to finance it, and half the sting has gone out of his friends' criticisms of the Government contributory measure, when it is known that the Bill which they announced as the greatest of boons in their election manifesto was based on exactly the same principle. Sir Douglas Hogg, the Attorney-General, rubbed in this point so remorselessly that Mr. Wheatley, who had called the Conservative proposal "a most heartless and fiendish fraud," almost lost his temper, while Mr. Snowden sat silent on the bench beside him with the expression of a statue. Liberals and Socialists alike are reduced to what the French call the policy of *surenchère*: it costs them nothing to say that they would be far more generous if they were in office; but the political fact remains that no wise politician likes voting against a Pensions Bill. It is a vote which is wont to make an awkward reappearance at election times.

On the more serious side very grave anxiety has been shown on the Conservative side of the House as to whether industry can possibly bear the additional contribution burden at the present moment. There is general agreement that the wind must in some way be tempered to the shorn employer. It is ridiculous to suggest that income tax relief is of the slightest use to a firm which is making no profits at all and which is working at a loss in order to give employment and keep its skilled men together. An important iron and steel firm which has not been mentioned in the House has passed its dividends for some years and the Government scheme will mean an additional expenditure of £17,000 a year, which can only be met by increasing unemployment. Sir Robert Horne drew attention to a most important point when he remarked that at the present moment we are competing with

Germany on the most unfavourable terms with which we are ever likely to be handicapped. The depreciation of the mark liberated Germany from its entire debenture debt. The Dawes scheme imposes a debt slightly less than that which previously represented the capital expenditure on German industry, but it does not become immediately effective, and for the moment we have to face a competitor free of debt, with a re-established currency. No wonder that Germany has become "a very, very serious rival." Then again, it is industry which must suffer temporarily for the return to the gold standard from the inevitable dislocation. In such circumstances Conservatives, both young and old, are agreed that some compensation should be given to industry greater than that mere relief of the rates mentioned by the Minister of Health.

The Film Industry

THE discussion in the House of Lords on the Film Industry might have suggested to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if he could forget for a moment his Free Trade superstitions, that he had missed an admirable method of increasing revenue by an import tax, which would not have aroused a word of protest except from theorists. It is well known that the British film industry is in a desperate condition. It is now practically confined to the renting and exhibition of foreign films, most of them as Lord Newton said, rubbish. It is said that the public wants rubbish. If that be true why should not that rubbish be English and not American. There is a serious side to the nonsense shown on the screen apart even from the question of unemployment. The United States have found in the film a heaven-sent method of self-advertisement throughout the world, which they are rapidly persuading to a belief that they are the only nation that counts. The effect on trade of this propaganda is incalculable. No one who has been to Canada will ignore its importance. Surely no one in this country wishes that a film showing the surrender of the German Fleet to the American Fleet should go round the world and establish a historic lie, injurious to our prestige and our commerce. It is incomprehensible that the Government should wish for further delay in setting up a committee of enquiry into facts that are patent to all.

UNDER his new Budget, Mr. Blythe, Minister of Finance in the Irish Free State, hopes to levy an annual toll of over £500,000 upon the British textile and clothing industries and another £250,000 from the British boot and shoe manufacturers.

Irish Taxation on British Industry

Great Britain will remain of course the largest, and almost the only, customer for Irish goods of the same kind (as indeed for most others). The total value of such Irish exports in 1924 was £431,298, of which Great Britain and Northern Ireland took £426,841, leaving only the small amount of £4,457 for all other countries. In the same year Great Britain exported to Northern Ireland clothing to the value of £3,554,921, exclusive of boots and shoes.

WHILE the Free State spokesmen continue loudly to assert their rights under the 1922 Treaty to dismember Ulster they are in no hurry to recognize their obligations under Clause V of the same treaty. We fear that harassed British taxpayers will derive little satisfaction from perusing it, but as some of our readers appear to be under the impression that we have been unduly harsh in our strictures on Free State finance, we will remind them of the clause under which Southern Ireland is undoubtedly liable to Great Britain for a sum amounting to many millions, not one penny of which has been paid.

Free State Default

> The Irish Free State shall assume liability for the service of the Public Debt of the United Kingdom as existing at the date hereof and towards the payment of war pensions as existing at that date in such proportion as may be fair and equitable, having regard to any just claims on the part of Ireland by way of set-off or counterclaim, the amount of such sums being determined in default of agreement by the arbitration of one or more independent persons being citizens of the British Empire.

When, if ever, a British Government makes up its mind seriously even to approach the question it will of course be met with fantastic Irish counterclaims after the fashion of the Soviet, whose methods the Free State so closely imitates. Ulster, it need hardly be said, has fully discharged its obligation to the Imperial Revenue, having contributed over £17,000,000 during the last four years. The Free State is content to clamour only for the execution of those clauses of the treaty which it regards as its rights, and to ignore its liabilities.

THE French municipal elections were fought on political lines, and were expected to show whether the country had changed its mind after the fall of the Herriot Ministry. Before the elections the Painlevé Government was inclined to cold-shoulder the Socialists and look to the Centre for the maintenance of its majority. The verdict of the country was that the Cartel des Gauches should be maintained. The Painlevé Government, anxious to promote national appeasement and co-operation, offended the Socialists by refusing the capital levy and maintaining the French embassy at the Vatican. Consequently intriguers are at work to bring about its fall. The Socialists would like M. Herriot back because while he was Premier they really governed without responsibility, and they hope that if M. Painlevé should fall, M. Herriot might return to power with M. Leon Blum, the Socialist leader, in a prominent post. Such a combination would restore the unity of the Cartel des Gauches which was considerably shaken by the formation of the present Government, for neither M. Briand nor M. Caillaux are enamoured of the Socialist programme. The Socialists championed M. Caillaux when he was the most unpopular man in France, but they would now like to bring him down because he rejects the capital levy.

Politics in France

France, therefore, presents the curious spectacle of the Communists striving for an alliance with the Socialists. They have put forward a programme based on Socialist ideals, such as the capital levy, the gift of the land to the cultivators, and, of course, the immediate end of the Painlevé Ministry. Even if this alliance were effected it would be impotent to realize such a programme in the Chamber. There are 105 Socialists and 26 Communist deputies. The total number of deputies is over 500, and on any attempt at spoliation and Bolshevism, Radicals, Radical-Socialists, and the solid block of deputies of the Right would give a Socialist-Communist alliance short shrift. M. Painlevé finds himself, therefore, in this position: either he will have to remain true to his declaration, and pursue a moderate policy of national appeasement—in which case he cannot count on any help from the Socialists—or he will have to fall back on the Cartel des Gauches. His decision will be determined by the measure of support he receives from the Centre.

Harold Frazer Wyatt

24th April, 1858—20th May, 1925

When, just two years ago, I undertook control of the English Review, I was encouraged to the adventure by the offer of help from one who, besides being my oldest and most valued friend, had the rarest qualifications for the task. During these two years such recognition as the Review has won as an uncompromising exponent of English interests and ideals has been largely due to his counsel, and in no small degree to his pen. He seldom failed, despite increasing illness and pain, to contribute a fine example of the dedication of a writer's command of virile English of classical purity to the service of English and Imperial interests. At last, on 20th May, his heroic struggle for life was overcome by the cruel disease which had all but defeated him in August 1923.

More than thirty years ago he inspired me with those Imperial ideals which were the mainspring of his life's work, and we embarked together under the leadership of Parkin, Seeley, and Milner upon a crusade on behalf of what was then known as Imperial Federation.

Like so many Englishmen of the best type, Harold Wyatt was the son of a country parson. After graduating at Exeter College, Oxford, in 1881, he spent several years at Toynbee Hall. In 1895 he joined the Executive Committee of the Navy League, and in 1902 he volunteered to visit the Dominions as its envoy. The interest and enthusiasm which he aroused in regard to Imperial Naval Defence started the movement which resulted in the Dominion contributions to the Imperial Navy. Later, as joint founder and secretary of the Imperial Maritime League, he worked unceasingly for the strengthening of the Navy. As a writer and speaker on this question he won wide respect as that rare combination—an informed enthusiast. For many years he was a constant contributor to "The Nineteenth Century" and other Reviews. His greatest achievement, the greater perhaps that so few of his countrymen ever recognized its magnitude, was his successful attack, almost single handed, upon the Declaration of London, a measure subtly designed by the enemies of England to weaken her naval power in war, and

foolishly accepted by that dangerous section of English opinion which is ever ready to sacrifice the interests of England to those of her foes. He was supported in this fight by the late Mr. Gibson Bowles, and he marshalled his forces with such prodigious energy and skill that the Cabinet of the day, pledged to acceptance of the Declaration, as embodied in the Naval Prize Bill (actually passed by the House of Commons in 1911), without, probably, having in the least grasped its real significance, was outmanœuvred, and submitted to its rejection by the House of Lords. At the commencement of the war, nevertheless, Sir Edward Grey for a time revived the principles of the Declaration of London until in actual practice every prediction of Harold Wyatt as to their ruinous effect on British interests was so unmistakably demonstrated that, after having caused incalculable damage, they were finally abandoned. Like all patriots gifted with vision and informed by study of history, he often gave warning of national dangers ahead not yet obvious to the crowd, and was sometimes called an alarmist for his pains. He was revenged upon his critics when, on the outbreak of the war, the editor of the "Nineteenth Century and After" republished an article in which, three years earlier, he had accurately forecast that tragedy. He was precluded by his age from military service in the war, but as speaker and writer for the Admiralty, he stimulated the workers in the shipyards, and counteracted the defeatist propaganda to which they were continually exposed. He also spoke at all the Public Schools, encouraging the older boys to enter the navy.

At that critical moment in the war when it was evident that voluntary effort was becoming exhausted, and that the fate of the country depended upon the adoption of compulsory military service, Harold Wyatt's ardent spirit impelled him to an effort to secure the support from public opinion needed to decide the attitude of the Press and of the responsible ministers. In his fight against the Declaration of London he had obtained the powerful help of Lord Northcliffe. He sought and obtained it again for conscription. For three or four weeks, during which I was privileged to assist him, he strove to secure sufficient pledges of support to turn the scale in favour of compulsory service, with such

success that its adoption was hastened by weeks, certainly, perhaps by months. A pivotal factor was the adherence of Lord Milner, who, as chairman of the National Service League, had become its President in effect, although not in name, after the death of Lord Roberts.

It is known that in the early days of the war Lord Roberts yielded to very strong influences and refrained from pressing the issue of compulsory service, which, at that time, in view of the splendid voluntary response to the nation's call, it was held must, at least, be delayed. Lord Milner was at first inclined to consider himself bound, as Lord Roberts' successor, to a negative attitude. His decision to back conscription, and his assurance to that effect, conveyed in the first instance privately to certain powerful sections of the Press, were undoubtedly hastened by the joint efforts of Harold Wyatt and Mr. George Shee, the founder of the National Service League. On the 19th of last month, not knowing that the end was so near, I sent my friend a message through his sister to enquire if he would write or dictate a short obituary note on Lord Milner. I received a reply that he would, as I knew, like to do it the next day. The light of that day never came for him. So stunning is the loss of a close and life-long friend that it is hard, writing within a few hours of his burial, to do even the barest justice to his memory. I have given a short outline of his activities, but I cannot hope to express in words any adequate tribute to his rare qualities, both of intellect and character. They won for him always the high regard, and often the affection, of those who had the privilege of his friendship. He was the soul of honour. He hated compromise. Every fibre of his being rebelled against the shams, the sophistries and the surrenders ever more and more demanded by democratic government, which he regarded as threatening the very fabric of our English constitution and the British Empire. A white flame of patriotism had burned out all dross of self-interest and personal ambition. One consideration alone affected his judgment of any question of public policy—the interests of England and of the Empire. Most fittingly was he laid to rest in English soil on Empire day.

ERNEST REMNANT.

Ex Tenebris

THE following lines—fragments of thought rough-hewn from the quarry of a splendid intellect—were dictated by Harold Wyatt, a few days before his death, in a gallant attempt to outline an article intended for this number of THE ENGLISH REVIEW. The horizon of his vision, always far, was already stretching beyond the range of mortal sight. The veil was lifting and the spirit straining to pierce the mists which hide the future from the eyes of men.

"Like the dust storms hurling their huge columns of sand upon the desert traveller, so do the tempests of man's past and the débris of his hopes and fears cumber the path which he has to tread.

"Darker and darker yet loom those clouds of the future into which he is visibly passing, but there are three formidable facts to encounter. They are war, death, and the successive dissolution of former civilizations.

"War is the fundamental condition of human advance, as the whole of biology demonstrates.

"It would seem from the great readers of the knowledge of the past, such as the Egyptologists and the students of Babylonian lore, that the feet of mankind are treading constantly on a path leading from one shelf of being to another, now up, now down . . . or which might be likened to successive waves tossing the life course of the human stream towards some as yet far-hidden goal.

"They must have arrived at a high point in human progress who have reached to this, and that penetration points to a drawing near to the attainment of the goal.

"But what is that goal? Unless all hints, all suggestions, harvested from a dim and distant knowledge of the past are vain . . . ."

The Pro-Consuls*

By Rudyard Kipling

"THE foundations which Lord Milner has laid are firm and strong, and he may leave other men to build upon them in the proud consciousness that, but for the decision which he took six years ago, there might now be ruins where a fair and stately building is slowly rising."—"The Times."

The overfaithful sword returns the user
His heart's desire at price of his heart's blood:
The clamour of the arrogant accuser
Wastes that one hour we needed to make good.
This was foretold of old at our outgoing;
This we accepted, who have squandered, knowing,
The strength and glory of our reputations,
At the day's need, as it were dross, to guard
The tender and new-dedicate foundations
Against the sea we fear—not man's award.

They that dig foundations deep,
Fit for realms to rise upon,
Little honour do they reap
Of their generation,
Any more than mountains gain
Stature till we reach the plain.

With no veil before their face
Such as shroud or sceptre lend—
Daily in the market-place,
Of one height to foe and friend,
They must cheapen self to find
Ends uncheapened for mankind.

* A Tribute to Lord Milner, published in "The Times," July 1905, on his return from South Africa.

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THE PRO-CONSULS

Through the night when hirelings rest,
Sleepless, they arise, alone,
The unsleeping arch to test
And the o'er-trusted corner-stone
'Gainst the need, they know, that lies
Hid behind the centuries.

Not by lust of praise or show,
Not by Peace herself betrayed,
Peace herself must they forgo
Till that peace be fitly made;
And in single strength uphold
Wearier hands and hearts acold.

On the stage their acts have framed
To thy sports, O Liberty!
Doubted are they and defamed
By the tongues their act set free,
While they quicken, tend and raise
Power that must their power displace.

Lesser men feign greater goals,
Failing whereof they may sit
Scholarly to judge the souls
That go down into the pit
And, despite its certain clay,
Heave a new world towards the day.

These, at labour, make no sign
More than planets, tides or years,
Which discover God's design,
Not our hopes, and not our fears:
Nor in aught they gain or lose
Seek a triumph or excuse.

For, so the Ark be born to Zion, who
Heeds how they perished or were paid that bore it?
For, so the shrine abide, what shame—what pride—
If we, the priests, were bound or crowned before it?

1905

The Problem of Security: The Triple Pact

By Ernest Remnant

THERE is little evidence that the problem of security is nearer solution. Indeed, as Brig.-General Morgan says in the following article,* it threatens to remain unsolved until another war is upon us. Is the problem then insoluble; and, if not, whose will be the fault if civilization be destroyed by another war, certain, if it come, to be more devastating than the last? For a year or more I have sought to learn the views of the greatest military experts in England and France, and of those statesmen, diplomatists, and officials in both countries upon whom the responsibility rests for finding a solution. As the future peace of the great European nations may either be secured or sacrificed by the decisions taken in the next few months, I am impelled to state the results of those enquiries without reserve of any kind.

So confused has the question of security become since the close of the war that it is necessary to reaffirm the obvious, namely, that although it is based upon the twofold factors of politics and force, the greatest of these is force. In the ultimate resort, neither relief from the fear of aggression nor certainty of its successful repulsion can rest upon merely moral or political foundations, however important these may be in lessening the risks of conflict. It follows that that nation, or group of nations, alone, which singly or in association, can command the greatest military force will be secure from conquest so long as there is any possible aggressor. Amongst the great number and variety of expert opinions I have found absolute unanimity upon three points:

1. Germany will certainly return to the attack if she sees a fair chance of success.
2. The potential military superiority of the allies, if properly organized, is sufficient to deny her such hope of success.

* The German Offer, page 712*m*.

3. Delay will render effective allied organization ever more difficult and costly.

Whose, then, will be the fault if, with the means of security in our hands, it is not achieved?

It will not be the fault of the General Staffs, either in London or in Paris. The soldiers whose duty it is to advise their respective Governments are in broad principle unanimous in their opinion that France and England are in common danger from a renewed German invasion, that the only effective line of defence is the Rhine, and that, therefore, the closest possible military alliance is necessary between England, France, and Belgium in respect of this danger. As is clearly shown in the following pages by General Morgan, a defensive alliance would not be strengthened, but more likely destroyed, by the admission on equal terms of the potential aggressor against whom it had been designed. I will not here digress upon the possibility—wholly desirable—of superimposing a supplementary treaty with Germany upon such a basic defensive pact between the three nations whose safety she threatens.

The elements of the problem having thus been defined and substantial agreement having been reached between the responsible military experts upon what is essentially a military matter, what stands in the way of a solution which they declare to be not only adequate, but without alternative? The answer is—politics. Do the politicians then differ from their military advisers? Some undoubtedly do, but it is doubtful if they constitute a majority. So far they have the public ear, and have been able to evade open conflict of opinion with the soldiers. It is, however, hardly more credible that this question of life and death should be decided against the advice of the experts to whom the nation looks to guard its security, than that the problem of the safety of St. Paul's Cathedral should be decided by the Dean and Chapter without reference to architects and engineers.

The soldiers themselves are, of course, officially silent. But why do not those public men, who agree with the expert view, openly proclaim what is already their private conviction? Almost without exception they plead that public opinion and the Press, if not actually

hostile, is not yet prepared for a definite military engagement to France and Belgium to defend the Rhine as a common frontier. But if one section of public opinion is against the triple pact, while another is merely indifferent, it is because they have been given no lead by those from whom they might expect guidance. The influences against such a pact have, on the other hand, been unceasingly active, and have gathered strength from the absence of opposition. A small leaven of anti-French propaganda has, in fact, been allowed to leaven a large lump of public opinion, much of which is quite unconscious either of the origin or the real tendency of the views that it has gradually come to regard as merely pro-peace.

It is an open secret that before the German offer to enter into a pact effected its obvious purpose of checking the negotiations then proceeding toward the conclusion of an agreement between England, France, and Belgium, opinion was moving rapidly in the direction of such a triple pact. The German manœuvre succeeded only too well—for the moment. But for the Hindenburg election it is possible that it might have destroyed all hopes of an effective agreement between the allies. The election of Hindenburg, while not probably making any intrinsic difference in the internal German position, has broken the hypnotic spell which the German offer undoubtedly threw over opinion in England and even, to some extent, in France. While there is still, of course, a strong desire to include Germany in a pact of mutual security which would give her reciprocal guarantees in respect of the Rhine frontier, and fully recognize her national rights and dignity as the greatest State in a new Europe, the view is once more gaining ground that any such treaty must be distinct from, and supplementary to, the essential foundation of a triple pact between England and her two nearest allies, strengthened, it may be hoped, by the addition of Italy.

It is a curious commentary upon the nature of democratic government that such fluctuations of opinion should have resulted, first from an offer which no professional diplomatist can have regarded as anything but a transparent manœuvre, and, second, from the election

of Hindenburg, which only the most unsophisticated can imagine to indicate any real change in the spirit of German policy.

The fact remains that whereas the election of Marx would have been hailed as evidence of a victory for liberal and pacific ideals, the choice of Hindenburg is more difficult to present in that light. The *Times* rightly described him as a "symbol." Marx was a cipher, although he might perhaps have been the subject of adulatory articles in "The Nation." Hindenburg, of whom his countrymen are justly proud, is a war lord. He may be a symbol, but only of the spirit of German nationalism, militarism, imperialism, whatever his assurances to the contrary. Stresemann and Luther remain the political masters of Germany, with Von Seeckt, Gesseler, and Von Tirpitz in the background. Perfectly natural and inevitable, and no cause either for surprise or alarm so long as the nations whose safety may be threatened by German aggression realize their danger and take adequate precautions. The election of Marx might have produced a false sense of security; that of Hindenburg is a warning, plain for all to see.

It would be presumption on my part to offer any comment upon General Morgan's searching analysis of the pros and cons of the German offer, as in his late capacity as Deputy Adjutant-General on the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany he has had exceptional opportunities, not only of studying the question of security from German aggression on the spot, but of learning the views of all those English and Allied military and political experts who have been engaged upon it since the war. His title to write with authority is, therefore, undoubted.

Of the second article, by Brigadier-General Spears, on the Demilitarisation of the Rhineland, I will only say that, as is well known, during and since his service as Head of the Military Mission in Paris he has devoted a great part of his time to finding a solution of this problem acceptable to Germany as well as to France. If such a solution could be discovered it would, of course, be the ideal. I regret that I cannot pretend to much more confidence in the effectiveness of General

Spears's proposals under the strain of conflict than I have in the mere signature of Germany to a treaty. He has, however, rendered an invaluable service in convincing an important section of opinion that the Rhine is the indispensable natural line of defence against German aggression. The most anti-French prejudice dare not dismiss his views on this point as merely Chauvinist. He is, notoriously, nothing of the kind. Yet he insists as strongly as Marshal Foch himself that if a German army of invasion once crosses the Rhine, France and the Channel ports will almost certainly be past saving, with the result that we could be starved out in a few weeks. Every soldier shares that opinion. General Spears has succeeded in educating many parliamentary and press men who, since the war ended, were inclined to discount professional military advice. His technical knowledge as a soldier has led him to a sound judgment on the strategic importance of the Rhine as the only natural barrier. He will, I hope, forgive me for saying that his proposals for safeguarding it suggest the politician, tinged with idealism, rather than the soldier concerned, as is war, only with the hardest of realities.

In the last few days I have again had opportunities of sounding opinion in official circles in Paris. It is unnecessary to impress upon English readers the fact that recent changes in the direction of foreign affairs in France have tended to strengthen the prospects of the closest understanding with England. The attitude of M. Briand is well known and M. Painlevé is as ardent a supporter of the entente as Mr. Chamberlain. The return of M. Phillipe Berthelot to the Quai d'Orsay with his encyclopædic knowledge of European politics, his quiet tenacity, and his faith in the necessity of maintaining and reinforcing the entente as the foundation of peace, promises a stability of policy calculated to check German designs of dividing the allies. The new Government will provide a sounder basis for united action than the idealistic and rather fluid aspirations of M. Herriot. I left Paris with the strong conviction that with such men in charge, while there would be no sign of Chauvinism, no policy of provocation or

pinpricks, there would be an inflexible, if polite, insistence upon the execution by Germany of every essential treaty obligation *au pied de la lettre*. This will have been exemplified in the reply to the German note, now in the hands of the British Government for approval, which it is desired should be presented jointly on behalf of France, England, Belgium, and Italy. It will be *suaviter in modo*. It may be hoped that Germany will not provide grounds for a change to the *fortiter in re*. But this will surely follow if necessary.

If the problem of security were limited to Western Europe—to the defence of the Rhine as the common frontier of France, Belgium, and England—a triple pact would probably have been already concluded. Unfortunately, as General Morgan shows, however difficult it may be to induce the average insular Englishman to think continentally, it is doubtful if the arena can be so restricted. Even the League of Nations and its projected Protocols and Treaties of Mutual Guarantee have not yet educated the Englishman to realization of the grim fact that we cannot hide our heads in the sand and pretend that the German conquest of Poland or Czecho-Slovakia, or annexation of Austria are not as certain to involve us in war as a German attack on France.

The Treaty of Versailles, to the sanctity of which all responsible opinion is pledged, has created a very complicated and, in part doubtless, artificial framework. No essential part of it, however, can be violently destroyed without disaster to the whole structure of European peace. To suggest that it must be regarded as stereotyped for all time and incapable of modification would, of course, be absurd. If there be any virtue in the German proposals it may lie in the offer to seek such modifications only through negotiation and arbitration. But it is useless to pretend—in view of the new agreement between Poland and Czecho-Slovakia, and the definite assurances which they have just received from France—that there is the least chance of these countries being prepared at present to make any territorial concessions to Germany. As it was forcibly put to me by a prominent Pole, not one of his countrymen could be found who would dare to recommend such a proposal

—if he did, he would be stoned in the street. Similarly it is impossible to conceive that Italy would consent to the absorption of Austria by her northern neighbour. What territorial changes, peaceable or otherwise, time may bring forth no man can foresee, but a considerable period must elapse before any are possible. On this aspect of the general question of security I am able to quote the view of ex-President Millerand, who expressed to me his absolute conviction that any interference by Germany with the frontiers of her southern or south-eastern neighbours, either by force of arms, or even by efforts at arbitration, would immediately precipitate war in which France would inevitably be involved. M. Millerand's conclusion, therefore, which agrees with that of every French statesman and soldier with whom I have discussed the question, is that peace can only be maintained by religious respect for existing treaties enforced, if necessary, by the united strength of the whole of the allied nations. In his view the economic war which Germany is certain soon to wage upon the other industrial nations of Europe will strain their powers of resistance to the utmost. If they are to survive at all they must so organize and consolidate their forces as to ensure at least that war is restricted to the commercial struggle for markets. In conclusion, I will quote a very distinguished French general, on the staff of Marshal Foch, who said to me: "The Palace of Peace erected by the League of Nations may be a magnificent structure of imposing treaties but, if it is to endure, it must be built upon the solid foundation of a pact between England and France. The building may then be enlarged and embellished from generation to generation, but without that foundation it will inevitably collapse."

The German Offer*

By Brigadier-General J. H. Morgan

Late Deputy-Adjutant-General on the Inter-Allied Military Commission of Control in Germany.

THERE are times when it appears as if "The Problem of Security" is likely to remain a problem until another war provides its own baneful solution. After six years' debate we seem no nearer a solution than we were in 1919. We are supposed to be living in a state of peace, but I should be more inclined to call it an armistice, with this important difference, that one of the conditions of every armistice is that neither of the parties shall seek to improve his military position at the expense of the others. But to-day nearly every party to the Treaty of Versailles, the vanquished as well as the victors, is seeking to strengthen itself for the next conflict, some openly others surreptitiously.

Everyone is talking of "Disarmament"; no one is practising it. There is general agreement of all the parties on only one point, and that is that it is the duty of someone else to begin.

There have, of course, been many solutions offered; not one of them has been universally accepted. There is not even a *consensus* of opinion about the method of approach. Some would proceed from the particular to the general—that is to say, they would proceed by local and particular pacts between two or more parties, to which other parties might adhere, these pacts being supplemented by other pacts of the same kind, relating to other frontiers, until the structure of European peace would be built up on the principle of what engineers call "standardization of parts." It is the system adopted—and in my opinion very wisely adopted—by France in the negotiation of treaties with the Succession States, but it is not disarmament. Others would proceed from the general to the particular. They would construct a treaty of general obligation and allow the parties to it

* Copyright in France with the "Revue des deux Mondes."

to supplement it, in special cases, by local and particular agreements among themselves. This was the system suggested by the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee with which the name of Lord Cecil is associated; it is a system recognized, if not encouraged, but in very different terms, by the Protocol, which is a contract of insurance by all with a provision for re-insurance by each. But whereas the first method, that of local and particular pacts between the interested parties, is based on armaments, the second method, that of a general pact, is based on reduction of armaments. Neither the draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee nor the Protocol were to come into force unless and until some plan of reduced armaments had been agreed upon by the signatories. But reduction of armaments is not disarmament, nor does it "secure" peace. The reduction of naval armaments under the Washington Agreement has not solved the problem of the rivalries of the nations in the Far East—we should not be building a naval base at Singapore if it had.

But not only is there this difference of opinion in the method of approach to the problem. There is the most extraordinary conflict of interpretation as to what the effects of the various proposals for its solution may be. In England we have the paradoxical spectacle of pacifists and soldiers uniting to denounce the Protocol—the soldiers on the ground that it will involve Great Britain, if not in an increase of armaments, at least in incalculable naval and military commitments; the pacifists, or some of them, in particular "The Nation" newspaper, on the ground that by stereotyping the *status quo* in Europe it makes it impossible for any State aggrieved by that *status quo* (was "The Nation" thinking of Germany?) to resort to war without the risk of outlawry. Thus the soldiers protest that they may be compelled to go to war in another's quarrel against their will; the pacifists that they will not be allowed to go to war in their own.

More than this, both the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and the Protocol have been objected to in Great Britain on the ground that, so far from promoting that reduction of armaments which they pre-suppose, the obligations they involve will actually lead to an increase of armaments by any power which interprets its police duties under

them conscientiously. So that this great œcumenical debate seems to be ever moving in a vicious circle, until it would appear that, so far as disarmament is concerned, all that these projects achieve is the substitution of another name for the armies of Europe. The nations of Europe may agree to call their soldiers *police*, for the preservation of European peace, but they will none the less remain what they were before. You do not get rid of armies by calling them "Security" Police—the sort of "Police" with which I was only too familiar in our attempts to secure the disarmament of Germany. Is not the root of the trouble to be found in the stubborn fact that the forces required to maintain the Covenant of the League may at any time be turned against it? This must always be the case so long as you are without an international force. To rely on national forces for the preservation of international peace is at the best an equivocal resource. That is the paradox of both the Covenant and the Protocol: human nature being what it is, you have to envisage the use of force to repress force. *Naturam expellas furcâ, tamen usque recurret.*

Even the Covenant itself has been criticized from opposite sides. I have read German criticisms objecting to it on the ground that Article 10 stereotypes the frontiers imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles; I have read French criticisms objecting to it on the ground that Article 19 imperils those frontiers by leaving it open to Germany, once she is admitted to the League, to agitate for their revision. One party fears that the Covenant will devour the Treaty; the other that the Treaty will devour the Covenant. According as they lay emphasis on Article 10 or Article 19, there are people who argue that the peace of Europe will never be safe so long as Germany remains outside the League, and other people who contend that the moment she comes within it the peace of Europe, or at any rate its stability, is endangered.

These differences of opinion represent a thesis and antithesis inherent in politics, and we have yet to find our "law of contradiction" for the problem of security. There will always be people, or peoples, who want to maintain the *status quo* in Europe, and there will always

be people who want to change it. The former will seek a solution of the problem as though it were one of statics, the latter as though it were one of dynamics. The moment you substitute law for diplomacy, which, in effect, is what you do when you attempt to reduce international relations to a code like the Covenant or the Protocol, you exchange flexibility for rigidity. And if that code attempts to make provision for every eventuality, it becomes liable to stresses and strains which may end in bringing the whole structure down about our ears. International politics, it is as well to remember, are what Bismarck said they were—a fluid element (*ein flüssiges Element*) which changes its specific gravity with every change in the political temperature.

The whole problem has, however, lately received a new orientation from Berlin. The German Government has made an offer to enter into a "mutual" pact with France and Great Britain to guarantee the western frontier of France and Germany, and to secure the demilitarization of those marches of the Rhineland which have been the field of bloody debate for more than a thousand years. That offer is, it is true, local and particular in its denomination, but it certainly will not be, if accepted, local and particular in its consequences. The mere fact that its negotiation involves, whether as a condition precedent or a condition subsequent, the entry of Germany, with or without reservations (there is no agreement on this point), into the League of Nations, is sufficient for it to raise the problem of security in all its European manifestations.

I will endeavour to present first the arguments, as I conceive them, in favour of entertaining this offer, and then, having made out the best case I can, the arguments against it.

I have lately had a conversation with a friend in a position of high authority on the subject of Mr. Chamberlain's speech in the House of Commons on March 24, regarding the German offer. That offer was, as was only to be expected, scrutinized with considerable distrust by French public opinion, but my friend, who has always shown a very sympathetic understanding of the French point of view, and who has no illusions about the bad

faith of Germany in the past, has addressed to me certain arguments in favour of acceptance of the German offer, which appear to me of such great weight that I feel it my duty to submit them.

His views are as follows: Sections of English public opinion and of the Press have been unwilling—unfortunately, as I think—to subscribe to an exclusive Anglo-Belgian-French pact of guarantee. I think this opinion wrong, but there is no doubt about its existence. On the other hand, a *double* pact by which England guaranteed not only to defend the frontiers of France against a German attack, but also to defend the frontiers of Germany against a French attack would be accepted by English opinion as removing all fears (and such fears, however unreasonable, exist) of our being involved in aggressive action by France. By the conclusion of such a pact we should be undertaking to support Germany in a contingency which would never arise, i.e. an unprovoked French attack, and which, therefore, does not really matter, while at the same time we should have bound ourselves to support France against the real danger, namely, an attack by Germany. The obligation to Germany would be a merely nominal one; the obligation to France would be a very real one, and would give her, masked under another form, all, or nearly all, that she could obtain by an exclusive Anglo-French pact.

If, of course, the price that Germany demanded for such an agreement were the evacuation of the Rhineland, before the periods prescribed by the treaty for the occupation had expired, or before the terms on which that evacuation is dependent had been fulfilled, then the agreement would be, though not perhaps valueless, a very questionable surrender of real guarantees for merely covenanted ones. But there is no intention on the part of our own Government of agreeing to any such conditions as the price of German assent to the proposed pact.

Thus far my friend. He added that in such a pact we should "go bail for the signatories and guarantee the sincerity of German pledges." The liability on all the signatories would, as in the case of the Belgian Neutrality Treaty of 1839, be what lawyers call a joint and several liability. If the pact were violated by Germany, Great

Britain would be bound to act, even as she acted in the case of Belgium, without waiting for some other co-signatory—Italy, for example, assuming she became a party to the pact—to act also. There can be no doubt about that. The distrust of the English nation for written engagements is not because we perform less than we promise, but for exactly the opposite reason: we always consider ourselves morally bound to perform more. We honour our pledges not only in the letter, but in the spirit.

Let me, for a moment, develop these arguments for the proposed pact in the light of Mr. Chamberlain's momentous speech of March 24, in the House of Commons. That speech, although given great prominence in the British and French Press, has not been reported in the newspapers with the textual accuracy which such an important utterance demands, and even the official report was, in its original form, incorrect, and has had to be revised. Moreover, Mr. Chamberlain obviously spoke with great economy of utterance, and from the report of a speech in which there was not one superfluous word not a single word can be spared. Now, this report not only bears out the interpretation of the pact I have given above, but it emphasizes the British interest in the security of France as an interest "which is more direct, more vital, and to which we are more closely pledged by our signed word than to the general obligations common to every signatory of the Covenant and member of the League." The Secretary for Foreign Affairs was referring, I take it, to Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Treaty of Versailles—possibly also, although this is not absolutely clear, to the homage which Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Ramsay Macdonald in successive declarations have paid to the principle of obligation incorporated in those clauses of the Treaty. Mr. Chamberlain made it clear, in his very terse summary of the German proposals, that the proposed pact would recognize those articles of the Treaty—it might even incorporate them. Let me quote his own words: "The pact might further guarantee the fulfilment of the articles." Whether it does so incorporate them or not, they remain "a direct Treaty obligation." What, therefore, the pact would do—

and this is obviously the strongest argument for it—would be to reinforce an obligation under Articles 42–44, which at present we merely share with all the co-signatories of the Treaty, by converting it into an obligation which would be particular to us. This unquestionably would be an improvement on the present position as defined by the Treaty. The terms of Articles 42–44 of the Treaty of Versailles are very vague; they do not define a "violation" of these articles which, it will be remembered, stipulate for the demobilization of the Rhineland and their denunciation of such violation, as "un acte hostile vis-à-vis des puissances signataires du present traité et comme cherchant à troubler la paix du monde," is an academic denunciation—it does not operate to make "un acte hostile" equivalent to a declaration of war. To declare a thing a sin is not to make it a crime, and the sanctions here are wanting. More than that, the liability of Great Britain under Article 44 is, as Lord Curzon pointed out on a certain occasion,* "one that belongs to *all* the signatory powers, and cannot properly be appropriated to two of their number." It is merely a collective liability. The proposed pact would, however, "appropriate" that liability to Great Britain, and France would have secured a pledge of our individual liability, where at present she has nothing better, as far as we are concerned, than a liability which is common to all the rest. That certainly is something. There is an old English proverb which says that "what is everybody's business is nobody's business," and that is how the matter stands under Article 44. But under the proposed pact "everybody's business" will become somebody's business. Our limited liability under Article 44 will become an unlimited liability under the terms of the pact. To use a legal metaphor, instead of being shareholders we shall become partners, we shall have substituted a partnership for a limited liability company.

There are precedents for such a course. In August, 1870, the English Government concluded ancillary treaties

* Note by the Marquess Curzon on the French Memorandum of February 1, 1922. (No. 44, page 158, of British Blue Book, Cmd. 2,169 of 1924.)

for the duration of the Franco-Prussian War, and twelve months thereafter, with France and Prussia, by which these powers individually pledged themselves to respect the neutrality of Belgium. These treaties did not reflect upon the inviolability of the original Treaty of 1839.* Rather they affirmed it; the liability of all the signatory powers under the Treaty of 1839 which some statesmen, quite wrongly, had chosen to regard as a merely collective liability, was affirmed to be what it was, namely, a liability incumbent on all the signatories, but, in particular, upon the three powers who negotiated the new Treaty. No responsible person has ever contended that the obligations contracted by the Treaty of 1870 implied that the obligations under the Treaty of 1839 were thereby put in doubt. And so with the proposed pact; its negotiation would not reflect upon or imperil the validity of Articles 42–44 of the Treaty of Versailles. But, unlike the case of 1870, there would be a real advance. There an individual liability was merely confirmed; here, as I have said, a collective liability will be transformed into an individual one.

Certain French writers have criticized the proposed pact in that it represents, to their mind, an invidious distinction between that part of the Treaty of Versailles which deals with the western frontiers of Germany and that which deals with the eastern. It seems a rather academic point, inasmuch as that distinction is already contained in the Treaty itself. There is nothing relating to the eastern frontier corresponding to Articles 42–44, and yet those articles have never been impugned as imperilling the rest of the Treaty.

So far I have made out the best case I can for the acceptance of the German offer—or rather I should say for its entertainment, because no one yet knows exactly what it amounts to and, so far as I know, it is at present nothing more corporeal than a diplomatic conversation. Let us now examine the case against it.

It is now no secret that, partly as a result of a study of the reports of the Control Commission, official opinion

* August 9, 1870. See Martens' "Nouveau Recueil Général," t. xix, p. 591. For an excellent account of the negotiations see Fitzmaurice's "Life of Lord Granville, II," Ch. II, p. 39, etc.

—by which I do not mean political opinion—in England was, at the beginning of this year, moving rapidly in the direction of an Anglo-French-Belgian pact for the defence of that eastern frontier of France and Belgium which Lord Curzon once described as "in a sense the outer frontier of Great Britain herself." There is reason to suppose that this development was not unknown to the German Government in Berlin. The reaction was immediate. Herr Stresemann approached the British Ambassador in Berlin "under circumstances of attempted secrecy" (I quote Mr. Austen Chamberlain) with an offer of something the exact nature of which is still a matter of speculation, but of which one thing at least is quite certain: if accepted, or even entertained, its acceptance or its entertainment would be fatal to the conception of an exclusively Anglo-French-Belgian pact such as had been, and was at that time, the subject of allied meditation. I do not say that that was the motive, or the only motive, which inspired the German offer, but the time and circumstance of its inception are such as to entitle us to scrutinize that offer very closely. A favourable impression of it is not assisted by the recent comment of a German newspaper, claiming to speak semi-officially, the "Hamburger Fremdenblatt," which has informed its readers that the object of the German Government's intervention was to nip in the bud the prospects of the new Anglo-French pact, adding, with illuminating complacency, "*We have been successful; the entente of* 1914 *has been buried in* 1925." A few weeks earlier another German newspaper, the "Germania," which speaks for the party of Herr Marx, had adumbrated another kind of pact, namely, a pact between France and Germany, to be directly concluded without the mediation of Great Britain. Thus both before the actual offer materialized, and after it had been made public, we have had two German comments, each emanating from sources in close touch with the German Government (and in no country are the relations between the Government and the Press so close as in Germany), and each pointing to the same conclusion, namely, that the inducement offered to the German public to support these negotiations was that they would drive a wedge between the two allies, France

and Great Britain. If that be the inducement offered to the German public to accept it, may it not be the motive in the minds of those German politicians who inspired it?

To those who, like myself, have had intimate experience in dealing with the German Government in the execution of the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, there is no getting away from the fact that the German Government have not hitherto given us any reason to trust them. Scarcely one of the clauses relating to effectives has been carried out; they are, in fact, a dead letter. The new German army estimates themselves tell their own tale, and an unmistakable tale it is, for those who have the technical equipment to understand them. The prohibition of the import and export of arms and munitions—and of what use is it to dismantle the plant in German armament factories if German ports remain an open door for the admission of armaments?—has never been observed, and with singular effrontery a German court has recently declared this clause of the treaty to be inoperative in German law.

I have no desire to sow distrust at such a moment as this, nor to imperil such chances as there may be of a happy solution, but I have a reason for emphasis, in the present connection, on this question of German disarmament. My justification is to be found in the German Chancellor's speech of April 29 when, speaking of the German offer, he laid repeated emphasis on what he called "the present disarmed state of Germany." We have encountered those words before and a little too often. They were also contained in the German letter to the secretariat of the League of Nations in which Germany sought to impose conditions on her admission to the League. And I say at once that if Germany is going to *insinuate* into these negotiations for a mutual pact, an admission on the part of the allies that she has fulfilled her obligations towards the Control Commission, then the sooner these negotiations are dropped the better, for we may find we have walked into a trap. Once admit that Germany is disarmed and the allies will have to evacuate Cologne. If that is the real meaning of the German offer of a pact, if an offer to sign one with us is

conditioned by the requirement, or the expectation, or the assumption of an admission on our part that she has discharged her pre-existing obligations under the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles—well, all I can say of such diplomacy is that it seems perilously like a debtor saying to his creditor, who holds valuable securities belonging to the debtor as a pledge for the discharge of an unredeemed promissory note: "Give me back my securities and I will sign another I.O.U."

In the same speech the German Chancellor goes on to complain that the Allied Governments have not supplied the German Government with "a reasoned explanation" of why and how Germany is in default in the matter of disarmament. To those of us who know the facts the German Chancellor's language is extraordinarily, indeed provocatively, disingenuous. If he really wants to know in what respect the German military authorities have defaulted in the general inspection, he need not ask the Allied Governments; he has only to ask General von Seeckt. One would think from the tenor of his complaints that he and General von Seeckt were not on speaking terms! He has only to ask General von Seeckt what orders were issued to withhold vital documents from our control officers, and where they could not be withheld, to fabricate them. If the public knew how control operations are actually conducted, they would realize that the German Government knows perfectly well how, why, and where it is in default. Hundreds of letters have been addressed to the German authorities by General Nollet and by his successor, General Walch, pointing out these defaults. They have not been published to the world, but they have been circulated to the German Government. They were nearly all of them requests for vital information, and that information has been refused. And having consistently refused information, the German Government are now demanding it. Their attitude in this matter of German disarmament is not "What can we tell you?" but "How much do you know?"

Let us, however, suppose, if such a supposition be possible, that this "mutual" pact is to be concluded without any assumptions or conditions as to whether the

German Government has fulfilled its obligations in the matter of disarmament. Two most formidable objections at once occur to me. The first is based on the history of the negotiations between the British and French Governments in January, 1922, as to the drafting of an Anglo-French security pact. Those negotiations broke down, among other reasons, because of the difficulty of defining "an act of aggression." The British Government wished to confine the definition to actual incursion on the soil of France. The French Government pointed out with unanswerable force that the act of incursion was not the beginning of aggression but the end of it or rather the end of a long chain of incidents: mobilization, concentration, advance of troops and so on, and that unless the pact provided for nipping such military preparations in the bud before their full efflorescence on French soil, the military assistance promised under the pact would come too late. Even a new military credit in the German Budget might constitute the seed of aggression. All that the British Government could suggest in reply was that such inchoate acts, such "menaces," should be treated as an occasion for "concert" between the two governments. Now apply those difficulties to a pact which is to include not only France and Great Britain but Germany as well and consider what would happen. Just as France could have claimed under an Anglo-French pact that any concentration of German troops in the neighbourhood of the neutral zone, any departure violating the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, might constitute a "menace of aggression," so also Germany would be able to claim, under an Anglo-Franco-German pact, that any concentration of French troops *on French soil*, any acts tending towards mobilization, any strengthening of the French frontier, possibly even any new credits in the French Budget, were a "menace" of aggression against the Rhineland. Such acts on the part of the French military authorities need not, in fact, have any such objective, none the less they would be a legitimate object, under such a pact, for representations by the German Government with a view to "concert" with the British Government. What would be the result? Every single departure in French military policy would be brought into debate.

By an international instrument the German Government, as the mouthpiece of the great General Staff (and, believe me, it still exists), would have acquired a *locus standi* in such matters. For such a pact must *ex hypothesi* assume an equality in these matters between the French and German parties to it. If under such an agreement Germany is not allowed to raise issues of "menace" to the Rhineland, France will not be able to raise them either; and what then? If there was to be, as there was bound to be if it was to be of any use, "concert" between the French and British Governments under an Anglo-French pact as to German military developments, there will have to be provision for "concert" between the British and German Governments as to French military developments. I do not envy the British Foreign Secretary, who in such a case will have to play the part of "honest broker." Thus this "mutual" pact, if it is to have any military meaning and if it is to satisfy the German authorities, may resolve itself in practice into a *servitude* imposed on the French Ministry of War in regards to mobilization not dissimilar to that imposed on the German Ministry of War by Article 178 of the Treaty of Versailles.

On the other hand, what about Poland? If she is excluded from the proposed pact, Germany might, without violating the pact in any respect, concentrate troops on her eastern frontier, and she would do it with impunity, for there would be no "menace" within the meaning of such a pact. But if France, on the other hand, concentrated troops on the German western frontier, as the result of such a situation, the action of France might be held to be a menace to the Rhineland. In other words, she would be completely immobilized, while Poland was left to her fate.

I confess that it is considerations of this kind which leave me wondering whether the object of the German offer is not to secure France, but to paralyse her. The truth is, that the question of the western frontier of Germany cannot thus be isolated diplomatically. The moment you attempt to do so you get into an utterly unreal atmosphere.

And then what of concert of staffs? If you really want to *secure* what some people call the "neutralization" of the Rhineland you must be ready with measures against

its violation. Such was the entente of British and French staffs in regard to Belgium from 1906 to 1914; such was the entente proposed, and in part accepted, in the draft Anglo-French Pact of 1922. As we now know from the recently published French official war history ("Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre"), even that entente very nearly failed to achieve its ultimate object, militarily speaking, owing to a disagreement about the concentration area at the eleventh hour. To be effective, such an entente has to achieve agreement on everything beforehand—transport, supplies, area of concentration, formations, and all the rest of it. But in the proposed "mutual" pact there can be no such provision for an entente of staffs, for the two conditions envisaged by it—a French attack and a German attack—cancel one another and reduce the pact to a paralysing rigidity so far as any military measures for its enforcement are concerned. At any rate my own mind cannot envisage the British General Staff consulting in secret (and to be of any value such consultations must be secret) with the German authorities to concert military measures in the event of French aggression in the Rhineland, and consulting, also in secret, with the French General Staff how to take measures against German aggression. In other words, there will be no military entente on either side, and by the time Germany has committed her act of aggression it will be too late to improvise one. What is the good of shutting one's eyes to facts? The real danger, as everyone knows, is not that the French army will invade the Rhineland, but that a German army will invade France across it. That is the contingency envisaged by the Treaty of Versailles. But the proposed pact treats such a contingency as no more likely than its converse, with the result that it is wholly unrelated to the actual state of things. The truth is that the demilitarization of the Rhineland would be in no way secured against German aggression under such a pact, for there would be no concert of any *military* measures to counter it. You would have another diplomatic instrument dependent like the Belgian Treaty on the good faith of Germany and that is all.

The second of my two objections is this: The proposed pact has been explained and defended as a kind of

"neutralization" of the Rhineland. An English newspaper of high standing, "The Daily Telegraph," has instituted this analogy; others have followed suit. The treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium is cited as a precedent. It is rather an ominous precedent. Still, let us use it for the purposes of comparison, and we shall see what a singularly one-sided kind of "neutralization" the Rhineland will present. No territory can be really neutralized, by which I mean neutralized with any prospect of its neutralization being respected, unless it is independent. The inhabitants of such a territory have not only the right, but the duty, as Belgium had the right and the duty, to resist any violation of their territory by any Power whatsoever. Unless the duty is performed without distinction, the neutralized territory has failed in its obligations to the rest of the parties, other than the aggressor, who have guaranteed her neutrality. That is the rule in International Law. But how are the inhabitants of the Rhineland going to assist the guarantors of its so-called "neutralization" in maintaining it? How, indeed, can they? They are German subjects. They may even, owing to a regrettable attenuation of the draft terms of the Treaty of Versailles, be, and unquestionably often are, German recruits. If Germany proposed to violate the "neutralization" of this territory they would be called upon to assist the German military authorities in the act of violation, and they would be liable to heavy penalties, under the German *droit de siège* (Belagerungzustand) and innumerable other German laws, if they refuse. If, on the other hand, they were to assist, as the Belgians assisted, the rest of the guarantor powers in defending the territory against the German military authorities, they would incur all the pains and penalties of high treason —of *Landesverrat*. Under these circumstances the less said about "neutralization" in connection with the proposed pact the better. You will never secure the demilitarization of the Rhineland by the use, or rather the misuse, of words. If the original French proposals for the transformation of the Rhineland into an independent state had been adopted (and I sometimes regret that they were not), we might talk of the neutralization of the Rhineland. But it is too late. The use, however, of the

word "neutralization" in connection with the proposed pact has one advantage; an examination of its use will serve to bring out the fact, which otherwise remains obscure, that, in any pact for the *defence* of the demilitarization of the Rhineland to which Germany is admitted as a party, the party who is most likely to violate it will have all the cards in his hands. And long before any British Expeditionary Force had set foot on French soil, the German troops would not only have penetrated the demilitarized territory, requisitioning, billeting, completing their "economic mobilization" with all the authority of German law, but would have crossed the frontier. The railways, *ex-hypothesi*, would be in their hands at the outset, and the whole of the railway personnel in the Rhineland mobilized, like the *Bahnschutz* in the rest of Germany, within twenty-four hours. Time, the greatest of all factors in a successful offensive, would be on their side.

One other point. Are we quite sure that the neutral zone as distinct from the Rhineland, i.e. the strip of territory running parallel to the Rhine and extending 50 kilometres to the east of it, is really demilitarized even now? I am thinking of the so-called "Security Police," who in reality are not police at all, but second-line troops. Their "demilitarization" is one of the points on which the German Government have never complied with the demands of the Allies and, I am afraid, never will. They are recruited at the same age as recruits for the army, and in pay, pensions, grades, and promotion, are identical with it, so much so that not only does service in the army count as service in the "Police," but, what is far more significant, service in the "Police" counts as service in the army. They take part in army manœuvres, and receive tactical training with the Reichsheer. Well, this militarized police is to be found everywhere in the "demilitarized" neutral zone, often occupying the old army garrisons, and distributed not so much with reference to the preservation of the peace and good order of the population as to the strategic advantages of the places which they garrison. They would serve as an admirable screen for the Reichsheer units, in the event of mobilization, as *troupes de couverture;* they would serve equally admirably to fill

up its cadres. The German military authorities have never lost sight of that contingency. The ink was hardly dry on the Treaty of Versailles when they approached our Commission in March, 1920, with the demand that they should be allowed to retain troops permanently in the neutral zone, and to move reinforcements into the territory at their own discretion whenever they might choose to regard it as "disturbed." Then, when refused this demand, they fell back upon a proposal that they should be allowed to maintain in that territory a force of "Police" of a strength of nearly two divisions, armed with machine-guns, military aeroplanes, and howitzers. It seems a curious conception of what is meant by a demilitarized zone. But it is a thoroughly German one, and I doubt if, once the Allies have evacuated the Rhineland, they will persuade the German military authorities to entertain any other. Indeed, by the careful exploitation of civil "disturbances" in the neutral zone, as carefully provoked by *agents provocateurs*, we may find, as our Commission found in April, 1920, the neutral zone "violated" by the incursion of German soldiers at any moment on the pretext of the maintenance of internal order. If our Commission, sitting in Berlin, could not prevent that breach of the Treaty, is there any likelihood that the signatories to the proposed pact will be able to prevent it? In any case it is no good talking about a mutual pact until the question of police has been settled with the German Government.

There is one very curious fact regarding the cession of territory—of Alsace and Lorraine—under the Treaty of Versailles. Under the proposed pact Germany will do voluntarily what hitherto—so runs the argument—she has done under compulsion, namely, acquiesce in the cession of those territories. Now it is not generally known that from the point of view of army organization the ceded territories still exist in the fertile brain of that modern Scharnhorst, General von Seeckt. He has, as is now fairly well known, in organizing the Treaty army, whose nominal strength is limited to 100,000 effectives, sought with great ingenuity to preserve the framework of the old army, whose peace strength was some 850,000 effectives, by giving each company, squadron, and battery

the number and "traditions" of one of the old regiments. In other words, each infantry company is a kind of nuclear cell for expansion into a regiment. This is by no means the only fact which convinces one that this singularly hydrocephalous army, with some twenty-two camouflaged generals in the Reichswehrministerium alone, is designed for expansion to the stature of the old army. But it is not these facts on which I am concerned to dwell in this article. My point is this: the old German army consisted of twenty-four army corps, exclusive of the Guards corps, and they were territorially distributed and territorially recruited in twenty-four army corps districts. Four of these corps districts, numbers V, XV, XVI, and XXI, have disappeared off the German map by the cession of the corresponding territories—Posen, Alsace, Western Lorraine, and Eastern Lorraine. Yet in the new army we discovered long ago that nearly all the higher units constituting each of these four corps have been carefully preserved in the lower units of the new army. Divisions and brigades of the old army corps of Prussian Poland have been identified *in cadre* in the regiments and battalions of the new German army, and, what is even more significant, their garrisons are distributed along the Polish frontier in Silesia and East Prussia. The same holds good of the West except that the garrisons are, necessarily, just outside the neutral zone. None the less they project an ominous shadow far westward, across the Rhine, across the new frontier, until that shadow falls upon Alsace and Lorraine. What inference can be drawn therefrom except that, in the mind of the Reichswehrministerium, the true frontier of Germany, the frontier to be recovered *vi et armis* at some future date, is the frontier which terminates only with the western boundaries of Alsace and Lorraine?

Now suppose Germany signs such a pact as that proposed and renounces once again these ceded territories. What guarantees are there that she will not reconstitute, that she has not reconstituted, the units formerly garrisoning the Rhineland itself with Rhenish recruits stationed just outside Rhenish territory? The only possible guarantee is the fulfilment of what she has not yet fulfilled, namely, the military clauses of the

Treaty of Versailles, and the abolition of the whole of the *cadre* system upon which this reconstitution of units, representing the garrisons of ceded and "demilitarized" territories is based, a cadre system the outlines of which are stamped upon the German army estimates. So that in all discussions of this pact, if it is discussed intelligently, one always comes back to the disarmament of Germany. Until Germany has complied with the demands of the allied Governments in the matter of "disarmament," the pact is, to my mind, a wholly speculative undertaking.

But, judging by his recent utterance, that is just what Herr Luther does not want to do. "The security question," he urges in his speech of April 29, "is too difficult a problem to allow of its being *burdened* with the introduction of other problems which either have no connection with it, or are best dealt with separately." In other words, this pact is to be considered and concluded without any reference to such "burdensome" questions as the Security Police. In this rarefied atmosphere a pact for the demilitarization of the Rhineland and the neutral zone is to be discussed without a word about the militarized police, whose presence in the neutral zone is a violation of Articles 42 and 43, both in the letter and the spirit. Such an abstraction of this and all the other military issues which I have already described will make the pact utterly unreal. With what mental reservations the German authorities would enter on negotiations of a question thus artificially isolated I do not know, but I can guess, and I think they will be many. Herr Luther's speech is a curiously ambiguous utterance in that, while it excludes the discussion of German defaults in disarmament from the negotiation of the proposed pact, it is, none the less, accompanied by the assumption that the pact is necessary to Germany's "security" in virtue of her being totally "disarmed." Am I very suspicious if I confess that I think that, the moment this pact is concluded, the German Government will turn round and say that the twin issues of disarmament and the evacuation of Cologne, which have been excluded from the negotiations, are now solved, and that Germany, having pledged her word to the pact, shall be regarded as in a complete "state of grace," and

no longer a menace to France. To put it paradoxically, it is when this pact is concluded that my anxieties will begin. Germany may be too astute to press the point that she is disarmed before the conclusion of the pact, but will she not press it for all she is worth afterwards? If she makes so much of her "total disarmament" now, how much more will she make of it then? The hypnotic effect of such a pact will be great, the mere offer of it has hypnotized many people in England. And that is why I say that you should make her disarmament a condition of such a pact, and not merely what lawyers call a condition subsequent, or even a condition collateral, but a condition precedent. In short, "No Disarmament, no Pact." It is the only safe way.

I speak without asperity and I feel none. After all you are entitled, nay, you are bound, when confronted with an offer of this kind, to make close enquiries into the political antecedents of those who make it. It is usual when you enter into a business negotiation to satisfy yourself as to the credit of the party who comes to you with nothing but his word to pledge. In this case there is a banker's reference—the source of inspiration of the German offer is known to some of us—but when the promissory note deals not with financial security but with military security, one wants to see the bill backed by General von Seeckt. One wants to be quite sure that the "Deutsche Volkspartei," in regard to whom Herr Stresemann is merely an agent, not a principal, are prepared to endorse it. In the forefront of their official programme, dated October 19, 1919, they proclaim as the "presupposition" ("Voraussetzung") of their political existence "the abolition of the Peace of Violence" (die "Aufhebung des Gewaltfriedens"), the "Peace of Violence" being their stock term for the Treaty of Versailles. Is the German offer a step towards the erasure of that "presupposition," or a step towards its fulfilment? Only yesterday Herr Stresemann was making an official move to obtain from the League of Nations a repudiation, in Germany's favour, of "war guilt." To-morrow, whether by "mandate" or otherwise, it may be the restoration of the German colonies. At this very moment a committee "for the German

colonies" has been formed in the Reichstag—those lost colonies which seem to be the object of the same solicitude as the lost Army Corps districts. In other words, is the German offer yet another move in that world-wide propaganda of insinuation, suggestion, reconnaissance, which is one of the most remarkable features of the German recovery?

There is certainly a marked subtlety of appeal in nearly every German utterance on the subject of the proposed pact. I refer to the repeated pleadings of German statesmen that Germany has as much need of "security" against France as France has against Germany. This kind of special pleading is subtle in two respects: firstly, it serves to produce a false perspective and to distort the real question at issue. That question is how to give effect to Articles 42–44 of the Treaty of Versailles. The object of those articles was not to give security to the aggressor, in other words, to Germany, but to her victim, namely, to France. But the German argument aims at creating a sort of atmospheric impression that the justification for those articles, and with it their objective, has wholly disappeared. It is all the more subtle in that it is calculated to appeal to all those people in this country who are infected with the strange belief that France is a danger to the peace of Europe and animated by the spirit of militarism.* Their only ground for this opinion is the fact that France has concluded a number of military alliances or developed a number of military *ententes* with the Succession States. If they knew as much as I do about the inner history of German disarmament during the last five years they would realize that those alliances and understandings are the effect, not the cause, of German contumacy. The moment the German Government—and the remarkable thing is, that it was then a Socialist, not a Nationalist, Government—presented a certain Note (it has never been published), dated April 24, 1920, to the Control Commission in Berlin, France had warning that the German authorities never intended to

* Since the above words were written the British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Crewe, has publicly stigmatized, in proper terms, this absurd belief as "one of those flagrant pieces of stupidity (*sottises*) which it is very difficult to forgive."

execute the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. That Note was an act of open defiance: it repudiated the right, the chartered right under the Treaty of Versailles, of the Allied Governments to impose any limit on armament manufacture in Germany and, with truly astonishing effrontery, it claimed to preserve intact all the great armament factories in Germany, "in order to promote a healthy competition" (*einen gesunden Wettbewerb herbeizuführen*) in armament production. It was the beginning of a policy of obstruction, aimed at wearing down the commission, which has never ceased. It took our commission seventeen months to secure the destruction of the vast parks of heavy artillery, nearly two years to obtain the dissolution of the Einwohnerwehren and the Free Corps, sixteen months to get the Germans to accept the principle (it is not the same thing as securing its execution) of limitation of armament output, three years and more (it is not done yet) to enforce the transformation of Krupp's. And all these things should, under the terms of the treaty, have been effected in six months from the date of ratification. It was under these circumstances that France, realizing their menacing implication, turned to the Succession States in an attempt to secure what the execution, or rather the non-execution, of the military clauses of the treaty had failed to give her. What else could she do? The Allied Guarantee, owing to the defection of America, had failed her, and with that failure the Treaty of Versailles had become a broken reed.

That brings me to the question of Cologne. One cannot ignore it in any talk of a "mutual" pact, and one may be sure that it is never absent from the minds of those German statesmen who are now dangling this pact before our eyes. It crept into the utterance of the German Chancellor to which I have already alluded, and it appears and reappears as a kind of innuendo in all German utterances on the proposed pact. I will not discuss here the question whether the evacuation of Cologne depends merely on the fulfilment, to the satisfaction of the Allies, of the military clauses of the Treaty, or whether it depends on the ulterior question of security for France. I will only say this: that while I think the

British argument on this point is the better in law, the French argument is the better in morality. There is little or nothing in the Treaty which supports the French view that the evacuation of Cologne is dependent upon securing France against all eventualities, but there is everything to support it in the inter-Allied negotiations upon which that treaty is based. In memorandum after memorandum, debate after debate, the argument used in 1919 by the British and American representatives and their understudies, was that in return for French acquiescence in a limitation of the term of occupation the Allied and Associated Governments, Great Britain and America, would guarantee her security.* And the price for France's acquiescence has never been paid.

I have already referred to the disingenuousness of Herr Luther's complaints that the Allied Governments have not acquainted him with the character and measures of those defaults in the matter of disarmament on which our continued occupation of Cologne is based. They were formulated in greater detail in an allocution of his on January 31, addressed to the foreign journalists in Berlin, wherein he hinted that the Allied Governments had been guilty of a breach of faith in not evacuating Cologne on January 10, and declared that the improved relations cultivated at the London Conference had received "a rude shock." "We have," he declared, "been deceived in our hopes." Unfortunately, this plaintive cry has been re-echoed in England, and a distinguished British general, a friend of mine, for whom I have nothing but respect, has charged our own Government with "a flagrant breach of faith." Let us consider the facts, not all of which are known to the world. The evacuation of Cologne is at least dependent—even Herr Stresemann admitted as much in the German note of January 27 last—on the fulfilment of the military clauses of the Treaty as evidenced by the results of the recent "General Inspection." One would have thought that, that being so, the German authorities would have done everything in their power not only to facilitate that inspection, but to accelerate it. Well, here are the facts.

* See, for example, pages 59, 69, 82, 104 of the British Blue Book. Cmd. 2,109 of 1924.

The inspection was proposed by the Allied Governments on March 5, 1924. The German Government kept us waiting four months, namely, till June 30, before they would even agree to it in principle, although the Allied Governments were asking for nothing but their rights under the Treaty. Having at last been compelled to admit the inspection, the German Government began on July 17 laying down conditions, conditions every one of which was calculated to defeat the efficacy of the inspection, and some of which they had in the earlier days of control been compelled to renounce altogether. These obstructive tactics were pursued for another two months, with the result that the inspection could not commence till September 8. Inspection had no sooner commenced than it became evident that the German military authorities had been charged to defeat it by every possible device that the ingenuity of General von Seeckt could invent. This obstruction continued till October 25, when the German authorities at last agreed *in principle* to issue orders to their subordinates that the obstruction should cease. It never ceased. During the whole of November it continued. On December 9 it was at its height, and control officers in the districts were contemptuously refused by German commanding officers the documents for which they asked. I could give scores of examples, but I forbear.* Protests were made again and again by the President of the Control Commission; they were of no avail, and the controversy ended in General von Pawelsz refusing to answer at all. Meanwhile time was running on, and the Treaty date for the evacuation of Cologne was fast approaching. It is under circumstances such as these that Herr Luther complains that the Germans were "deceived in their hopes." We can see now what those hopes were. The rôles were to be reversed. The Allied Governments were to be held rigidly to the promise, contained in the treaty, of the evacuation of Cologne and the German Government were to be absolved from the condition on which that promise was based. The Treaty was to be binding on those who imposed it,

* It is sufficient to refer English readers to an article, obviously well-informed, in "The Times," of November 14, 1924, entitled "The Disarming of Germany: Passive Opposition."

but not upon those on whom it was imposed. Instead of their having to satisfy us as to the state of German disarmament, it is we whom they call upon to satisfy them.

Cologne is the key of the fortress of "Security." Surrender it and, as Marshal Foch lately remarked to me, the Allied defensive front is "broken" (*rompu*). The occupation of Cologne is only less vital to the defence of France and of England, as things now are, against a German offensive than Mainz itself, and I sometimes wonder whether those newspapers who clamoured for the gratuitous surrender on January 10 of this pledge in our hands have ever stopped to consider what the strategical position of the armies of occupation would be when we had surrendered it. Instead of having their flank protected by the Dutch frontier and their front by the line of the lower Rhine, they would find themselves with the Dutch frontier at their back and their left flank exposed to the attack of German forces astride the river. Their present railway communications through Aix-la-Chapelle would be almost useless, and they would find what is now their left flank folded back on their centre in a narrow zone in which, owing to the character of the terrain and the direction of the communications, all the advantages, strategically speaking, would be in the hands of a German force advancing from the north. And in surrendering Cologne we surrender the nerve-centre of the whole railway system of Northern and Central Germany from the point of view of mobilization for an attack in the West. Not only that, but we lose all control over Germany's great industrial arsenal—the gun-shops of the Ruhr.

Read the military correspondence of von Moltke during the years 1857–1870 : all that he says of the strategic importance of the Rhine in case of a German offensive is as true now as it was then. All that he wrote in October, 1858, as to the capital necessity of the occupation of Cologne to the maintenance of any forces of occupation on the left bank of the Rhine has lost none of its force. There is no need to labour this point in France. It is only in England that it is not understood. It has been the subject of masterly exposition in the three notes of Marshal Foch dated January 10, March 31, and May 6,

1919,* and in the memorandum of the French Government of February 25, 1919, which bears traces of the same indisputable authority.† They are, to my mind, four of the most powerful State papers ever written, and in their piercing clairvoyance, in their impressive forecast of German obstruction to "control," in their exact estimate of the temper we were destined to encounter beyond the Rhine, in their appraisement of what was transient and what was permanent in the situation, they will stand as monuments of human wisdom and human foresight.

It is for the reader to consider, in the light of all this, whether the German offer is calculated to "underpin" the foundations of the Treaty of Versailles or to sap and mine it. I leave it to his own judgment. I neither pronounce for this offer nor against it. I would only say, in the words of Montesquieu, *il s'agit de faire penser*.

* Published in THE ENGLISH REVIEW, August and September, 1924, and reprinted in "Security," ENGLISH REVIEW, 4 Dean's Yard, Westminster, S.W. 1s. 2d. post free.

† British Blue Book. Cmd. 2169 of 1924; Nos. 9 (page 10) and 10 (page 25).

The Demilitarization of the Rhineland

By Brig.-General E. L. Spears, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.

Most thinking people who realize the undoubted fact that to-day more than ever the interests of this country are inextricably bound up in the affairs of Europe will agree that it is of the first importance that we should possess a clearly defined European policy.

It is true that there is a certain school of thought which maintains that as we are but one member of the great commonwealth of free peoples which is the British Empire, it is our duty to turn our backs on Europe as far as may be, and to co-operate with the Dominions in the refusal to accept commitments in Europe, which is at present undoubtedly their strong tendency.

But there is an obvious fallacy in this line of argument. First of all, the Dominions themselves, by their signature of the Treaty of Versailles, and by their membership of the League of Nations, have accepted commitments in Europe of a very extensive kind. They, no more than we, can keep aloof. Secondly, if war broke out, as it almost certainly will if by withdrawing ourselves we take away the historical counterpoise of power, and we became eventually involved in it, which, again, would almost certainly happen, the Dominions, whether they decided to come in with us or not, would be bound to suffer to a greater or less extent.

It must therefore be the duty of Great Britain, the European outpost of the Empire, to do everything possible to ensure the maintenance of peace, to accept the necessary commitments which will make for peace, and to try to convince the Dominions of the wisdom of such a policy from their point of view as well as ours.

Some people urge that it is even more important that we should first of all decide upon our Pacific policy than that we should decide upon our European policy, because in the Pacific lies a more urgent peril. But until

we have arrived at some sort of general settlement of the European problem, of what use would a Pacific policy be, since we should only meet in those distant waters the very problems we have shirked in Europe—the problem of our attitude towards Germany, which, if she feels an arrangement acceptable to herself impossible, may well, although she is not at present inclined that way, decide to come to an arrangement with Russia and, therefore, Japan; the problem of our policy towards France, who, on account of Indo-China, must keep a watchful eye on Japan.

Moreover, if war involving any of the important European nations broke out, the stability of our Pacific policy would be destroyed in twenty-four hours.

From every point of view, therefore, it is essential to determine what, in the interests of the British Empire, our foreign policy should be, and, having decided that, to try to persuade the Dominions to co-operate with us in carrying it out.

Whether we like it or not we are bound to be closely and vitally affected by the European situation. But more than that, any serious danger of war in Western Europe is a threat to our very existence as a nation. Readers of the ENGLISH REVIEW are familiar with what is now accepted as an axiom, that under modern conditions our military frontier is the Rhine; a hostile army able to use the river as a jumping-off ground would be in a position to invade North-western Europe, seize the Channel ports, and starve us out in a few weeks, for an enemy in possession of those ports, and able to use them as submarine bases, could make the supplying of London and the south-eastern counties an impossibility.

In our own vital interests, therefore, we have to decide what our European policy should be, and what commitments we must undertake to enforce peace.

Any policy that is decided upon *must* have for its object the maintenance and enforcement of peace: if there is one thing that it is safe to say that the nation is determined upon, it is not to be involved in another war, and it will look to its political leaders to pursue a policy which has as its object first and foremost the preservation of peace.

But if we want peace we must be prepared to pay for it.

It is quite certain that there can be no European settlement without our participation: in fact, it is more than probable that without us a situation would very soon arise which would involve war, and such participation involves the acceptance by ourselves of certain commitments, which must be definite, or they would be valueless, and which must be limited, or they will be inacceptable to the peoples of the Empire. It was the indefinite and vague nature of the commitments involved which was rightly responsible for the rejection by the British Empire both of the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and of the Protocol. And it is generally accepted now that had Germany known that we should stand by France in 1914 she might have acted very differently. Do not let us again make the mistake of not stating clearly exactly what action we should take under given circumstances. We must lay down beyond all possibility of misunderstanding what our policy is, and what action if any, that policy will involve should crises arise.

What, then, is the situation with which we have got to deal? What is it that makes our intervention necessary?

The answer is known to everybody. It is that Europe, far from having, seven years after the armistice, recovered its normal equilibrium, is to-day more panic-stricken and unstable than it ever was in the years which led up to the war, and that the atmosphere of hostility and mutual distrust has not even begun to be dissipated; and the reason is that Europe is afraid. Like a shellshock patient, it is unable to believe that the cause of its terror is no longer active. And while this terror and distrust last there is no hope of permanent peace, no hope of any measure of disarmament.

There is only one remedy for this state of things, and the need for that remedy is what has become commonly known as the problem of security.

If the nations can be made to feel safe against aggression by their neighbours they will in time settle down to a normal outlook and a normal mentality, and we may eventually hope that this return to normality will synchronize with a reduction in the crushing financial

burden which is involved, especially in France, by armaments on the present scale.

This problem of security has come to mean particularly the problem of French security, for if once France feels safe and feels justified in acting accordingly, nine-tenths of the European problem will be soluble or already solved.

The question of our European policy, therefore, resolves itself largely into the question of our attitude towards this problem of French security. If our intervention can solve that we shall have gone a long way towards achieving the object we have set ourselves.

What is the explanation of French fears, and why is it these are such an all-important factor in the situation?

France is afraid, justifiably afraid, because, having been invaded twice within living memory, having only emerged victorious from the Great War by the help of her Allies, herself bled white of men and treasure by the long struggle to keep the enemy at bay until those Allies could come to her aid in sufficient numbers, she finds herself, with a diminishing population of less than forty millions, face to face with a German Empire which now totals some sixty-five millions, whose numbers are increasing by leaps and bounds; she has lost her great ally Russia, and she has no assurance that either Great Britain or America will, or, indeed, could, if they would, come to her aid in time were she again attacked, and she cannot believe that in the future she will not be again attacked.

She *cannot* trust Germany. Why, indeed, should she? What wonder, then, that she is afraid?

It was this fear which caused Marshal Foch in 1919 to demand that the Rhine bridgeheads should be permanently occupied by international or allied forces, and it was because neither the English nor the American delegates at the Peace Conference would consent to this demand that France accepted, instead, their offer of a military pact of guarantee by England and America.

Everyone knows how this pact lapsed owing to the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify it, and how France has been striving ever since, without being able to convince herself that she was succeeding, to find

some substitute, by the maintenance of a huge army, by forming alliances with the small succession states, by financing them and identifying her policy with theirs, for the loss of this Anglo-American guarantee.

It was because Great Britain felt in honour bound to do something to compensate France for this loss that she offered her the Pact put forward at the Cannes Conference by Mr. Lloyd George, the preamble of which states that guarantees of the security of France are indispensable to the safety of Great Britain and the peace of the world, but this Pact was not acceptable to M. Poincaré.

In offering it we discharged the obligation which we felt we were under, but as it is very much in our interests, if we want peace in Europe, to give France security, this fact does not mean that it is not essential that we should find some formula which will meet French fears. What shape, then, should this formula take?

Two things we cannot do; we cannot accept unlimited and undefined commitments, and we cannot guarantee in any way Germany's eastern neighbours, France's allies, the Poles and the Czechs. It has already been shown how closely French policy has been identified with theirs, and the reason for this, but it is to be hoped that, if France can herself be given security, she will be willing to co-operate with us in tackling the problem of Eastern Europe and bringing that to a peaceful solution also: but it is quite certain that we cannot hope to achieve this until French fears are allayed.

What we can do, and what it is very much to our advantage to do, is to guarantee, under conditions which will be discussed in a moment, that France shall be made safe from invasion by Germany on their common frontier, and that the strategic possibilities of the Rhine shall not again be available as the jumping-off ground of an aggressor.

After all, not only is the question of the Rhine, as has been already pointed out, of vital importance to Great Britain from a military point of view, but it is the point, almost to the exclusion of all others, on which French fears are centred. Marshal Foch, whose opinion as a military expert can on that point be second to

none, has declared that if it were made impossible for Germany to use the Rhine bridgeheads as a springboard from which to attack France, he would be satisfied that she had been made as safe as she could hope to be, but if that assurance were lacking there was no equivalent security.

But Marshal Foch's own proposals were turned down by public opinion both in America and England in 1919. Can the desired result be achieved without the same objections as destroyed Marshal Foch's plan holding good ?

It is the object of this paper to show that it can, but only if any scheme put forward is freely accepted by Germany, for if it were not freely accepted it would lead, not to peace, but to future war. To be freely accepted, two conditions are necessary.

Firstly, German sovereignty within her own territory must not be interfered with, and, secondly, if Germany is asked to consent to anything except what she has accepted under the Treaty of Versailles she must be given equivalent compensation, for she is under no obligation to accept anything which goes beyond the Treaty.

There is a very important section of opinion in Germany which is prepared to go a long way to meet the French demand for security, for it is realized that it is very much to Germany's advantage that France should feel secure, and this factor gives something to build upon, so that the problem, viewed in this light, would appear to be by no means insoluble.

The existence of the League of Nations has given us an instrument by means of which all the essential conditions can be met.

The proposal which is advocated here is one which has steadily gained ground in French, German, and British circles, since it was first put forward in the beginning of 1922.

Briefly, it is that under the ægis of the League of Nations the demilitarization clauses applied to the Rhineland by the Treaty of Versailles, should be so adapted and extended as to make of this area a really effective barrier to any armed force.

THE DEMILITARIZATION OF THE RHINELAND

Articles 42–44 of the Treaty of Versailles, which establish the demilitarized Rhineland zone, read as follows:

Article 42.—Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

Article 43.—In the area defined above the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manœuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization, are in the same way forbidden.

Article 44.—In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the Powers signatory of the present Treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world.

It is not necessary to discuss at length why these articles are not accepted by France as giving her security; suffice it to quote again the high authority of Marshal Foch, who has stated that from a military point of view this section of the Treaty "represents guarantees which I consider to be equal to precisely nothing," and to point out that there is no provision for supervision to see that the clauses are carried out, and nothing in them to prevent Germany, were she so minded, from braving the penalties involved, invading the demilitarized territory, seizing the Rhine passages, and thus immediately placing herself in a position of great superiority to France, who might easily be overwhelmed before her Allies could come to her rescue.

What, then, can be done to make these clauses effective?

What is essential if France is to feel secure, is that she should have the assurance that Germany can neither mobilize on the Rhine nor seize its passages, nor make use for purposes of aggression of the exceedingly important strategic railways with which the area is netted, and of which she made such good use in 1914.

A scheme to deal with all these points has been worked out in detail, and has been submitted to experts, but at the present stage such details are bound to be the subject of endless discussion, and would certainly have to be very greatly modified before such a plan could finally be put into practice, and it is not proposed to give here more than the broad outlines of it.

First of all, the whole area should be placed under a Commission of the League of Nations, which would be charged with supervising the demilitarization, and seeing that it was properly carried out. The Commission would also have as its duty to supervise the railways. The question of the railways is a very difficult one, as it obviously closely affects the interests of the civil population, but experts consider that it should be possible for a small staff working under the authority of the League to insure that the railways were not, and could not be, adapted to the use of an army intending to take advantage of the intricate system for the purpose of invading France.

It is suggested that representatives of the League should be permanently stationed on the borders of the zone at important points, whose duty it would be to report to the League in case of invasion, and at times of acute political tension to remind all and sundry by their presence that to violate the zone would mean to join issue with all the nations members of the League. The moral sanction which this implies would be a most important guarantee of peace.

To deal with the passages of the Rhine, which from the French point of view are of more importance than anything else, it is suggested that small posts of civilian engineers should be stationed at each bridgehead, and also possibly at the important road tunnels, etc., leading into the zone, whose duty it would be to destroy these immediately in case of violation of the zone. They would be notified of such violation by the resident League Commission, and this notification would be the signal for the destruction of these points, so that there should not be any delay, which might allow an aggressor to possess himself of them before action could be taken.

It will be obvious that these proposals entail that Germany should be asked, in the cause of world peace, to undertake obligations which go considerably beyond those to which she is committed by Articles 42–43 of the Treaty, and it has been suggested that in that event she must be given compensation elsewhere. It is necessary then to examine what France is prepared to do in return for these concessions from Germany?

It must be borne in mind that by the Treaty Germany is bound to demilitarize a very large area, larger than Belgium or Switzerland, that this arrangement is unilateral, and bears on Germany alone, and that she has to carry it out without any compensation or equivalent whatsoever. These clauses, although, as has been shown, they do not satisfy France, are undoubtedly felt by Germany to be a very heavy burden, and because of their unilateral aspect may well be a constant cause of friction in the future. And it certainly cannot be expected that Germany will consent to increase this burden, on the lines suggested above, unless some measure of reciprocity is introduced.

What is suggested, therefore, is that France should be asked to consent to demilitarize some of her own territory, and to submit it to an identical regime to that suggested for Germany.

It is obvious that this is by no means an easy matter, and it would be completely out of the question to ask France to demilitarize a corresponding area to that which Germany has to demilitarize under the Treaty, for this would mean that she would have to dismantle what is practically her one line of defence, the line of Strasbourg-Metz, for the only alternative line of Toul-Verdun, if once broken through, leaves the plains of Champagne and, therefore, Paris open to an invader. But she might consent to the demilitarization of a band of territory 10 kilometres wide along her side of the common frontier, except in the immediate neighbourhood of the defensive works of Strasbourg, and of the Department of the Haut Rhin, which has no offensive possibilities, which area would be placed under the supervision of the same commission of the League of Nations as would have the Rhineland in charge, and this might be accepted by Germany as an equivalent for the extra sacrifice demanded of her. German public opinion would understand that, as Germany has already consented to the unilateral clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, there is no question of compensating her for those, but only for anything over and above those clauses to which she may consent, and it would, therefore, understand that if France agreed to such a proposal as

that made above, she would be doing a great deal to meet Germany, and by making the demilitarization arrangement reciprocal would be removing what is undoubtedly at present felt to be a stigma on German national pride.

It might be considered further whether there would not be substantial advantage in demilitarizing the Pyrenees between France and Spain, and placing this area also under the supervision of the League. Germany once a member of the League, as, it is hoped, will very shortly be the case, would thus be in exactly the same relation to this area. As a member of the League she would share the responsibility for its supervision, as would France in regard to the Rhineland under the suggested scheme. An approximately equal area in France and Germany would thus be under the supervision of the League of Nations, which would emphasize the reciprocal nature of the arrangement.

It must, of course, be understood that the supervision by the League of any demilitarized area would be purely for the purpose of seeing that the demilitarization was duly carried out, and would in no way interfere with the political rights and liberties of the inhabitants, nor with the sovereignty of the State of which they were nationals.

It has been advanced that with modern weapons demilitarized zones are of little importance because they can be flown over, and in certain cases shot over. Such an objection is not valid, as any soldier knows. The day has not yet come when armies can be transported by air. No nation in its senses would commit so obvious an act of aggression, put itself in the wrong, and give away its intentions, if such an act of aggression were not immediately followed up by an army to take advantage of the destruction and disturbance wrought by the air attack. An air attack passing over the demilitarized zone must therefore inevitably be followed by a violation of that zone by troops. It goes without saying that flying over or shooting over the zone would entail exactly the same penalties as transgressing its borders. There might be some advantage in placing a few aeroplanes in the zone

under the League of Nations commission, for air-police purposes.

In the case of a violation of the zone being notified by the League Commission, all the nations guaranteeing the zone, and the members of the League generally, would be called upon to combine against the aggressor. At the present stage a specific guarantee by Great Britain to come to France's aid immediately such an aggression was signified would probably also be necessary in order to give France the necessary feeling of security.

This, put very briefly, is the proposal which it is suggested would meet the requirements of a British European policy as laid down above.

From the point of view of the Empire it has the following advantages:

It solves the problem of the Rhine, which, as has been shown, is as much a British as a French problem.

It limits our commitments to the specific undertaking to come to France's aid if the demilitarized zone is violated, and so fulfils the necessary condition that our commitments must be definite and limited.

It is more likely than any other proposal to meet with the approval and endorsement of the Dominions, and so inaugurate not only a British but an Empire policy, for the following reasons:

The Dominions, themselves members of the League, and proud of their membership, are more likely to endorse an arrangement come to under the ægis of the League than any other.

Limited commitments are as important to them as to Great Britain.

The idea that they are simply guaranteeing the inviolability of a zone across which no armed forces, from whatever quarter they may come, can pass, is one which is easy for them to comprehend, and which they can understand it is in the interests of peace to enforce.

From the French point of view the advantages are equally obvious.

It makes them safe against invasion, except under circumstances which are so much to the disadvantage of the invader that they may well feel a security which has

never been theirs in all the hundreds of years that the Rhine problem has been in existence.

They are given the assurance that never again can the Rhine bridgeheads be used against them by an aggressor. They are, in fact, given Marshal Foch's demands, without having to maintain an army of occupation. They secure the backing of all the nations Members of the League, as well as the specific guarantee of Great Britain, which is more than they have even ventured to hope for, and the whole League becomes responsible for insuring the inviolability of their frontier.

Under such conditions it is not too much to prophesy that France will feel sufficiently safe to co-operate with us and America in initiating a policy of disarmament which is absolutely essential unless Europe is to become again the armed camp it was in 1914; and not only this, but that she will help us in dealing with the many and vexed problems of her small allies, so that the hope of a pacific Europe will begin to seem realizable.

To Germany the scheme presents advantages which the moderate elements in that country will appreciate. It protects her from France as much as it protects France from Germany. The zone is a barrier against the invasion of Germany from the west, a barrier which will only be lifted in case she makes an unprovoked attack on some other neighbour, when the League would impose on France and the other Members of the League the duty of punishing the wrongdoer. The proposal entails, of course, before it can be put into practice at all, that she shall be admitted to membership of the League of Nations on an equal footing, and it makes it to France's advantage that Germany should be re-admitted as soon as possible to the comity of European nations. It raises her national status by introducing the principles of reciprocity, and it gives her the possibility of bargaining for any concessions she may make. It has been suggested that she might be offered the mandate for one of her lost colonies, as an additional price for the concessions demanded of her, and there can be no doubt that this would appeal to her as a very great inducement.

It remains to consider who is to put this proposal forward.

It is obviously impossible for either French or German politicians, each having to deal with a somewhat over-sensitive public opinion, to put forward such a scheme. Were they to do so, Nationalist extremists in both countries would almost certainly manage so to discredit them that the scheme would come to nothing.

Remembering then the thesis laid down at the beginning of this paper, that it is necessary that we should have a clearly defined British foreign policy, it seems obvious that there is every advantage in adopting this scheme and putting it forward as the required policy. It has been shown that it fulfils all the necessary conditions of such a policy, and any proposal put forward by Great Britain is obviously far more likely of acceptance by both France and Germany than a scheme emanating from either would be to the other.

Recent events in Germany have not unnaturally increased the nervousness of French public opinion, and have made the realization of the suggested Five-Power Pact more difficult.

All the more reason, therefore, to seize this opportunity to put forward a proposal which deals simply and solely with the specific question of making France safe against German aggression, and yet which can easily be fitted in to or made part of a wide arrangement, such as a Five-Power Pact, which incidentally it would make easier of realization.

The Truth About Imperial Russia

By Professor Charles Sarolea

HISTORY has been described as a perpetual conspiracy against truth, as a "fable convenue," as a piece of fiction which for the time being we are agreed to accept, involving a constant effort on the part of the critical mind to disentangle sober reality from the misrepresentations of sympathy and antipathy, of prejudice and passion. This description of history as a conventional and collective lie applies especially to the recent annals of the Russian people. In the eighteenth century the Russian State enjoyed immense prestige in European public opinion. Catherine II, like the Hohenzollern Frederick II, was yclept "the Great," because, like her Prussian cousin, she had taken the wise precaution of enlisting in her pay such eloquent apologists as Voltaire, d'Alembert, and Grimm. On the contrary, in the nineteenth century, the Russian Tsars had a uniformly bad press, and Tsarism became synonymous with tyranny and obscurantism, with cruelty and stupidity.

The history of most nations is generally written by their friends. The history of Russia has been mainly written by her enemies. And through an unfortunate combination of circumstances it so happened that the Russian State in the nineteenth century was faced on every side by a hostile world.

On the one hand there was the formidable array of foreign enemies. The Scandinavians hated Russia, because they dreaded an imaginary menace to their independence. The Germans denounced the peril of Panslavism, which never existed, because the Slavs were always hopelessly divided, whereas the peril of Pangermanism was a reality, because the Teutonic peoples were closely united. The British people dreaded in the Russian Government the evil principle of autocracy and an imminent danger to India.

On the other hand there were the even more bitter and more irreconcilable enemies at home. The Russian State contained within its boundaries half the Jewish population of the globe, and being unable to assimilate the teeming millions of the Ghettos, felt compelled to protect itself through special legislation which was justly resented and attacked by the Jewish press in every country. Similarly the Russian State had inherited from the past the terrible Polish Question, which was even more tragic and more insoluble than the Irish Question. For Great Britain at least could have settled the Irish Question without any outside interference, and on her own terms. On the contrary the Polish Question, in addition to Russia, also involved Austria and Prussia. Like the Jewish trouble, it was a European problem which, as I predicted in 1912, would only be solved as the result of a world war, and even then only provisionally.

Nor ought we to forget, in order to understand the almost unanimously unfavourable opinion of Europe about the Russian State, the determined malevolent conspiracy of the disloyal Russians themselves. Before the war you could find in every political centre of the Continent little groups of revolutionists and refugees, of anarchists and nihilists, who would persistently malign the government of their country and organize systematic attempts to overthrow it. And as the Russian conspirators were generally intellectuals, as they constituted the so-called "Intelligentsia," it seemed logical to conclude from this fact, that the Russian Government stood for reaction and obscurantism. The very popularity and glory of Russian literature, the works of Gogol and Turgeniev, of Tolstoy and Dostoievski, became indirect arguments against Tsarism, because readers forgot that those works referred to distant times and to abuses which had long ceased to exist.

The better to realize the extent and the nature of the Russian revolutionary influence in England, one ought to remember the amazing paradox that throughout the nineteenth century Conservative England shared with law-abiding Switzerland the dubious honour of being the headquarters of international revolution. It was from London, as from a centre, that Mazzini and

Garibaldi, Kossuth and Orsini, Marx and Engels, Bakunine and Kropotkin organized their subversive intrigues and their regicide plots. In no other country were Russian revolutionists looked upon with such high favour. Whilst Prince Kropotkin, the anarchist leader, was sent to prison in republican France, he was made a hero in monarchist England.

The reasons for this political paradox have never been adequately investigated, although the investigation would bring many startling revelations. Amongst the more superficial reasons, let us recall, in the first place, that the very immunity of Great Britain from any serious social upheaval made the English people look upon Russian revolutionists as harmless eccentrics and as romantic idealists. One could afford to admire these idealists as interesting political specimens, just as the visitor in a Zoological Garden can afford to admire the beauty and majesty of the tiger behind the bars of his cage. We may note, in the second place, that the word revolution in the English political vocabulary has an entirely different connotation from the Russian meaning. To the Englishman a revolution is a struggle for freedom, it implies some constructive reform. On the contrary, to the Russian a revolution is mainly destructive. The typical nihilist, Bazarov, in Turgeniev's famous novel, "Fathers and Sons," is not an idealist, but a materialist. He is a Mephistopheles, the genius incarnate of negation, "der Geist der stets verneint." He is not only opposed to the Tsarist government, he is opposed to all government.

And let it be further noted that even when the Russian revolutionist happens to be an idealist, even then he retains his destructive proclivities. Tolstoy is still hailed in Great Britain as an inspiring teacher and preacher, and the University of Oxford is just preparing to issue a monumental edition of his collected works. It is obvious that the Laird of Yassnaia Poliana can be accepted as a teacher and prophet, only because the implications of his teaching are not understood by the average British reader. It is scarcely realized that Tolstoy is the spiritual father of Bolshevism. For he recognizes no State and no Church; he recognizes no law and no punishment, no

family and no marriage. Like his master, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Tolstoy is opposed to all civilization. But unlike his master, who at least believes in a "Social Compact" and in a Socialist State, the Russian disciple is a whole-hearted anarchist. Only a solitary ascetic dwelling on his pillar in a desert, like Simeon Stylites, could "live up" to the exalted ideals of Tolstoy.*

We shall understand but little about either past or present-day Russia unless we take in a few fundamental facts about Russian geography and Russian history and Russian economic conditions. They are quite simple and quite obvious, yet they are ignored by ninety-nine out of every hundred readers.

In no other European country has civilization arisen under such inauspicious circumstances. There are happy, sunny and temperate lands like Greece and Italy, where man is able to conquer Nature, where culture is native to the soil and where it appears as a spontaneous blossoming. On the contrary, there are countries where man is always engaged in an unequal struggle against malignant forces, and where, instead of man conquering Nature, it is Nature which is always threatening to conquer man. The Russian Continent is one of those disinherited lands, with a tragic past behind it, with geography and history combining to arrest political growth, to prevent peace and prosperity.

Some publicists may talk of Russia, just as they talk of India, as being a country of boundless and inexhaustible wealth. Unfortunately the wealth of Russia is only potential, and it will take all the efforts of our industrial civilization to exploit her hidden resources. In the meantime the Russian people have a lower standard of living than any European nation. The greater part of historic Muscovy is a land of sand and marsh, of meagre forests and steppes. The climate is hard, the winters are long and severe, droughts and famines are frequent, distances are immense, roads are few and the country is thinly populated. Even the raw materials for building a lasting home are lacking. In a considerable part of European Russia there is not a stone quarry to be found. Not only

* See my paper in the February issue of the ENGLISH REVIEW, 1925: "Is Tolstoy the Spiritual Father of Bolshevism?"

peasant dwellings, but even churches and mansions are built of wood, and it has been calculated that once every fifteen years the whole of the Russian villages are burnt down.

It is largely because conditions were so unfavourable to the growth of civilization, that Russia was actually the last European country to be reclaimed from barbarism. The Elizabethan mariners whose explorations we read of in "Hakluyt's Voyages," speak of the Muscovy of Ivan the Terrible as they speak of the China of the Great Khan, or of the Persia of the Great Sophi, or as Livingstone and Stanley in the seventies spoke of "Darkest Africa."

Civilization is younger in Russia than in the United States, which is supposed to be a "new" country. For one thousand five hundred years the Russian Continent may almost be described as a "terra nullius," a no-man's-land. Only in the poverty-stricken northern forest area did the agricultural serf find an abiding settlement. The much more fertile South, the rich, black soil of the Ukraine, was overrun by one invading horde after another, by Tatars and Turks, by Cossacks and Poles. The present commercial metropolis of South Russia, Odessa, was only built one hundred and fifty years ago by the French Duke of Richelieu. The abolition of serfdom only took place sixty years ago, and there are hundreds of thousands of Russian peasants still living who were born in slavery and who were sold as children to the highest bidder.

If we keep in mind those essential facts of Russian geography and Russian history which we have just indicated, we shall better understand the two characteristic features which differentiate Russian civilization from all others. *On the Russian Continent civilization had to be imported from outside and it had to be imposed from above.*

In the first place, civilization, for good or for evil, had to be imported from outside. It was not an indigenous growth. It was originally introduced into Kief from the South by Byzantine monks and from the North through Scandinavian warriors. After the Renaissance it was introduced into Moscow by the Italians and the French, by the English and the Germans. In the eighteenth century both Peter the Great and Catherine

the Great westernized and modernized the whole political structure.

In the second place, civilization in Russia had to be imposed from above. It was not, as in Europe, the achievement of a free people, or of an aristocracy, or of a burgher class. The history of Modern Russia is as intimately bound up with the House of Romanov as the history of Prussia with the House of Hohenzollern. In every country the particular form of government is determined by the nature of things. It has been said by Renan that the Arabian Desert is monotheistic. It would be even more true to say that the Russian plain is monarchistic. Everything predestined the Russian Continent to become the seat of a mighty State. And the Tsars were to be the master-builders of that State, the "assemblers" of its scattered territories, the unifiers of its fifty warring races. The Tsars settled the nomadic, anarchic Russian peasant on the land. This settlement for which Boris Godunov is made mainly responsible, was both an urgent necessity and a fateful tragedy. For it plunged a whole people into slavery at the very moment when the remainder of Europe was emerging from villainage. The European peasantry began with serfdom and ended in freedom. The Russian peasantry began with freedom and ended in serfdom.

It would be as impossible to extemporize a parliamentary government in Russia as it is to improvise parliamentary government in India. For neither Russia nor India possesses the political foundations on which a parliamentary system can be built up. Parliamentary government presupposes the existence of an enlightened public opinion. It also presupposes the establishment of local self-government. It cannot precede it. And, unfortunately, in Russia, local self-government never had a chance except in the mediæval border republics of Novgorod and Pskov. The Russian temperament is too unstable and too anarchic to develop spontaneously disciplined liberty. Again and again the country has fallen a prey to disruptive forces. Again and again we hear the pathetic cry of the old Chronicler Nestor: "Our country is vast and fertile, but there is no law or justice. Come to rule over us and to establish order among us."

The various conquerors heard the cry. The Princes of Kief listened to it. The Romanov rulers responded to it.

The peasantry themselves in every great crisis of Russian history, prompted by the instinct of self-preservation, realized what was an elemental political necessity. They had, indeed, their elective assemblies, their States General, their "zemski sobor," their "duma," even as they had their village communities. But they had no state-building capacity. Again and again their feeble attempts at self-government failed. They returned to a state of Nature. Again and again their elective assemblies met, only to surrender their political rights to a central monarchical power which alone would be strong enough to restore order.

We have further to note that in this superhuman task of building up a strong, disciplined State in this immense unprotected plain which was threatened on all sides by formidable enemies, the Monarchy was generally in close alliance with the Church. So intimate, indeed, is this alliance that the connection necessarily resulted in the fusion and confusion of the temporal power and of the spiritual power, which again led to all the abuses of a Byzantine Cæsaropapism. When the Romanov dynasty was called to the throne, Father Philaret became Metropolitan Patriarch of Moscow, whilst his son became Tsar of all the Russias. This dual control, where the father and the son divided between them the spiritual and temporal offices, is probably unique in modern European history.

In the annals of Russia, even more than in the annals of Spain, every national struggle was also a religious crusade. In fighting the Tatars and the Turks, the Russian people were also fighting Mohammedanism. In fighting the Poles the Russian people were also fighting Roman Catholicism. In fighting Napoleon the Russian people were also fighting revolutionary atheism.

The humble Russian peasant seems to have always been dimly conscious of a religious mission. In his abject political condition he found refuge in his creed. He describes himself, not as the "mujik"—which is a misnomer and almost an insult—but as the "Krestianine," the "Christian," the champion of Christ.

The very forms of the architecture of Russian churches and monasteries reveal the close union of State and Church. The most important shrines of the country were built under the protection of a fortress or Kremlin. The most beautiful and revered monastery, the Troitsa Lavra, near Moscow, has the aspect of a military stronghold, and had repeatedly to stand the siege of invading armies.

The identity of the monarchy and of the Greek Orthodox Church, of the "Samoderjavie" and the "Pravoslavie," was before the revolution the creed of the Conservative Party. As the result of the anti-Christian propaganda of the Bolshevist dictators, it has now become the creed even of Russian radicals. The very intellectuals who ten years ago were atheists and agnostics have rallied round the church as round a patriotic banner. The unexpected, and yet logical, consequence of the cruel persecution of Christianity has been to strengthen orthodoxy in the minds and in the hearts of the people.

If our analysis of the foundation of Russian history is substantially correct, we shall have to revise all our preconceived notions of the Russian State.

It has almost become a political axiom that the Russian State represents the type of an aggressive, militarist, imperialist power. In reality the Russian State for a thousand years has been fighting a succession of defensive wars. It has been fighting a perilous struggle for existence. The peculiar strategy which is equally characteristic of Russian politics and of the Russian temperament has been the strategy of tactical retreat and passive resistance. (Kutuzov in Tolstoy's "War and Peace.")

When we talk of the steady encroachments of the Russian power, we suffer from the optical and cartographic delusion of mere size. We quite naturally assume that a state which has managed to appropriate one-sixth part of the inhabited globe must have been driven on by some predatory instinct, and must have acquired its vast possessions as the result of constant and systematic aggression. But such a conclusion would be as erroneous with regard to Russia as it would be with regard to the United States. The continuous acquisition by the United

States of the huge territories of Louisiana, of Texas, of New Mexico, of Oregon, of California does not prove that the American State has been a predatory power. Similarly the expansion of the Russian State has not been primarily a militarist expansion. Rather has it been a process of peaceful penetration, of colonial settlement. Already at the beginning of the seventeenth century Yermak had occupied the greater part of Siberia. Like the American Commonwealth, the Russian Commonwealth was to sprawl and to spread over a whole continent from sea to sea, and in the vast Russian plain there were no Rocky Mountains to arrest that sprawling process.

And as in the case of the settlement of the American Middle West and Far West, so the settlement of the Ukraine, of Siberia, of Transcaucasia, of Turkestan was essentially the victory of civilization over barbarism. The Russian colonists who are often contemptuously described as semi-Asiatics were, indeed, the bulwark of Europe against Asia.

And the Russian colonization, whilst carried on under far more difficult conditions than in the United States, was even more rapid. In one or two generations the unruly tribes of Turkestan, the nomadic hordes of Siberia were reduced to law and order. And the capital of Turkestan, Tashkend, in the heart of Central Asia, was turned into a little Paris, before it was destroyed by the vandalism of the Bolshevists.

It is quite true that the Russian State, after accomplishing its work of colonization in Asia, had still to secure its unprotected frontiers against the constant inroads of hostile neighbours in Europe. It had to wrest the Baltic Provinces from the successors of the Teutonic knights and from the Scandinavian. It had to wrest the Black Sea from the Turks and the Tatars. It had to wrest Lithuania and the Ukraine from the Cossacks and the Poles.

To secure its frontiers was a question of life and death for the Russian State. It was a strategic necessity. We may deeply deplore the destruction of the Polish State. But we have to remember that long before the Russian State tried to destroy the Polish Republic, the Polish Republic itself had very nearly succeeded in annihilating

the Russian State, and had plunged it into the horrors of the "Smutnoe Vremia," the prolonged chaos of the opening years of the seventeenth century, from which the Romanov dynasty rescued the Russian people.

In strict accordance with the defensive strategy which is the characteristic and original feature of the military history of Russia, is the pacific and almost pacifist policy which we may note in her diplomatic history. It is not too much to say that in her international relations the Russian Government worked systematically for peace. It was concerned generally with the maintenance of the balance of power. Russia undertook most of her wars not from self-interest, but in the interests of Europe.

This may seem a paradoxical statement, but it is very easy to prove it.

(*a*) Russia defended the balance of power against Frederick the Great in the Seven Years' War, and in 1759 her armies occupied Berlin. If it had not been for that timely and decisive intervention, the advent of Prussianism as a disturbing factor in Continental policy would have been antedated by one hundred years.

(*b*) Similarly Russia, in close union with Great Britain, defended the balance of power against Napoleon. If Great Britain destroyed the Napoleonic power on the high seas, Russia destroyed it on the Continent.

(*c*) And after that Napoleonic supremacy had been destroyed Russia intervened again with consummate wisdom to prevent the Grand Alliance from abusing its victory, which would have led to an inevitable war of revenge. It was due to the moderating influence of Alexander I that after Waterloo Europe for forty years enjoyed an almost uninterrupted spell of peace.

(*d*) And once more when the political equilibrium which was the main achievement of the Congress of Vienna was upset by the encroachments of Prussia and by the fateful victories of 1870, Russia intervened in 1875 to prevent Bismarck from crushing France.

(*e*) And when the epigons of Bismarck began to make their bid for world supremacy, when the coming European catastrophe began to throw its shadow over the Continent, Russia, as a last resort, took the initiative in convening a

Peace Conference. She tried to vindicate the principle of arbitration and to establish in the Hague Tribunal an international instrument which, if it could have been adopted, would have prevented the world war.

Precisely because of her vast size, Russia was the only State which had nothing to gain in Europe. Moreover, because of her unwieldiness, war did involve greater risks for her than for any other European State. Those are probably the two reasons why a moderating and restraining influence seems to have been the law of the international relations of Russia in the past.

And it will be more than ever her providential mission in the future. More than ever the Russia of to-morrow will have to play her part in European politics. More than ever she will have to throw her due weight into the balance. Unless Russian power is speedily restored; unless it is able to keep Germany in check, the new succession States, and especially Poland, are doomed to destruction, and a German Super-State will once more threaten world peace in the very near future. The restoration of Russia is not merely a Russian interest, it is a vital and urgent European interest. If Russia were to remain weak and helpless, if anarchy were to be prolonged, the whole of the Russo-Asiatic Continent from the Baltic to the Pacific would become a German colony.

How often have we been told both by Liberal and by Conservative publicists like Kinglake, that the Russian Government was synonymous with oppression and tyranny, that it was not a polity, but a police. No one would of course deny that the Russian State, being after all human, did commit many grievous blunders, just as the British State committed blunders in Ireland, in the Transvaal, and in Egypt. But the general fact remains that except for the treatment of the Jews and of the Poles, which is explained by a compelling fatality, Russia generally was a liberating instead of an oppressive influence. That liberating influence made itself felt in her Asiatic possessions, which were lifted from barbarism to civilization. That influence equally applied to Finland, which, for a hundred years enjoyed a privileged and almost a paradoxical position under Russian rule. Similarly under

Russian protection the Baltic Provinces were given a large measure of autonomy until the Teutonic policy of Germanization compelled the Russian Government to retaliate with a policy of Russification. When German publicists complain of Russian hostility to Germany, the easy reply is that thousands of Baltic Germans were given commanding positions in the Russian civil service as well as in the Russian Army.

The same liberating influence of Russia is revealed in her near Eastern policy. Whatever ulterior motive and ambitions Russia may have had in the Balkans, as the heir to the Byzantine Empire, and as the natural protector of her Slavonic brethren and co-religionists—and those ambitions were shared even by Russian Radical politicians like Miliukow—in the end the Balkan policy of the Russian Monarchy mainly resulted in freeing the Christian nations from the yoke of the unspeakable Turk and in resisting the world supremacy of the Austro-German combination. In the great square of Sofia there stands to this day a gigantic statue of Alexander II, the "Tsar Osvoboditel," the Great Liberator. Never was a title of honour more fully deserved. It surely bespeaks a strange lack of humour on the part of British publicists when they denounce the aggressive Eastern policy of the Russian Monarchy. They would do well to remember that it is the British policy which was mainly instrumental in imposing for a hundred years a cruel Turkish tyranny upon defenceless Balkan peoples, whereas the Russian policy brought freedom to Greece and to Roumania, to Bulgaria and to Siberia. To have enfranchised four nationalities is not a bad record for a "tyrannical" Muscovite State.

There is a widespread belief that the Russian State was pre-eminently anti-democratic, and that it was ruled by a corrupt and parasitic bureaucracy. Now it is certainly true that the government of Russia was bureaucratic, and that the bureaucracy had developed some intolerable abuses which were freely attacked, often with the approval of the rulers, in many masterpieces of Russian literature, such as the "Inspector General" of Gogol. But it has to be remembered that those abuses are inherent to every bureaucratic form of government, and that if we consider the vast size of the country, and

the difficulty of any effective supervision, the evils of the Russian administration were no worse than they would have been in other countries confronted with similar obstacles. It has further to be remembered that the bureaucratic methods were adopted in strict imitation of the Prussian and French systems of centralization, and that those systems represent until this day the "beau ideal" of the very socialists who were denouncing them in Old Russia.

But whilst we admit that the importation of French and Prussian methods was a bad preparation for self-government, and was ill-adapted to the needs and conditions of the country, it is certainly not true that the Russian form of government was anti-democratic. On the contrary the Russian Monarchy was essentially democratic, just as the Monarchy of Saint Louis was democratic. It was of popular origin. The Romanov Dynasty itself was originally established by the will of the people. If we look beneath the surface, the Russian Commonwealth was a vast federation of fifty thousand little peasant republics, each administering its own affairs, obeying its own laws, having even its own tribunals of Starosts or Elders.

The trouble about the Russian State was not that it had too little democracy, but that it had too much both of democracy and socialism. The trouble was that its social structure was too simple and too primitive, that there was not sufficient differentiation of classes, that there was no ruling class, and no middle class, and especially that there was no strong independent church. It is largely because of the excessively democratic and levelling spirit of the Russian Monarchy, and because of the destruction of the political power of the aristocracy, that the mass of the people fell such an easy prey to Bolshevist tyranny.

One of the most frequent gibes against the Russian Monarchy was that it was reactionary and obscurantist, that it was an enemy to light and progress. In fact, it was probably the most progressive government in Europe. It corresponded to an extreme modern type, to what the political writers of the eighteenth century, Montesquieu and Voltaire, defined as "enlightened

despotism." It was not behind, rather was it in advance of public opinion. Political trouble generally arose in Russia from the fact that progress was too quick, that everything had to be extemporized. The rulers were too eager to make up for the centuries which had been lost. Tsarism often tried to achieve in a few years what had been elsewhere the achievement of generations. Russian civilization was not a normal, healthy growth, it was a hothouse plant. The building of Rome and Paris took hundreds of years. On the contrary, Petrograd was a mushroom city. The Palace of the Louvre was the work of many ages. The colossal Winter Palace on the Neva was erected in a few months. Between 1860 and 1870 there took place more far-reaching reforms than had been accomplished in any other country in any previous epoch of European history, reforms far more fundamental than those which followed the French Revolution. Serfdom was abolished by a stroke of the pen. A new system of laws was established. The country was covered with a network of railways even before there were any roads. Industries were artificially fostered by high protective tariffs, and those industries were concentrated in gigantic factories which inevitably became hotbeds of unrest. The country never had time to adapt itself to the new conditions and to find its political and economic balance.

In no sphere of public life were changes so rapid as in education, and in no sphere did those changes produce more ominous results. Normally education ought to follow the general progress of the community. If in a new country you establish thousands of schools without providing an outlet for the spiritual energies which the schools are releasing, you only create an intellectual proletariate. This is exactly what the Russian Government did in the last decades of the nineteenth century. University education was encouraged by doles and by immunity from military service. But the increasing army of students were not provided, and they could not be provided, with remunerative occupations. The result was that young chemists who did not find an outlet in chemical laboratories took to manufacturing explosive bombs. Law students, not finding an outlet in the

service of the State, became heralds of revolt and destruction.

We have tried to disprove the contention that the Tsarist Monarchy stands condemned by Russian history. Rather was it the necessary outcome of definite conditions over which it had little control. It would be equally easy to disprove the widespread assumption that Tsarism was repudiated by the Russian people, and that the revolution of 1917 represents their just and irrevocable verdict on their rulers.

If we were to accept the current explanation of the Russian catastrophe, the revolution surprised the Russian Government in a hopeless state of decay and corruption and exhaustion. The reality is entirely different. When the upheaval came, it found the people in a crisis of growth, on the high tide of political reform and economic prosperity. I can well remember my amazement and perplexity when I studied Russian conditions five years before the war. I had witnessed on a previous visit the terrible disorganization following the Russo-Japanese War and the Civil War. Revisiting the country in 1909, I fully expected to find everywhere traces of the sufferings endured in the two terrible years 1904 and 1905. Instead, I observed the most wonderful recovery, a gigantic agrarian reform successfully carried through by the great statesman Stolypine; millions of peasants settled in Siberia, industries growing by leaps and bounds, capital flowing into the country, the budget showing an abundant surplus, the population increasing at the rate of three millions a year.

Why then did the collapse come? Why did a prodigious prosperity end in an unexampled disaster? Why did the Russian Monarchy fall almost without a struggle? It did not fall of its inner weakness and corruption. It did not fall because it had outlived its usefulness. It fell because of purely accidental causes which would have brought about the downfall even of the most ideal Western government, if it had been faced with the same ordeal.

Tsarism fell in the first place because of the tragic coincidence that in the greatest political crisis of European history a weak ruler happened to occupy the throne, at

the very moment when a strong monarch was most urgently needed. As in the case of the English Revolution in the seventeenth century, of the French Revolution of 1789, of the second Napoleonic Empire, of the Austrian Revolution of 1918, even so in Russia the ruler who was riding the storm happened to be a henpecked husband.

Tsarism fell in the second place because an agricultural state was unexpectedly called upon to fight a gigantic industrial war when it had not the material or technical means of carrying on such a war. Even a highly organized community like Great Britain was taken by surprise and found itself short of munitions. Even France had largely to depend on the assistance both of Great Britain and of the United States.

But whereas Great Britain could depend on the co-operation of the United States, whereas France could depend on the assistance of her British ally, Russia was compelled to struggle in tragic isolation. She was left to her own resources. She had to fight without weapons and munitions. Russia had a right to expect that the British sea power should keep open the Dardanelles, and that British industrial power should supply the Russian armies with the means of continuing the war. Great Britain was not able to discharge either of those two functions. Through the closing of the Dardanelles, Russia, from the beginning, was cut off. Through the British shortage of munitions Russia was faced with military disaster, and military disaster inevitably culminated in a political revolution, even as the military disaster of Sedan culminated in the Paris Commune of 1871. It may therefore justly be said that the Russian Monarchy was the vicarious sacrificial victim of the delinquencies of her allies. We often hear it said that Russia failed her allies in their hour of need. The truth is exactly the opposite. It was not Russia who failed her allies. Her allies failed Russia. In fairness to the Russian people it would be well if British and French publicists, who are still denouncing the Great Russian Treason of 1917, would remember that it is Europe who left the Russian people in the lurch in the supreme ordeal of their national history.

Who Wrote the Shakespeare Sonnets ?

By W. H. Denning

THERE is a peculiar autobiographical fact in some of the sonnets which has been noticed and commented on, but as soon passed over. From an anti-Shakesperean point of view it can be considered to reveal the author.

I pointed it out to a well-known Baconian author who admitted it was an entirely *new* subject for discussion, and if only on that account was worth putting forward.

This fact occurs in the sonnets from which extracts relevant to the matter are here given :

Sonnet 37

As a decrepit father takes delight
To see his active child do deeds of youth,
So I, made lame by fortune's dearest spite,
Take all my comfort of thy worth and truth;
.....

Sonnet 89.

Say that thou didst forsake me for some fault,
And I will comment upon that offence :
Speak of my lameness, and I straight will halt;
.....

There are two or three other sonnets in which this "spite of fortune" is implied, but only those are taken where it would be most difficult to misconstrue.

One early Editor commented on the line in Sonnet 37 as follows :

A late Mr. Capell grounding himself on this line and another in Sonnet 89 conjectured that Shakespeare was literally lame, but the expression appears to be only figurative.

He went to some length, however, to explain the passages away, and made no reference to other sonnets.

Sonnet 66.

.....
And strength by limping sway disabled,
And art made tongue-tied by authority,
.....
Tired with all these, from these I would be gone,
Save that, to die, I leave my love alone.

Mr. Harold Bayley suggested that this line referred to the "deformed" Cecil, but it will be seen that the author was referring to his own affliction.

The Rev. George Gilfillan, in an edition of poems printed in 1856, says:

> Some biographers of Shakespeare will have it that he was *lame:* and Sir Walter Scott in "Kenilworth," probably from some secret fellow-feeling, seems to sanction the notion, when he makes one of his characters call the great dramatist a "halting fellow." The notion is founded on expressions in the 37th and 89th Sonnets, which some have supposed literal, while others believe them to be merely poetically true . . . and we suspect Walter Scott must have applauded the theory that Shakespeare, like himself, was a gigantic (and lame) limb of the law. At all events his lameness was not so entire as to disqualify him from manly exercises, such as riding.

Every one after carefully studying the sonnets quoted must surely agree that the poet says and means that he was *physically* lame.

It will be pointed out that Francis Bacon was not lame, neither was William Shakespere; the latter, according to Aubrey, was a "handsome well-shap't man."

Can the author of the sonnets be identified with any particular lame man?

Assuming Francis Bacon was the author of the accepted Shakespeare plays with which the sonnets and poems are not only so closely connected, but to which they are, in fact, related, it follows we shall not have to look far for a man with "impotent feet" and "nimble head."

Anthony Bacon, two years older than Francis, "of as great a wit as his brother but less learned," was, according to the "Dictionary of National Biography," so afflicted—"throughout his life he was lame."

To show there is nothing very preposterous in the suggestion that Anthony was the author of the sonnets, I quote Mr. G. C. Bompas:

> Among Anthony Bacon's correspondence at Lambeth Palace is a French elegy to his memory, which addresses him as "the flower of English gentlemen and the honour of the nine Muses and of Pallas, who now wander without guide or succour through the wood." It would seem from this that Anthony was known as a poet, although no poems are known to have been printed in his name.
>
> Is it an improbable conjecture that Anthony Bacon may have written "Venus and Adonis," which is as poetical as the plays, but less learned? This may have been "the first heir of his invention." The moral tone of the poem differs widely from that of the plays, and seems to harmonize as little with the character of Francis Bacon as the polished elegance of the verse does with the education of William Shakspere.

Though Mr. Bompas makes the tentative suggestion that Anthony Bacon might have written "Venus and Adonis," he brings no evidence to bear upon it, and leaves it as mere "conjecture." The connection between the lameness of the author of the sonnets and the afflicted Anthony Bacon is now put forward for the first time as a theory for serious consideration.

The poet may have left other means of identification: for instance, Sonnet 113 begins:

> Since I left you, mine eye is in my mind,
> And that which governs me to go about,
> Doth part his function, and is partly blind,
> Seems seeing, but effectually is out:
> .....

Did Anthony Bacon suffer in *later years* from failing eyesight? In the "Dictionary of National Biography" we read: "at fourteen his sight was in danger."

It is a strange coincidence, and a very suggestive one, that when "Venus and Adonis" was enrolled on the Stationers' Register, it was under the special authority of Archbishop Whitgift, who had been tutor to both Anthony and Francis.

It would also be a coincidence if no Shakespeare poems of the kind were written after Anthony's death in May, 1601. "It was noticed with some surprise by Henry Chettle that his (Shakespeare's) 'honied muse' dropped no 'sable tear' to celebrate the death of the Queen" (1603)—"Encyclopædia Britannica."

If this theory were accepted, the poems would not add much to our knowledge of Anthony, but if, by bringing his name to the forefront, it would hasten the deciphering of his correspondence now at Lambeth Palace, some good will have been done.

How Our Forbears Managed the Dole

By Commander Lord Teignmouth, R.N.

"THE Poor Law system," according to "The Times" Annual Survey (December 29, 1924), "is founded on its recognition by the community of a legal responsibility to provide for its members a last resort against extreme necessity." In other words, the Poor Law is the residuary legatee of all forms of want.

During the year 1831, a time of great distress and real suffering throughout the country, commissioners were appointed for the purpose of inquiring into the administration and operation of the Poor Laws. They were especially enjoined to investigate the causes which brought the various systems of relief into existence, at what period, and with what result.

"It has been supposed," ran the instructions, "that it was to the 43rd of Elizabeth, and to the superintendence which it forced the rich to exercise over the poorer, that we owed the industry, the orderly behaviour, and the adequation of their numbers to the demand for labour which, within the memory of man, distinguished the English labourers." On the other hand, "the idleness, profligacy, and improvidence"—so ran the official message from the Central Board—"which now debase the character and increase the numbers residing in certain parts of the south-eastern districts are due to the changes to which that law (43rd of Elizabeth) has been subjected."

Strange to relate, and contrary to general belief, the "dole," as it is now called, was already in active operation at the time the commissioners were appointed, and had been for several years past, in one or other of the numerous demoralizing forms it was wont to assume, such as "allowance" from the parish, "bread money," or money in lieu, "payment of rent" by the parish, "making up wages," when the wage paid by the employer fell below the "standard" fixed by the magistrates. In point of fact, the "allowance system," or "dole," as worked in the majority of parishes by employers of labour, had degenerated into

a gigantic system of fraud for the purpose of keeping wages down and paying the difference between the actual wage received and the "standard" out of the parish rates. Most justly was this system denounced by a dweller in the town where it was notoriously practised as "horrible."

The consequences of resorting to the "dole" in any form were just such as had been predicted by all experienced students of human nature. Sixteen years before the appointment of commissioners a report on the working of the Poor Law issued by Parliament contained a warning that:

> Unless some efficacious check be interposed, the amount of assessment for Poor Rate will continue, as it has done, to increase, until, at a period more or less remote, it shall have absorbed the profits of the property on which the rate may have been assessed, producing thereby the neglect and ruin of the land, and the waste or removal of other property, to the utter subversion of that happy order of society so long upheld in these kingdoms.

In a previous number of this REVIEW (November, 1924) I was permitted by the Editor to give some account of the "dole system a century ago," the method of administering it, and the disastrous results to the morale of the nation arising out of the system of doles instead of the reward of honest labour, a system which, in the opinion of competent judges, "prevents anyone from raising himself by good conduct, or from sinking by the opposite course," is obviously out of harmony with the scheme of creation, and justifies up to the hilt the accusation levelled against it by a poor-inspector that, amongst the consequences of such a system, "the veracity, frugality, industry, and domestic virtues of the poorer classes must be very nearly extinct." That this was no overdrawn picture of the condition of things prevailing throughout extensive districts of rural England, as a consequence of the indiscriminate use of the "dole," was clearly shown. Had the lesson conveyed by the experiences of our forbears been taken to heart, or even pondered over in the most cursory fashion, we should never have been forced to witness the shameful waste of our national resources which has gone on since the Great War. By way of driving the lesson home I propose quoting some further examples of the gross abuse of the "allowance system" as worked a century ago. As was remarked by a con-

temporary, "To look back upon what is beginning to appear almost a fabulous era in the eyes of the modern children of light, is not unamusing or uninstructive; for still better to appreciate the present, we should be led not infrequently to recall the intellectual muzziness of the past."

As an instance of the extraordinary requests (arising out of the habit directly encouraged by the "allowance system" of relying on the parish for the supply of every want) that came to the magistrates and overseers, let the following suffice: A young man in the service of a country gentleman, who had taken to himself a wife, continued to reside with his wife's relations until there was a quarrel; then the pair were turned out of the house. Later the same evening they both applied to the overseer, who happened to be the man's employer, demanding to be provided with a house. On being told that the overseer was only obliged to find work, the man announced his intention of remaining where he was till lodgings were found, and the pair had to be removed by force. Next day they complained to the magistrates, who gave them an open letter advising the overseer to provide them with a house, which, on presentation, was promptly put in the fire. This was followed by a sealed letter of expostulation, which shared the same fate. After trying various ruses, equally unsuccessfully, the pair found lodgings for themselves and the man returned to his work.

Or take the following as an example of the abuse of the "bread allowance," a fertile source of chicanery. The rector of a country parish, desirous of improving the character of at least one household and rendering it independent of the allowance system, engaged as bailiff a man with a numerous family, paying him what were considered very high wages on condition that he was no longer to consider himself a pauper by claiming the parish allowance. The bailiff, however, not satisfied with his wages, asked permission of his master to apply for parish assistance in the payment of his rent. The rector, on making inquiries, found to his surprise and disgust that the receipts of a "parish pauper" exceeded those of his bailiff by about £15 per annum, and that a labourer with five children received in one year, wages £33 6s., bread money £24 4s.,

in addition to which he had other opportunities of earning money, as also his wife and children. The rector, on discovering that his attempt to reward good conduct and industry had only exposed him to ridicule, very justly stigmatized the system which produced such a result as a "premium on profligacy and idleness."

In a Suffolk parish owned by a gentleman farmer, where the allowance system had been entirely abolished several years previously, the owner, on succeeding to the property, had sent for the labourers in order to arrange terms with them. On hearing of the proposed change they all said it was a matter of indifference to them what wages be paid, as the shortage would be made up by the parish allowance in the same way as in neighbouring parishes. The owner then gave them to understand that he was not going to deal with them in that way, and offered them a fair wage, promising to keep them, along with their wives and children, in constant employment, winter and summer. The proposal caused great discontent; many threats were held out against the owner and appeals made to the magistrates, from whom many verbal messages were received, to which, however, no regard was paid. It was then explained to the men that, under the system of constant employment, a man with several children was able to earn large weekly wages—thus one labourer and his three boys could earn £1 2s. 6d. at a time of year when employment was hard to get. An average worker would earn from £30 to £35 a year, while his wife and four children would earn 2s. 4d. a week. On this sum a careful man and his wife—were they not confident of receiving parish relief—could not only live, but make provision against sickness and old age. Eventually the men agreed to the terms.

It was stated in evidence by the rector of a parish near Reading that, on notification being given of the discontinuance of the system of parish relief in aid of wages, all the single labourers, including both those who were on the parish and those who were independent, hailed the notice with great satisfaction, as they considered it would in future render wages more proportioned to their work, and that single men would have a better chance.

Further remarkable evidence of the abuse of the

"parish allowance" was furnished by the assistant overseer of a district in the same neighbourhood, to the effect that it was a common thing for young couples to come to him for parish relief two or three days after their marriage. "I have even known them come just as they left the church and apply for a loaf of bread to eat and for a bed to lie on that night." He added, "These sort of marriages are now checked. If the same system had been allowed to go on we should have been swallowed up (ruined) in a short time."

The question will naturally be asked, "Was it possible for any agricultural labourer, with wife and family, to support them on the wages he earned, without the 'parish allowance'?" As a matter of fact, the widest possible difference of opinion existed on the subject, even amongst competent and experienced parish officers. A London magistrate, questioned on this very subject, replied, "Nothing is more difficult than for a gentleman to form a correct estimate of the necessary means of living of a labouring man; let any scheme for his maintenance be devised by a gentleman, and you will always find that the labouring man will live at a cheaper rate than that estimated."

An assistant commissioner stated, "I have generally found the estimates of magistrates and others, as to the means of living or saving (with respect to the allowance from rates which ought to be made in aid of wages), vary with the individuals and customs of the place, rather than with the prices of provisions." While as regards the competency of magistrates and parish officers to decide in such matters, a deputy lieutenant for the county of Berkshire declared that the magistrates, from their ignorance of the habits of the labouring classes, are extremely unfair judges of the amount of relief to be granted. "To a gentleman," said he, "1s. appears an extremely small sum, but it often procures two, or even three, days' subsistence for a labouring man"; adding, "hence the most benevolent men commonly grant the most profuse and injurious allowances."

Evidence as to the careless manner in which relief was administered by the duly authorized parish officers was forthcoming from all parts of the kingdom. It was further

admitted by these officers that many married labourers maintained their families without demanding relief from the parish; "they are above coming on the parish, but how they manage it we cannot tell."

According to the statement of an assistant commissioner, careful inquiries conducted over wide areas established the fact that agricultural labourers were able to live without relief in aid of wages, that they "had the means of obtaining as many necessaries and comforts as at any former period, and that their wages would go as far, if not further, than at any time known to the present generation." About thirty labourers living in London stated positively that they could live on 1s. a day, while inquiries amongst the same number of occupants of London gaols elicited the fact that, though they would prefer the life of an independent labourer, they could manage to live, provided they could get regular employment at 1s. a day. In fact, it appeared to be the general opinion amongst them that a single man could live on 1s. a day. Labourers and others, living in the Metropolis, though, as a rule, paying more for lodging, found the markets greatly in their favour, so that, in the opinion of reliable witnesses, "they could live as cheaply, if not more so, than in the rural districts," in proof of which may be urged the fact that workers earning as much as 2s. a day were found to be depositors in the savings banks.

The extraordinary difference in the replies to the questions, "What can a family earn; can they live on it and lay by anything?" suffices to show the insufficient evidence on which the rates of wages were fixed, and judgments given on appeals against the allowances granted by parish officers.

In a large industrial town in the north, where the allowance system was avowedly and regularly established, the parish allowances to able-bodied labourers were graduated according to the numbers in their families, and whenever the wages of any class of labourers fell below the amount shown on the official scale (fixed by the magistrates) the difference was made up, as a matter of course, by the parish, the minimum allowance being 2s. a head a week to heads of families and 1s. 6d. for each child under twelve years of age. A single man earning 2s. could make

no claim for relief, while if married and earning the same wages he could claim 2s. for self and wife, and if there were six children 1s. 6d. a head for each, making in all 13s. weekly. A family man thus had a recognized claim on the parish of 11s. weekly, whereas if single he must be content with his wages. It may be added that, though they did not profess to pay their paupers' rents in this town, a guardian admitted that "they were often given money to pay their rents with."

In this same town the weavers (the class most constantly burdensome to the parish), on the shortest interruption of work, immediately made application to have their "average," as it was termed, "made up." Thus a man who owned to having earned 21s. during the last fortnight, yet, because he had not applied to the parish during the preceding month and his average during that period had not been made up, now applied to have the deficit made good, which was done at once. Twenty-one shillings in a fortnight may not seem an exorbitant wage according to present-day standards, yet an assistant commissioner was assured by an "eminent practical authority" residing in this same town that 8s. a week would amply cover a working-man's weekly expenditure on lodging, washing, and board, if he was single. Nevertheless, the same authority added that wages of 18s. or 20s. a week and upwards disappeared with uniform celerity, leaving the workman liable, on the first "turn of trade," to be thrown on the parish, which he attributed to the "improvident and reckless spirit generated under the allowance system"—what we now call the "dole."

The overseer of a neighbouring town was asked, "Supposing a man has ten children and receives 9s. a week in wages—that is to say, 6s. short of the standard fixed by the magistrates—would the parish be obliged to make up the deficiency?" The reply was "Yes."

Sometimes an arrangement exists by which the "pauper," in consideration of an advance from the parish say of £3 or £4, shall not trouble the overseer again for the next twenty weeks. Amongst the results of such a bargain is a practice adopted in this same town by the master manufacturers in the carpet-weaving line, the chief employment there. A number of boys are taken on

the footing of apprentices, not bound, however, by any indentures, and paid at the rate of 4d. in the 1s. lower than the regular journeymen. When business gets slack the latter are turned off and thrown on the parish. Thus it is a common thing for weavers to finish their job on Friday or Saturday and come to the parish for relief on Monday night. "This system is becoming horrible," declared a man conversant with local affairs, adding, "the parish is used as if it was a depôt for soldiers," meaning that the workmen were billeted on the parish whenever they were not required by the employers.

A Government commissioner observes, with reference to the above: "It does not seem the less an abuse that the workers thus half-dismissed from active service should have their wages made up by parish allowance, and thus become in some sort quartered on the public till it shall suit their commanding officers to call out their whole effective force."

Incidentally, we gather that the most frequent cause of interruption to work was the competition of "linen woven at Irish wages."

Great encouragement to improvidence and extravagance had unwittingly been given of late by improvements in the dietary of workhouses and gaols. As regards the former, note especially the evidence given before a Royal Commission in 1832 by the keeper of one of the principal workhouses in London: "I have constant proof that the diet in our house is as good as the majority of labouring men with families can procure for themselves when in work, and that the poor in our workhouse live as well as many of the ratepayers. This operates as a powerful stimulus to enter the house." He further explained the result to the labouring classes: "They spend all they can without regard to the future, being well aware that when a rainy day comes they are sure of relief or of admittance to a place of comfort superior to anything their irregular conduct has allowed them to inhabit"; and, most important of all, that "no bad conduct on their part will lead to expulsion or occasion their relief to be forfeited." The witness added: "We have now about one hundred bad characters in the house, many of whom have been frequently in prison."

As regards the attractions of workhouses, the vestry clerk of a city workhouse stated that many of the inmates had been reduced to the condition of "hereditary paupers" by improvidence or vicious habits, and that many might obtain work now, "but that they are well aware, and say so when remonstrated with, that there is a sure provision for them and their families, do what they will"; and this provision means better keep, better food, and better lodging than the poor workers can generally earn. Moreover, persons who come into the house find the mode of living so superior to what they are accustomed to that they try to remain there. Under these circumstances it is not to be expected that people will deny themselves indulgences in order to make a provision for the future; "their recklessness is something awful," added this official.

An overseer who had formerly been at Gosport, in Hampshire, describing his experiences there, stated that, in his belief, the poorer ratepayers fared much worse than the paupers in the workhouse. "I have seen the former dining, day after day, on potatoes; they hardly ever saw such things as beer or butter, unless it be on Sundays, and I have gone back to the workhouse and served the paupers there with meat and comparatively sumptuous dinners." He added, "I have known poor agricultural workers go out in the morning with a bottle of water and a piece of bread made of bran and flour, and return at night to a supper of potatoes with a little skimmed milk thrown over them, the milk given, perhaps, by a neighbourly farmer."

The pauper in the workhouse, on the other hand, "is always sure of a hot breakfast—without even the trouble of cooking it. He is also sure of a hot dinner; he is better clothed, better lodged, and does less work." Consequently, when a poor family had once sampled the sort of existence the paupers led in a workhouse, "they can't be driven out again." In one workhouse the women were given the same allowance as the men of beer, butter, and sugar. There were five feasts in the year: a pea-feast, a bean-feast, two mutton-feasts, and a plum-pudding-feast. In a London suburban workhouse the governor was bound to give salmon once, when in season, and mackerel once.

The maintenance of discipline amongst refractory paupers was a matter of great difficulty, and had been

increased by recent improvements in the scale of dietary for the inmates of gaols, where the allowance of bread exceeded that provided for the paupers in workhouses, many of whom, when threatened with imprisonment, replied: "Oh, we do not care; that's where we want to go; we get more bread there, and the meat allowance is the same."

As a further proof of the attraction of the workhouses, the following case deserves mention. A stout, able-bodied man, having entered a workhouse with his wife and children, became so enamoured of the life that he refused to stir out. While there an annuity of £100 was left him; but so lost was he to every feeling of independence that he refused to quit. He was repeatedly brought before the magistrates for riotous conduct and refusal to work, and invariably replied that he never would work—that no one could make him; and, in short, that he would do as he liked; and stay there he did, the parish, in the meanwhile, receiving as much of the man's annuity as would pay for his keep.

On a pauper being sentenced to seven years' transportation, a workhouse official was heard to remark that "it was equivalent to promotion to a place where he would get more food, if not more comfort, than in the workhouse," explaining that convicts received more bread than the paupers.

In consequence of the amelioration in the lot of the inmates of gaols—more especially convicts—the threat of transportation had entirely lost its sting. Thus, a man, on being refused the amount of outdoor relief claimed, replied that "he must and would have it; he would sooner go into prison than seek work." On being told that if he did not take care he would be transported, his answer was: "If you think I care for being transported you are mistaken; if I am I shall be better taken care of and shall live like a gentleman."

Inquiries amongst numerous old "gaol-birds" elicited the fact that, though they considered the food allowance in the prison and workhouse about the same in regard to quantity, they preferred the prison allowance.

At Gosport, where there was a convict establishment, it was a common subject of remark that the convicts

received more meat per day than the soldiers set to guard them. The remark of some convicts, who had been told off to do something they did not like, was overheard one day by the guard: "What next, I wonder? D——n it, we shall soon be as badly off as the soldiers." The convicts would ridicule their guard. "I have myself seen a convict hold up food to the guard," said a former governor of the Gosport Workhouse, "with the invitation, 'Soldier, will you have a bite?'" * He added that it was evident from conversation with convicts that neither imprisonment nor transportation was much dreaded; they would say: "We are better fed, have better clothes, and are more comfortably lodged than as the result of our own efforts."

The calamitous result of the gradual spread of the "dole" system throughout the land, so far as the agricultural districts were concerned, was graphically expressed by the rector of a parish in the county of Sussex, the centre of what were officially known as "the disturbed districts" (where the law was, virtually, in abeyance, and riots, rick-burning, and incendiarism were alarmingly rife). In an "Official Report" on the condition of his parish this gentleman wrote as follows:

> Within the last year the parish burdens have been much increased by the land going out of cultivation, and the whole population being thrown upon the rates. At the present moment some of the proprietors have confessed an intention of abandoning their property in the parish, the rates having more than swallowed up the rents. . . . The able-bodied poor and the boys are deteriorating physically and morally, by reason of the want of useful and productive employment, without any chance of bettering themselves by any exertion or good conduct.

The means by which the nation managed to shake off the numbing and soul-destroying incubus of the "allowance system" a century ago would prove an interesting and profitable subject of study. That it was possible is shown by the example of a parish in the lowlands of Scotland, where, without Government intervention, a

* A military historian, describing the conditions of military life at this period, tells us that our soldiers were not only badly fed, but that their unchangeable daily dinner consisted of broth and boiled beef; they were only given two meals a day. "They were vilely housed; and at night herded by fours into wooden cribs." The wives of men "married on the strength" had to take their chance, along with other occupants of the barrack rooms; and here their children were born! As for pay, a private was lucky if he received the magnificent sum of 2½d. a day.

complete reform in the management of parochial accounts was effected, and the non-assessing system re-introduced, with enormous advantage to all classes.

Previous to the year 1804, the poor of this parish, numbering some 1,300 souls, all told, had been entirely supported by the church collections and the interest of a sum of money left for that purpose. Two successive bad seasons, however, preceding the date in question, entailed an excessive demand on the Poor's Fund, with the result that the trustees were unable to meet the demand, and the subscribers being unwilling to increase their donations, there was no alternative but to fall back on the assessment system, which, in an evil moment for the parish, was adopted. For, notwithstanding the passing away of the scarcity which had led to the alteration in the system of poor relief, almost immediately afterwards, an increased demand for relief had been created, and this demand increased so rapidly that the rates soon reached five times their original amount. In the meantime the condition of the poor, so far from being improved by the increased sums spent upon them, was rapidly deteriorating; while at the same time there was more discomfort, combined with discontent, than previously existed. "In point of fact, we felt convinced," declared an influential parishioner, "that a work of mischief was going forward, and the wants of the poor would increase in the direct ratio to the augmentation of the means of supply." Meanwhile, from high-raised but unfulfilled expectations, an exasperated state of feeling was observed bursting forth, where formerly there would have been nothing but feelings of gratitude.

In view of the demoralized condition of the parish, a meeting was called, and, after much deliberation, it was decided to take the bold step of abolishing the assessments, and at the same time it was agreed that the heritors and tenants should increase their church subscriptions, without which, indeed, the change would have been impossible. At first there was considerable clamour amongst the poor, who thought themselves defrauded of their rights. And the minister of the parish, who had been the chief advocate of the change, had to bear much odium on that account. It was persisted in, however,

and the decision was justified by the result, as will be clear from a study of the following table :—

COMPARISON BETWEEN THE YEAR 1821 AND 1831.

(*The system of assessments terminated in* 1822.)

Year.	Population.	No. of Paupers.	Collections.	Assessments.
1821	1,315	36	£21 8 4	£100
1831	1,384	26	£106 19 9	None

NOTE.—The voluntary increase of Church donations began in 1822.

It will be observed that, though the population had increased by sixty-nine in the interval, the paupers decreased by ten, though the latter year had been one of great hardship in the parish. The success which had been achieved was the more remarkable, in so far as it had been attained under very adverse conditions, without the assistance of neighbouring parishes. "Had a similar system been adopted elsewhere," wrote a competent judge, "the results would have been even more marked. A moral change has already (1831) been wrought in the habits of the populace; there are far fewer applications for relief, less discontent among the poor, and greatly diminished trouble in managing them. Many persons now give voluntarily more than they were formerly compelled to pay legally towards the support of the poor; while the latter, seeing that donations are purely voluntary, are consequently less eager to push their claims on a fund whose existence depends on the kindness of their superiors, and to receive less as a matter of right than as the effects of the consideration and benevolence of the givers."

It was truly remarked at the time that the superiority of the non-assessing system must not be judged alone by the saving of the pockets of the rich, "but in regard to its effect on the principles and morals of the poor, and although its invariable effect was to diminish the poor rates, this is of infinitely minor importance in comparison with the moral change produced in the habits of the poorer classes."

Finally, it may be permissible to express a feeling of profound regret that the wealth of experience acquired by our forbears in the working of the "dole" system a century ago was not placed at the disposal of the public previous to the revival of the system in recent times.

The First Ambassadress

By Francis Gribble

It sounds incredible that a bankrupt tradesman should have introduced himself to a fashionable *demi-mondaine* and promised her that, if she would lend him a small sum of money to tide him over a temporary embarrassment, he would take her as an ambassadress to the country of the Thousand and One Nights. It sounds even more incredible that the money should have been lent and the promise kept. But the story is true. It is the story of the first French mission to the Court of the Shah of Persia.

The tradesman in question was Jean-Baptiste Fabre, a flamboyant Marseillais, who had been in business in Constantinople, but had quitted that city in a hurry, leaving his wife behind him, in order to avoid his creditors. He had been on bad terms there with M. Ferriol, the French Ambassador, who, when asked by the French Foreign Office what he knew of M. Fabre, replied, unfavourably: "M. Fabre's acquaintance with the Grand Vizir is that of a merchant who may have sold him a strip of cloth or lent him money at usurious interest. It is as if your shoemaker were to give out that he plays a great part in the affairs of state because he once made a pair of boots for a cabinet minister."

But M. Fabre had certain advantages. He knew the East. Before his Constantinople creditors took to pressing him, he had been a man of some note in the mercantile community there. His manner was impressive and plausible, and he knew how to magnify such services as his position and his knowledge of Oriental languages had, once or twice, enabled him to render to French interests. So when he called at the Foreign Office, pointed out that the Persian trade was practically monopolized by the English and the Dutch, and proposed that he himself should be placed in charge of a French commercial mission to Ispahan, M. de Pontchartrain was interested.

No doubt, if he had presented the appearance of a penniless adventurer, he would have been refused a hearing. But he did not. He was well dressed, and had an air of prosperity—thanks to the funds so conveniently advanced to him by the *demi-mondaine*, Mlle. Petit.

Of that lady's previous career practically nothing is known, except that she was the daughter of a laundress, and that her adventures in the half-world had been profitable. She had, however, a reputation for intelligence, as well as for beauty; and M. Fabre had persuaded her that, by financing him in this enterprise, she would be investing her savings to the best advantage. So, thanks to the help thus furnished—and thanks also to the fact, well known to M. Fabre, that the relations between the Foreign Minister and his diplomatic representative at Constantinople were somewhat strained—all the initial obstacles were triumphantly overcome.

It was decided to send the mission, and to place M. Fabre at the head of it. It was decided to do the thing in style, and to offer the Shah such presents as were thought likely to conciliate him. These included clocks, watches, thermometers, barometers, atlases, paintings, and cases of liqueurs; and it is an interesting fact that the attaché who took charge of the presents was the cousin of the illustrious Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose father, Isaac Rousseau, had, in that very year, taken up his remarkable appointment at Constantinople as watchmaker to the Seraglio.

These preparations made, M. Fabre's credentials were duly prepared and delivered to him; and he was provided with sufficient funds, the only serious restriction placed upon him being that he should take with him "only the persons necessary to the Mission."

There is an indication here, no doubt, that, though Mlle. Petit had been discreetly kept in the background, queer rumours had reached the ministerial ears, and M. Fabre knew better than to propose her inclusion in the *cadre*. The day of the typist in diplomacy had not yet dawned, and there was no recognized capacity in which he could very well attach a lady to his staff. He professed himself, therefore, in complete accordance with the ministerial views, took with him a surgeon, two priests, a cartographer, a number of merchants, and male attendants and servants of various degrees—about fifty persons in all—and set forth in a French ship of war in March, 1705.

And then, as they say in the story-books, a strange thing happened.

Hardly had the vessel cleared the port than one of

the male attendants went below, entered a cabin, and presently emerged from it, smiling, in feminine attire. It was Mlle. Petit, who had thus started in disguise to fulfil the functions, as she herself defined them, of "Ambassadress of the French Princesses." And no one raised any objection. The authority of the ebullient ambassador was such that not even the two priests ventured to say that they were surprised and shocked.

If she had merely styled herself an Ambassadress, her story would, of course, have been of no importance; but presently, as we shall see, she was actually called upon to sustain the *rôle*.

Not at first, however, nor for some considerable time. The beginnings of the expedition were remarkable chiefly on account of Mlle. Petit's vivacious departures from ambassadorial correctitude. The party, having got to Aleppo without incident, was there hung up, for some months, waiting for passports, and was ultimately obliged to repair to Constantinople in order to obtain them. Meanwhile there was nothing to be done except to show hospitality to the notables; and the manners of the Ambassadress at the entertainments which she graced were not the manners which Turks expect ladies of high station to adopt. It was not merely that she uncovered her face instead of letting her veil conceal it. It was not merely that, in her new *rôle* of *grande dame*, she gave receptions every evening in the French Consulate in which she was lodged. All that, though unusual, might have passed. But the Ambassadress also sent for a fife and drum band, and danced and sang, for the diversion of her guests, like any light opera artist.

When she took to doing that, the scandal was great in the eyes, not only of Turkish magnates, but also of French functionaries and priests. It fell to the priests to remonstrate; but their remonstrances were in vain. Mlle. Petit snapped her pretty fingers in their faces. Even their threats of excommunication failed to move her. They were quite welcome to excommunicate her, if they liked, she said, but, if they did, she should turn Mohammedan.

Representations addressed to the Ambassador were equally unavailing. He was not advertising his relations with Mlle. Petit. He had camouflaged her, as we should say nowadays, as the wife of his Major-Domo; and she

passed as Mme. de Hamel, though she spent much more of her time in M. Fabre's than in her supposed husband's society. And now M. Fabre protected her, refused to listen to any unfavourable comments on her behaviour, but carried the war into the clerical camp, saying that he had been charged, among other duties, with that of investigating the morals of missionaries, and that they would find his report very unpleasant reading if they molested this respectable lady any further.

The bluff served its purpose. Strange stories of the proceedings at Aleppo did, indeed, reach Paris, but the postal service in those days was slow, and the information arrived so late, and took so long to sift, that M. Fabre had reached Constantinople and, with the help of the Persian Ambassador there, started on the road to Ispahan, before the French Foreign Office had made up its mind whether to recall him or not. The dispatch directing him to proceed with his mission, but to send Mlle. Petit home, and threatening to "make an example" of him if he took her with him, duly reached the Turkish capital, but did not follow the Ambassador to Asia Minor.

Attended by a Persian escort, he got to Erivan, where he had to await formal permission to travel in the Shah's territory. It was there that his mission began to cut a dash; and it was there that the calamity occurred which gave Mlle. Petit her opportunity of playing a real part in the conduct of French diplomacy.

The Persians did not take the Turkish view of her free-and-easy demeanour. It did not matter to them that her skirts were (as the Ambassador at Constantinople reported to his Foreign Minister) shorter than was compatible with other people's standards of modesty. They were fascinated by her charms, and showed her every attention. The Khan of Erivan, in particular, was very attentive, and very hospitable; but his hospitality had an unfortunate result.

When the Shah's permit for the mission to proceed arrived, he entertained all the travellers at a farewell banquet. Towards the end of the banquet, M. Fabre was suddenly taken ill. He rapidly got worse, shrieked out that he had been poisoned, and then expired in Mlle. Petit's arms.

Had he really been poisoned? Had the Khan, fascinated by Mlle. Petit's charms, chosen this means of

removing a rival from his path? It is impossible to know, though it is easy to guess; but two things are certain: the first that Mlle. Petit herself was no party to any plot of the kind; the second that she now saw her chance to become a real ambassadress and promptly seized it.

The situation was a difficult one, for the diplomatic mission was not only deprived of its leader, but had no titular second-in-command. Discipline had broken down, and all was chaos and confusion. Some of the party proposed to write to Constantinople for instructions and sit tight till they arrived. Others were for entrusting the keys of the baggage to M. Fabre's son—a boy of fifteen, who howled in terror at the prospect—others again, were for opening the packages, dividing the contents, and dispersing. Mlle. Petit alone spoke as one having authority.

"Give me the keys," she said. "I am going to take charge of this mission in the capacity of Ambassadress of the French Princesses."

The Persians encouraged her, and she did take charge of it. Those who disputed her supremacy were bastinadoed. One of them—the Major-Domo, as whose wife she had sometimes passed—was packed off to a Persian prison and died there; and when the Persians locked up other members of the company for rioting, she asserted her diplomatic authority and insisted upon their release. But then she had to cope with opposition.

The news of M. Fabre's death had reached M. Ferriol at Constantinople, and he had, for once, been quick to act. He had dispatched a representative of his own—a certain M. Michel—with orders to travel post-haste, send Mlle. Petit home, and proceed to Ispahan in M. Fabre's place; but Mlle. Petit was not to be deposed so easily. She had set her heart upon this journey, and she had the Persians in her pocket. She smiled on the Khans, and the Khans did her bidding. Perhaps they were the readier to do so because she said very little about commercial treaties but undertook, in the character of Ambassadress of the French Princesses, to tell the Persian Princesses all about the latest Paris fashions.

In due course M. Michel arrived, only to discover that, whoever might propose at Constantinople, it was the Persians who disposed at Erivan. He and Mlle. Petit watched each other, and negotiated and quarrelled there;

and when the long-awaited message arrived from the capital, it was to the effect that he must either return or remain where he was, but that she might proceed.

So she went forward, splendidly escorted, and was received in audience by the Shah, and spent two days in Ispahan in the grand style of a fully accredited emissary of her country. There are no records to show whether it was on the subject of trade or on that of the fashions that she opened her heart to the King of Kings. But, at least, she "showed the flag" and won her title to fame as the pioneer of diplomatic relations between France and Persia.

It was the hour of her triumph—the great climax of her remarkable career—but the hour of anti-climax and discomfiture was soon to follow. While she was on the way to Ispahan to show the flag, Constantinople had reported to Paris, and Paris had been moved to action. Supplies had been stopped, and the order had been issued that Mlle. Petit must return to Constantinople and be sent thence to Marseilles, where she would be lodged in a house of detention for loose women while the charges preferred against her were being investigated.

If she had known that that fate awaited her, she would probably have stayed in Persia, turned Mohammedan, and comforted a Khan. Not knowing it, she was satisfied with her achievement, and willing to return. Her fatigues and responsibilities had, after all, been too much for her. She was wasted to a shadow, and she needed rest; and she had persuaded herself that a grateful country could not fail to recognize the value of her services.

That expectation was to some extent confirmed when she reached Constantinople. M. Ferriol insisted upon her accepting the hospitality of the Embassy in order to make sure that she did not escape; and there she fascinated him, even as she had fascinated the Khans.

There was, indeed, no question of a love affair. M. Ferriol was too old and too gouty for such relaxations. But he was none the less captivated, and his dispatches regarding her took on a new tone. He could find "nothing to condemn," he now wrote, in any of her proceedings. He had satisfied himself that she had taken good care of all the property of the mission. If her behaviour had been irregular, it was M. Fabre who had led her astray, and she must be regarded as the victim of that adventurer.

In spite of that testimonial from the diplomat who, but a little while before, had been denouncing the shamelessness of her conduct and the brevity of her skirts, she was conveyed from the Constantinople Embassy to the Marseilles house of detention for loose women. She was kept there for some time while the many charges against her were being examined, but in the end, M. de Pontchartrain decided not to punish her.

Instead of handing her dossier to the Public Prosecutor, he handed it to Lesage, telling him that it would make good material for a novel; and the reply of the author of "Gil Blas" is interesting.

The Foreign Minister's suggestion, he wrote, was very embarrassing. Some reminiscences written down by Mlle. Petit had already been placed in his hands for the same purpose. He had discovered in them a delightful heroine—an injured innocent—a calumniated victim of untoward circumstances—"a Cleopatra who, more fortunate than Cleopatra of Egypt, has the privilege of charming mankind without any moral perversity." The documents now communicated to him exhibited his heroine in very different colours. The revelation disconcerted him. Unable any longer to treat the subject as he had originally intended to treat it, he must beg to be excused from treating it at all.

His hesitation robbed the world of what might have been one of its most famous romances; but Mlle. Petit is nevertheless entitled to her niche in history. Adventuress though she was, she did show the French flag in Persia as an Ambassadress, and did save the mission from breaking up; and if it had not been for her timely loan to M. Fabre, and her ready response to his offer to make her an Ambassadress, that flag would not have been shown there until a much later date. Moreover, though the mission itself came to little good, one member of the mission—Jean-Jacques Rousseau's cousin—fell on his feet.

He went to Ispahan as attaché in charge of the clocks and watches to be presented to the Shah. He remained there as Chief Jeweller to the Persian Court. He subsequently acted as French Consul at various Persian trading centres; and a lineal descendant of his, Baron Alfred Rousseau, represented the Rousseau family at the Rousseau centenary celebrations.

Vaccination

By Dr. L. C. Dundas Irvine

It is a curious and perpetual trait of human nature that the foolish and ignorant man will be most dogmatic on the subject that he knows least about, while the savant, whose teaching would be of the greatest value, has continually to be coaxed from his shell.

There have recently been several meetings of a semi-public nature to protest against the teaching and practice of vaccination, and questions have been asked in Parliament which have elicited loud cries from the ignorant and untaught against the practice.

The British nation, whether it wishes to or not, will have to make up its mind on this subject, and that without much further delay, for the continuous increase in the incidence of smallpox is of a very alarming nature. I am not in this short article going to give long lists of statistics, and will only quote the numbers of cases notified in the first four months of each year, 1922–23—1924–25. They are:

1922	..	..	350
1923	..	..	700
1924	..	..	1,400
1925	..	..	2,300

If smallpox continues to double itself annually, the question of vaccination as a protection will become the question of the day before any of us are very much older.

Let us first take the objections urged by the anti-vaccinator and see what they really are:

1. That it is no protection against smallpox.
2. That vaccination is, in itself, a disease-producing method, and has been the cause of a multitude of horrible diseases in otherwise healthy children.
3. That it causes a great deal of suffering to animals.
4. That it is only taught and practised by the medical profession as a means of increasing their income.

Let us consider the last argument first, for it is so

demonstrably puerile, that it is easily disposed of. The great majority of doctors have been taught and unquestionably believe that vaccination does prevent smallpox. If, then, they are anxious to increase their incomes at the expense of the general public—and, thank God, I do not think that this can ever be said fairly of the profession as a whole—which would be the more paying proposition, one vaccination and a few subsequent attendances, or a severe epidemic with the whole profession working overtime to cope with it? Obviously, in urging vaccination on the public, the doctors are arguing against their pockets. It is no use saying that they would make nothing out of a smallpox outbreak, since the patients would be whisked away into isolation hospitals at once, for in such an epidemic, as is clearly before us, if the cases continue to increase in geometrical proportion, the isolation accommodation would be utterly insufficient, and patients would have to be treated in their own homes.

Is vaccination no protection against smallpox? This is the crux of the whole matter. Statistics of public health can be made to prove the affirmative or the negative according to the way they are handled, so I am going back to first principles, and will argue from them.

Smallpox is an acute and extremely infectious illness, sometimes much more virulent than at other times. (I will discuss the reason of this shortly.) It is exactly similar in its habits to all the other acute infectious diseases—scarlet fever, diphtheria, chicken-pox, measles, mumps, etc. That is, the infection can be carried on clothes, it can be passed by personal contact; there is a definite incubation period between the picking up of the infection and the appearance of the rash. These diseases breed true to themselves always, that is, one cannot catch mumps from a patient suffering from measles, or smallpox from a victim of scarlet fever: and, finally, and *most important,* there is in the great, *great* majority of cases something different in the body after an attack, some new power, some new protective mechanism which prevents a victim of one of these diseases from getting it again. This protection is not absolute, and has been known to break down, but in the vast majority of cases it is the rule that one attack protects against all others.

But, again, this protection "breeds true": an attack of scarlet fever does not protect against an attack of measles, and vice versa.

These diseases are so alike in their behaviour that there must be something in common between them. There is—they are all caused by germs. Nonsense! say the cranks—a germ, if it exists at all, is just a chance inhabitant, and can do no harm. Other cranks, more exaggerated, will maintain that the germ is caused by the disease, not the disease by the germ. It is quite impossible to argue with this type of mind. It ranges itself with that of the Great Unbeliever: "Though I saw it with mine own eyes, *yet* would I not believe."

One of the accusations, perhaps justifiably, thrown at the medical profession is that it is intensely conservative, it will not move with the times, will not accept and use new discoveries, new remedies. This is true up to a point. New discoveries are trumpeted abroad, new treatments, proprietary drugs and the like advertised on every hoarding: to succeed sometimes, to fail many times. The tests properly required by the profession are many and severe before any new thing can be accepted. The tests required by medicine before a germ can be accepted as the causal agent in any disease are simple, but they are stringent. The germ must be capable of being grown in the laboratory, and of having a constant appearance, both in colonies—to the naked eye—and singly—under the microscope. It must breed true in the laboratory on the broths and culture media used, to the "n^{th}" generation. When injected in pure culture, that is, unmixed with any other germ, into animals susceptible to the disease, it must produce the recognized symptoms. It must be capable of being recovered in pure form from the lesions on the animal when alive, or after death, of being re-grown in the laboratory, unaltered in appearance by its transit through an animal, and, finally, of reproducing the disease in exactly the same way in another healthy animal.

If then a definite germ is capable every time of producing a disease, and with the same appearance both in colonies and singly, surely it is but logical to argue that that germ is an entity, a malignant entity—the cause of

a definite chain of symptoms—which is all that a disease is.

These tests are stringently demanded before the profession will accept any germ as being a causal agent. Unfortunately our laboratory methods have so far failed to find the germ of many of the acute diseases. The germ is known only by its results. The finest filter cannot catch it, it has defied all attempts to grow it. Tubercle we know, diphtheria we know, typhoid we know, tetanus, anthrax, and many another; but so far smallpox, chicken-pox, scarlet fever (this with a query, as the germ is not yet accepted), measles, and mumps, are all caused by filter-passing germs, the causal agent has not yet been found. But they so obviously belong to the same group, so obviously obey the same laws, that no person capable of logical thought can refuse to believe that they are caused by germs.

What is then the change that takes place in the body after an attack, which protects it against another attack? No one knows for a certainty. This much is known positively and can be seen and demonstrated. When invasion of the tissues takes place, there is first an increase in the flow of blood to the part, secondly, a migration from the blood vessels into the tissues of a certain type of blood cell, known as the phagocyte. In a large number of conditions, although not in all, an actual fight takes place between the invading army of germs and the phagocytes, in which some of the phagocytes are destroyed by the poisons formed by the invading germs, while many of the germs themselves are killed and ingested (eaten) by the phagocytes—"the killed and wounded" are discharged from the body as pus. So much is known for certainty and can be seen; beyond this is conjecture. But the conjecture of the scientific, logically trained mind is usually not far from the truth. If a theory is formed which answers and explains all the phenomena it is probably pretty near the truth. Gravity cannot be seen, its effects only can be measured, but Newton's Law of Gravity was sufficiently near the truth to enable astronomers to prophesy; Einstein's Theory is only a theory, but it is accepted as fact because it explains satisfactorily, and corrects the small errors that were left by Newton's Law.

In just the same way the protective mechanism of the body can only be explained by the formation in the blood of what we will call an "anti-body," a substance which, by paralysing the germs and neutralizing their poisons, enables the phagocytes to deal with them and destroy them. This anti-body remains in the blood to a greater or less degree during the lifetime of the individual, and by the greater power it gives to the phagocytes, enables them on all subsequent occasions to drive away the invaders.

As, however, the germs of the various diseases are separate and distinct, so are the anti-bodies formed against them. The anti-body formed against diphtheria has no power to aid in the defence against scarlet fever.

Now where are we in our argument that vaccination protects against smallpox—what happens when one is vaccinated?

It has been found possible—the initial work lies largely to the credit of Pasteur—so to reduce the malignancy of some germs as to make an attack by them a very minor matter—but even a minor attack which causes the minimum of pain and inconvenience has the effect of exciting the formation of the anti-body and so enabling the blood to deal with a subsequent malignant attack. Pasteur's work was mainly done on hydrophobia. He was able by reducing (how, is no matter here) the malignancy of the germ of hydrophobia to take such advantage of the incubation period of hydrophobia, that a minor attack could be given and recovered from before the major attack developed. By his development of the germ "theory," thousands of lives have been saved and are being saved every year from a particularly agonizing and horrible death.

Smallpox, unfortunately, is caused by a filter-passing germ. But most fortunately Nature has supplied us with an "attenuated" germ. Smallpox attacks cattle much less severely than it does human beings, and a human injected by smallpox through a cow develops a very minor attack, sufficient, however, to induce the anti-body in the blood and protect against a major attack. Just as in hydrophobia, this minor attack can be given and recovered from during the incubation period of a major attack, which if it then develops at all is itself of very

slight consequence. This has been done in thousands of cases. There is no question about it. Vaccination, or the production of an attack of cowpox, does, has done, and will, protect absolutely and every time against an attack of smallpox.

The objectors argue also that vaccination is a disease-producing method and has been the cause of a multitude of horrible diseases in healthy children.

Originally vaccination did lay itself partially open to this objection, for the inoculation was done from one human being to another—now this is never done. Selected calves only are used in Government laboratories. The calves are carefully "vetted" to see that they are free from any other disease. They are infected with cowpox from other calves, themselves free from any other disease, and the lymph drawn off from them is put away in little glass tubes hermetically sealed, so that it is impossible, humanly speaking, for any other disease or germ to be present in the lymph. If then, the operation of vaccination is done properly—aseptically—as if it were a major operation, with sterile knives on a sterile skin, with sterile dressings afterwards, there will be *no* regrettable after-effects and very little disturbance in the child's health. The really bad arms seen are due to septic dressings—an ordinarily clean handkerchief or piece of rag is *not* an aseptic dressing unless it has been rendered so by being sterilized.

There recently appeared in "The Times" a letter from one of the anti-vaccinators, which repeated the usual misstatements regarding the effects of vaccination, but added the outrageous assertion that the calf lymph used is contaminated with syphilis.

Not only can he have no proof of such a statement, but positive proof exists to the contrary. In a series of experiments along a totally different line of research it was found that cattle are totally immune from syphilis.

Of course, even with this explanation you will get, as I did a short while ago, a mother refusing to allow her children to be vaccinated because the girl next door developed epileptic fits after being vaccinated and had had them ever since. Such *post hoc propter hoc* confusion of thought is by no means so rare as would be imagined.

The last argument of the objector left is that it is cruel to animals. Strictly speaking, I suppose it is, but the pain and discomfort caused by an attack of cowpox in a calf are *very* slight. They do not go off their food, they are not restless, they are insured against ever being killed or eaten. With hydrophobia the animals used in attenuating the virus do suffer—but surely, it is better that the suffering of one animal should save a hundred lives. Surely the life of any human being is worth the life of a rabbit.

But many people, although convinced of the value of vaccination, postpone it. They will argue that it is only a disease of the slums—of dirt and overcrowding.

Certainly, dirty surroundings and overcrowding make it easier for the infection to spread. Clothes that are never exposed to sunlight or fresh air will carry infection for a long time, when ten minutes' bright sunshine would sterilize them. You and I run less risk of infection than dwellers in crowded tenements, but in buses, tubes, taxis, anywhere, the infection may be lurking. If it is there we are as likely to pick it up as the dirtiest wastrel, unless we have been vaccinated. It has only to get amongst us to begin its awful work. At present the infection is of a low virulence, but this property germs have in common—that apparently, if the generations can only be transferred quickly enough from one host to another, the increase in virulence becomes very marked, and anyone who has seen a severe smallpox or smelt it, which is worse, knows what that would mean.

At present the health authorities can cope with the outbreak, even though over 50 per cent. of the people are unvaccinated; but each year the unprotected proportion becomes higher and—350, 700, 1,400, 2,300, cases of smallpox in the corresponding four months only! Such geometrical progression is a terribly quick rate of progress. If unchecked it would reach the appalling total of 300,000 cases in 1930, and 9,600,000 in 1935.

"Says Sergeant Murphy"

By A. P. Garland

The Reformed Public-house.

"What's a sane public-house, Sar'nt?" asked Heddle.

"Why is a caterpillar?" replied Sergeant Murphy.

"No. I don't mean a joke," went on Heddle. "But a chap in the paper has been writing a piece about the coming of the sane public-house, and I just wondered——"

"Oh, that," interrupted Sergeant Murphy contemptuously. "I know what you're talkin' about now. The sane public-house means prohibition be instalmints, prohibition from a flank, the thin ind of the pussyfoot wedge—sure, it's wan of the latest stunts of the timperance bolsheviks.

"You see, Heddle, the cute wans have long since made up their mind that they haven't a dog's chance of imposin' prohibition direct. The counthry wouldn't stand it. So they're thryin to lay their hands on the public-house so as to desthroy it. You, yourself, Heddle, are goin' to be reformed in a way that'll astonish you. Your primises will be improved into a cross between a cocoa-rooms and the Y.M.C.A.

"A man walks up to the counter and calls for a half of beer. You look at him sorrowfully, and say: 'Brother, wouldn't a nice cup of cocoa suit you better, or how about a glass of milk and a heart-cake?'

"If he insists you'll have to serve him with the beer, but he'll not injye it. Every time he looks at your disappointed face he'll feel that he's committin' the eighth and the deadliest of the Sivin Deadly Sins."

"Think I'll serve blinkin' cocoa?" asked Heddle indignantly.

"You'll have to. You'll be a civil servant, and every evenin' you'll sind a return in thriplicate showin' the proportion of tea, coffee, cocoa, and sarsaparilla to alcoholic dhrinks you've served, and if, on a show of hands, beer and Scotch seem to be the favourite dhrinks with your customers, you'll be appointed barman to the Chilthern Hundhreds.

"Meals will be ready at all hours. If a man bursts in here two minutes before closin' time you'll have to assume that he's on the verge of starvation, and you'll hand him the minu with a hint that the saddle of mutton is *non compos mentis*, and can't be recomminded.

"You'll hold services here three times a day——"

"Me? Hold services?"

"You might do worse, Heddle. But I'm only jokin', though with some thruth in it all.

"You see, Heddle, these timperance fellahs don't care a hoot about the comfort of a public-house. You remimber thim cafés in France where the Frinchmen used to bring their wives and childhren, and would sit for hours chattin' and laughin' and injyin' thimselves. Suggest cafés to the timperance crowd here and they begin to froth at the mouth. That's because it's not dhrunkenness they're fightin' against—though they pretind they are—it's dhrink!

"Everybody knows the dhrunkenness problem is solvin' itself. Not twinty years ago half the songs in a music-hall programme was about dhrunken min and what great lads they were. Nowadays that stuff would be hissed off the halls. And things will go on gettin' better unless dhrink is made very difficult to get. Thin be the Holy! you'll see some real dhrunkenness!

"Never mind the damfools that lay the blame on dhrink for every calamity from thriplets to thunderbolts. The fellahs to watch are the wans that say they're not in favour of prohibition, but want to have the public-house reformed.

"Don't thrust thim for wan minute. They're all hypocrites and frauds.

"Listen to this. Every other day you hear wan or other of thim—me bould Lloyd George among thim—bleatin' that we're spindin' three hundhred millions a year on dhrink.

"Now of two things wan. If they don't know that about two-thirds of that money is simply taxes they're plain fools.

"If they do know, and don't mintion the fact—well, what are they, Heddle? Answer me that!"

Within a China-Cabinet

By Mary Barnett

WITHIN a china-cabinet
With many other figures set,
Are ladies, trim and prim and neat,
Slim and straight, with little feet,
Dressed in crinolines of white,
With bodices well-laced and tight.
Well-seasoned wood, that smells so sweet,
Surrounds them, giving life complete
To mien demure, and smile discreet.

Some friends I had. When we had met
But once or twice, a glimpse was caught
Of olden days. "Such friends," I thought,
"Are in the china-cabinet."
But, when I came to know them more,
Those gentle ladies now, I saw,
Were swinging wide their long glass door,
To step demurely to the floor.
I found (to my delight, be sure)
My real friends had goodly store
Of thoughts, refinement, gentle wit.
Often, their mood was lively. Yet
They never lost a certain air
Of other days, and other things.

Of all that recollection brings,
One picture can, alone, compare
With them. About that picture clings
The smell of wood and lavender;
And, in it, with a smile discreet,
With mittened hands, red-slippered feet,
And crinolines befrilled, so neat,
There stand those ladies, as before,
With Cupid, Pan, and many more,
Within the china-cabinet.

Storm

By Arthur Salmon

THE gods are battling in the skies.
I see the smoking of their fires, the flash
Of sword and spear; I hear the crash,
The hurtling cries,
The hot defiance and the thick replies.
They throng to the earth,
Trampling the valleys and the moorland wide,
Snapping the forest trees of massive girth
Like thistle-stems a boy might thrust aside.
Far inland from the shore,
Where maddened surges strike the caverned rocks,
Goes the unceasing roar
Of raging wind and water's baffled shocks.
And when the conflict fails
In sudden moments of portentous peace,
The ravaged land bewails
Its terror as it waits the storm's increase.

O battling godheads, give
Some earnest of a guidance in your strife—
Some proof that we may live
To read its purpose in a newborn life.
Give us a promise of our betterment,
A hope for other harvests, happier days
To solace our dismays;
For old despairing bring a new content,
Love, and the dawn on far transfigured heights,
And vision purged to see the Light of lights.

The Little Sister of Christ

By Phyllis Mégroz

WHEN I was born, my mother, familiarly known to every man, woman, and child in Rouen as "La Bichette," turned round on the filthy heap of straw on which she was lying, and would have choked the life from me then and there, with the greatest satisfaction in the world, had not her neighbour entered at that moment with a bowl of cabbage soup. The opportune arrival of old Marie was due to a long-cherished desire to be even with my mother, who had once cheated her of a few coins, and she had no intention now of allowing La Bichette to free herself so easily of her encumbrance.

"Not so fast, my girl," chuckled the hag, stooping to have a look at La Bichette's brat, and grinning as she saw my mother's great red hands twitching and straining towards me, "not so fast. This morning I went round to Monsieur le Curé and told him that you were about to become a mother, so that he might be prepared to baptise the infant. And what, now, would le bon Curé say if he found the sweet child"—this with a horrible affectation of love for me—"with a necklace of your finger-marks round its throat, eh?"

Then she picked me up in her skinny arms and peered at me with her blear eyes. "A pretty cherub, a little sweeting," she mumbled, and then: "She'll never walk a step though. Look at her legs—you've brought a cripple into the world, my beauty!"

My mother remained silent. It was a matter of indifference to her whether I were pretty or plain; indeed, she was rather pleased than otherwise to hear that I was deformed.

"All the sooner dead and done with, and no questions asked," she reflected sullenly.

But she was not destined to be so easily rid of me; for M. le Curé, who baptised me in the name of Augustine, felt an impulse of pity for the weakly child, and being well enough acquainted with La Bichette's unsavoury repu-

tation, he kept a watchful eye on me to see that I came to no harm.

For the first few years of my life I was not actively unhappy. True, I was neglected, sickly, and nearly always hungry and in pain, but La Bichette left me to myself, and that was all I asked of life. Huddled up all day on a heap of rags in the bare, dirty garret that overlooked the street below, I used to watch the children clattering over the cobbles, playing their rough and tumble games. Sometimes they laughed; more often they wept and shrieked out curses they had learned from their elders. I never envied these children, though they could walk and run. No, it was the sunbeams that danced on the garret floor and the swallows who flew past the window, spring and summer, that I envied. They were so beautiful and so free that sometimes, when I saw them, bitter tears came into my eyes that were never brought there by pain. "Ugly, wretched little Augustine," I would sob, "why should not you, too, be beautiful and free?" And sometimes it seemed as though I could bear it no longer, and I would pray to the Holy Virgin to receive my soul.

When I was fourteen, the good Curé, who had baptised me, died, and if my life had not been happy before, now it was ten times worse. For La Bichette, who was middle-aged and had lost even the semblance of good-looks, vented her rage against an ungrateful world on me, and spared me neither kicks nor blows. I grew so weak that at last I scarcely felt pain when her brutal hands struck me, but with tightly shut eyes I would listen to a ringing noise in my ears that drowned La Bichette's sodden voice.

Old Marie, our neighbour, was long since dead, and next door to us there now lived Ma'mselle Cornichon, a timid, religious body who eked out a living with her needle. Ma'mselle Cornichon sometimes brought her work into my garret when La Bichette was out, and eagerly I listened to her stories of saints and martyrs and fingered the wooden beads of her rosary. But directly she heard La Bichette's footstep on the creaking stairs, Ma'mselle Cornichon would start away in a flutter and scurry back to her room like a mouse.

One day, my mother came home in a blacker rage than usual. I had been lying in a stupor of pain all day, and as I saw her stooping over me, her great fists clenched and her face swollen and scarlet with anger, a horror of being beaten grew in me. I felt that I would die at the first sickening blow, and though life was ugly and wretched enough, I did not want to die and never see the swallows and the sunshine any more. I tried to beg her to have pity on me, but my voice would not come. I just looked and looked at her, and put my hand on the corner of her shawl. The next moment I screamed—the walls rocked and fell inwards on me. . . .

When I opened my eyes, Ma'mselle Cornichon was in the room, and La Bichette was staring at me with arms akimbo. I heard Ma'mselle Cornichon say in a shrill high-pitched voice which sounded a long way off:

"See, see, the Stigmata. She-devil, you have killed the little Sister of Christ!"

Then I saw that on my hands and feet there were bloody gashes, as though they had been pierced by nails. I gave a little sob, and Ma'mselle Cornichon ran over to me and knelt by me, crossing herself three times. She would have kissed my hands and feet, but La Bichette took her roughly by the shoulders and pushed her through the door.

It was quite dark in the room now, and La Bichette threw herself down on the heap of straw in the corner that served as bed. I heard her give a grunt that was meant to express satisfaction before she fell into a noisy sleep.

The next day, my mother had a little wooden cart made for me, and early on the morrow she wheeled me into the market-place.

In the market-place of Rouen all the beggars and unfortunates were accustomed to take their stand, imploring the charity of the townsfolk. Cripples were too common to attract attention, and for that reason La Bichette had never, until now, troubled her head about me—but a cripple, bearing on hands and feet the Blessed Stigmata—that was quite another matter. In every town, reflected La Bichette, there were *miserables* with withered hands, with noseless and earless faces, with arms that terminated in stumps, but where else could you

find a crippled girl marked with the Wounds of Christ? Not one of the townsfolk, however humble, passed us by without crossing themselves, and putting a coin into La Bichette's wooden platter. Some of them begged me to bless them, but I remained dumb, tears burning in my eyes at the sad sights round me.

On one side of me there was an old woman with six fingers on each hand; and on the other stood a young boy of seventeen. They called him Louis the Fool. The face of Louis was the one thing beautiful among all the deformity. He had large clear brown eyes and bright brown hair, and when he smiled, his face was like that of the loveliest little child. I kept my eyes fixed on him so that I should not notice the terrible people round me, and when Louis caught sight of me, he smiled and nodded. At that, I felt almost happy.

We came every day to the market-place, in sunshine and in rain, summer and winter. Always the people made the Sign of the Cross when they passed me, and the coins grew heavy in La Bichette's platter. My mother fed me well now, and cared for me ungrudgingly, but I hated the touch of her hand when she plaited my hair, and shuddered when she lifted me into the wooden cart.

Every day, Louis the Fool stood by my side, and sometimes I spoke to him, but he never answered, only smiled and nodded. Once, when I had been in pain all day and could not keep back my tears, suddenly his mouth drooped and he began to sob. But when I laughed to show him I was better, he smiled through his tears, and took my hand in his. After that, he would always hold my hands, or, kneeling down beside me, he would put his arm about my shoulders. We were so happy, Louis and I; I was his sister, and he was my dear, dear brother. We never spoke to each other, only smiled, and that was how we told how dearly we loved one another.

La Bichette's most regular contributors were the good Sisters from the Couvent du Sacré Cœur. They always looked at me with such adoring eyes that I felt timid and abashed. Even the Mother Superior, Mère Clementine, would stop and speak with me. Once she asked me if I would not like to enter the convent, but I shook my head and slipped my hand closer in Louis' clasp.

"No, no, no, I will never leave thee, dear Louis!" I cried, half sobbing, and Louis leaned down and rubbed his cheek for comfort against mine.

A year and a half passed in this way, and my only unhappy times were at nightfall when La Bichette wheeled me away from Louis. La Bichette was getting fat and prosperous. She had real gold and turquoise ear-rings in her ears and a golden filigree brooch on her bosom. From the first she had nodded complacently at the friendship between Louis and me, not because it pleased her to see me happy, but because she had noticed that people gave her double alms when they saw us locked, smiling, in each other's arms.

One warm day in early spring, a plan came into my head. Why shouldn't Louis and I be together for always? We would run away to the woods, and there we would build ourselves a little house and live on the nuts and berries that Louis would gather. And we would be so happy, so happy, far away from La Bichette and everything ugly and evil. And perhaps the Holy Virgin would miraculously cure me if only I prayed all day long. This was my plan, and I clapped my hands for joy. It was mid-day, and La Bichette was drowsing in an estaminet, so I began to speak excitedly, laughing all the while.

"Louis, dear Louis," I said, "to-morrow, when *she* is at 'Les Trois Étoiles,' you must wheel me away out of the town into the woods, and there we will live, and be so happy—so happy."

Louis smiled and nodded, and I threw my arms round his neck and kissed him.

When La Bichette wheeled me home that night I could not sleep. I kept saying to myself: "To-morrow I will be sleeping in the woods with the stars looking down at me, and Louis and I will be together for always."

When I went out in my little cart next day, the sun was shining and the swallows were flying past in the bright blue sky. But when we reached the market-place, Louis was not there. I thought: "He is making ready, and when La Bichette goes away at noon, then he will come and take me away." And I was happy. But when mid-day came and La Bichette vanished into "Les Trois Étoiles," and still I could not see Louis, I grew afraid.

Mère Clementine, who was passing by, saw how pale and distraught I looked, and stopped to speak with me and ask what ailed me.

"Nothing, nothing, *ma mère*," I whispered, for a great sob was choking me. Louis, Louis, why didn't he come?

Just then La Bichette came out of the estaminet, a look of annoyance on her face.

"That fool of a Louis," she exclaimed angrily, taking no heed of Mère Clementine. "What did he want to go and get run over and killed for, I should like to know? Now I shan't get nearly such good takings . . ."

Everything swam before my eyes. A mist came over the sun and the sky grew black.

"Mère Clementine, Mère Clementine, take me with you to the convent!" I managed to cry out before the blackness closed in on me.

* * * * *

So they took me to the convent. They say that I am the little Sister of Christ, that I can work miracles, they say that I cured the miller's blind baby by laying my hands over its eyes, and that when I am dead they will put my bones in a gilded box, and they, too, will work miracles. But oh, Jesu, if indeed I am thy little Sister, lift from me the sorrow that lies so heavy on my heart and suffer me to sleep.

The Doubts of a Would-be Young Conservative

By Roy J. Nixon

In many respects I am a Conservative, but there are many points of the Conservative view with which I am unable to agree. In the first place there is the all-important subject of the League of Nations. I cannot understand why the Conservative Party gives its support to the League considering the fact that it refuses to have anything to do with the Geneva Protocol. In my view the Geneva Protocol and the Covenant of the League of Nations are, for practical purposes, one and the same, except that in the former arbitration is to be compulsory (if that be possible), whilst in the latter it is not definitely stated to be so. Both the Covenant of the League, and the League's Protocol seem to me to be the most hypocritical documents ever drawn up in the history of the world, especially when one remembers that the League affects to consider the use of force a very wicked act, and then proposes to use it itself in order to enforce its principles. The League is very similar to the Congress at Vienna, which tried to make countries, and re-arrange frontiers, succeeding so well in the case of Germany that it was directly responsible for the Great War. If the League continues we shall find that it will prove an even greater menace to the peace of the world than did the Congress at Vienna.

The Conservative Party has taken the right line with the Protocol, which would prove to be an unwarrantable interference with the rights of nations if it was ever allowed to be put into practice, and it should take the same line with regard to the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League is the direct negation of the British Empire, of which we hear so much from Conservatives, in that it professes to have a hatred of force.

When it be considered that there is hardly a scrap of the British Empire that at some time or other has not been taken from our enemies by force of arms, it will be seen that it is nothing but sheer hypocrisy for us to be a member of the League of Nations. No country can live for ever upon its past traditions, as we must do, if we remain in the League; if the British Empire is to last as a great force in the future we shall have our Trafalgars and our Waterloos just as we did in the past.

The Empire cannot disarm because it is scattered all round the world. It must keep its trade routes open and protect its distant territories. Nevertheless, the League, while looking to us to maintain a navy to enforce its arbitral decrees, will expect us otherwise to disarm.

Our continuance in the League will simply mean the ultimate dissolution of the British Empire. For instance, the natives in Africa will soon be saying to the League: "We want our independence; there are more of us in Africa than there are white men, therefore we are entitled to it." The question would thereupon be submitted to arbitration, and we should be in a very awkward fix. The Empire can only maintain its position as chief among the nations if it is prepared to fight for it. Our position at present is very similar to that of the ostrich who hid his head and then thought he could not be seen. We have joined the League, and we are trying to persuade ourselves that we are safe when all the time we *know* we are not. The League is leading up to an attempt to place all the nations under one flag—in other words, it has embraced the elusive dream of Internationalism, so much vaunted by the Socialists. Internationalism, or Universal Brotherhood is to be put into practice several thousand years before its time, if the League has its way, and the only result can be strife compared with which the Great War will be a mere storm in a teacup. Quite probably the League will be the very spark that will set the East ablaze. Imagine a pacific Europe, lulled to a sense of false security by the League; contrast with it Asia seething with discontent of wrongs both imaginary and real, and you have the material to make the greatest bonfire the world has ever seen—East and West locked in deadly combat.

If I thought that the League could be a real force in keeping the peace of the world, no one would be a more ardent supporter of it than I. Unfortunately, I believe that it is an actual menace to the British Empire, and that it is safer to put our trust in material armaments than in nebulous dreams.

Another thing that makes me hesitate about modern Conservatism is its tendency towards Socialism. For instance, judging by their actions most Conservatives believe that everyone has a right to education, meaning that the State must pay for it. I deny that such a right exists. If a person can pay for it then he has a right to it, but no one has any right to say to the State, "My children want educating; I can't afford to pay for it, therefore someone else must." That person brought the children into the world, and they are his affair—not the State's.

The same applies to many other forms of interference by the State—as, for instance, housing. No one denies that the housing conditions of this country were very bad before the State started to interfere in the matter, but I deny that State interference has made things any better. I will even go so far as to say that it has made things infinitely worse. It is no good giving builders a subsidy for building houses, because that merely means putting another tax on industry, with the result that it is less able to produce houses than it was before the subsidy was given. The trouble is that politicians of all Parties fail to face the real issues. What is the matter with living conditions in Great Britain to-day is, not that there are too few houses, but that there are at least 40,000,000 people in a country that can only decently support about half that number. We have vast tracts of fertile land in Australia, Canada, and Africa, all lying idle, and simply waiting for people to settle on them; and yet we in Great Britain to-day are quite content to remain cooped up as we now are. We propose, indeed, to build more houses, and crowd together still more. The housing problem in this country will never be solved until some of our millions are willing to emigrate to the wider spaces of the Empire. This is one important subject to which the Conservative Party should devote much more energetic attention. With the

question of emigration is also bound up the equally important question of food prices, which will never be solved by holding half-hearted inquiries as is being done at present. The reason for these high prices is that there is so little home competition that foreign producers are finding it very easy to ask high prices for their goods, and under present conditions such competition is not likely to be forthcoming.

The above comprise the chief of the many doubts of one who has for some time hesitated to declare himself an out-and-out Conservative.

Articles and letters from young Conservatives are invited. Owing to the pressure on space, brevity will necessarily be taken into consideration in selecting those for publication.

Lord Balfour in Palestine

A Reply

By Israel Cohen

THE article by Lord Raglan in the last number of this REVIEW is an unfortunate illustration of the opposition that continues to be directed by a small band of anti-Zionists against British policy in Palestine. Most of these antagonists, including Lord Raglan, have held some appointment, military or civil, in Palestine or Transjordania, and, having been "dressed in a little brief authority," they pretend to a far wiser understanding of the position than that possessed by the successive British Cabinets of the last seven years, or by the Government of Palestine itself. Their methods consist largely in misrepresenting or ignoring the facts, and it is therefore a duty to the public and to British interests in the Near East to expose their mischievous tactics.

It is rather late in the day to attempt to justify hostility to British policy in Palestine on the ground of the demarcation of that country's frontiers. The present division into Syria, Palestine, and Transjordan, can certainly not be attributed to Zionist policy. It is an open secret that the Zionists were opposed to the detachment of Transjordan, and as Lord Raglan himself has accused the Zionists of wishing to annex Damascus he is obviously guilty of inconsistent reasoning. There may be a particular Arab family that has been inconvenienced by the setting up of new frontiers, but the Zionists are all equally incommoded by the passport formalities that have been instituted, and would be the first to welcome the abolition of these restrictions.

The analogy that Lord Raglan seeks to make between the settlement of the Jews in Palestine and a hypothetical settlement of the Chinese in the south of England is utterly fallacious. It is a type of argument that is frequently employed by the anti-Zionist "die-hards," and is a proof of their deplorable ignorance of history. For the simple fact is that the Jews inhabited Palestine

for fifteen hundred years—a period longer than that in which the Anglo-Saxons and their descendants have occupied Great Britain—and as it was during their settlement in Palestine that the Jews developed their nationhood, fashioned their language, produced their literature, and created their culture, ideals, and traditions, they established an incontestable historic right to the country, which nobody would be so extravagant as to claim for the Chinese in regard to England. Equally fallacious is the attempt to show that Palestine is not an empty land by quoting the population statistics only of an exceptional area. According to the census in 1922, the total population was 757,182, and as impartial authorities, in the days before controversy about Palestine began, declared that the country could hold three or four millions—Colonel Conder even asserted that it could sustain a population of ten millions—there is every justification for asserting that the present number of inhabitants is only a fraction of what Palestine, after proper development, could hold.

But the main purpose of Lord Raglan is to prove that Lord Balfour's visit to Palestine was not a success and that it will be productive of more harm than good. The fact that elementary precautions were taken to ensure the safety of Lord Balfour in a country in which disaffection has been systematically stimulated by agitators—some of them retired officials writing provocative articles at home—and that he concluded his visit "with a whole skin," merely arouses the irony of our noble critic. But he is not very careful about the truth. He says that Lord Balfour's "tour was not without bloodshed, since it led to a party of Jewish pilgrims being attacked at Nablus." It is very questionable whether the stone-throwing by Arabs at Nablus had anything to do with the visit of the author of the Balfour Declaration, since he did not include Nablus in his itinerary, and it is well known that the Arabs of that city are the most fanatical in the country, and have thrown stones on previous occasions. But in any case their attacks involved no fatalities, and the only blood shed was that of the Paschal lamb sacrificed by the Samaritans. That Lord Balfour's visit to Damascus was marred by an

ugly riot does not evoke a syllable of regret from Lord Raglan, but just an attempt to discredit the idea that "public security is better in the British than in the French sphere." And incidentally he commits the blunder of terming Palestine "a British dependency."

It is in his observations on the Hebrew University, however, that Lord Raglan commits the most serious misrepresentations. His description of the Jews of Palestine as consisting "nearly all" of "extremists of one kind or another" is too grotesque to call for refutation. Palestine has been visited by such a succession of notable and varied personalities during the last few years, trained to observe and report—such as Lord Milner and Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Sir Martin Conway and Mr. Adolph Ochs, Mrs. Fawcett and Mrs. Philip Snowden—that we should long ago have had accounts of this population of "extremists," if it really existed. There may be some Communists in Palestine, though much fewer than on the Clyde, and there are also some who are super-orthodox in religious observance, but it is preposterous to suggest that these two classes make up the entire community and that therefore the University is doomed. The fact is that neither element has anything to do with the University, as this is administered and staffed by men of academic experience and reputation, gained in the leading universities of Europe and America, whilst some of the names on the governing board, such as Sir Alfred Mond, Professor Einstein, and Mr. James de Rothschild, should suffice to dispel any doubts concerning the ideals and principles by which the new seat of learning is animated. It should be remembered that the Hebrew University has been launched on the first stage of its career as a research institute in chemistry and microbiology, in neither of which departments is there room for Lord Raglan's bogy, Communism, and as the Institute of Jewish Studies is under the control of a committee that contains the Chief Rabbi of the British Empire and the Chief Rabbi of France, Lord Raglan need have no fear that it will form "a centre for all that is retrograde and obscurantist in Jewish theology."

In his anxiety to minimize the importance of Lord

Balfour's visit to Palestine, Lord Raglan disparages the plea made by that great statesman in his final speech for co-operation between the Jews and the Arabs, on the ground that these two peoples are separated by differences of customs and language and that "co-operation is denounced as treason by the extremists on both sides." The truth is that the Jews and the Arabs understand one another much better than Lord Raglan understands either, and that they would have made much greater progress along the road of co-operation by now but for the persistent and pernicious interference on the part of those—neither Jews nor Arabs—who are making every endeavour to keep them asunder. The Jews have repeatedly declared their desire for co-operation, and there is not a single extremist among them who is opposed to it. Besides, there has, during the last five years, been increasing co-operation between Jews and Arabs in various fields of economic effort, and their common interest in the welfare of the country is bound to lead to a continuous development of common endeavour. Lord Balfour was greeted by a number of Arabs, who testified to the friendly relations prevailing between them and the Jews, and at the synagogue in the colony of Rosh Pinah an address on this theme was delivered by Sheikh Mohammed Ali.

Lord Raglan says that "it is too early to estimate in full the results of Lord Balfour's visit," though he has done his best to try to show that only evil can result, and even concludes with a sinister warning that there may be "bloodshed and destruction" this year. His article is a singular exception to the chorus of reasoned eulogies that have appeared in the world's Press, which has welcomed in the inauguration of the University of Jerusalem the dawn of a better day not only in the history of the Holy Land but also in the development of the Near East and, indeed, of civilization as a whole. But the intolerance by which it is characterized and the misrepresentations of which it is composed will fail to impair even in the least degree the enduring value of the service that Lord Balfour has rendered to his country and to humanity at large by his recent visit to Palestine.

American Glimpses*

VIII—Automobiles

By William A. Robson

I ALWAYS regarded motor-cars as essentially desirable things until I went to the United States, where, I understand, about eleven-twelfths of all that exist in the world are to be found. Oh! those eternal strings of infernal, nerve-racking, inescapable automobiles! Every little Middle West town has its masses of parked cars, every road its endless procession. They tend to make life mechanized, and the continuous rushing about prevents an individual from ever really getting to know and to love each tree and stone in his environment. Then, again, American automobiles look all alike. They all seem to be painted a gloomy black, and they all have their hoods up, wet or fine, sunshine or snow. One longs for a splash of violent, unreasonable colour. . . .

In England a motor-car usually costs two or three times as much as in America, and is regarded as a luxury only within the reach of rather well-off people. In the States everyone has an automobile, or at least a "flivver." But the main difference is that in England motoring is a pursuit which you may either like or dislike, whereas in America the question has been finally settled: everyone is assumed to like it, and the subject is closed—or, rather, never arises. Walking is a formal act, like playing golf, which is set apart for certain days on which long expeditions are made, and hardly forms part of the daily round of life. One winter's day I emerged from a fashionable apartment in New York. "Taxi, sir?" asked the doorkeeper, getting ready to call one. "No, thank you," I said earnestly, "I prefer to use the limbs God gave me." He looked at me with an expression of puzzled bewilderment on his face. I believe he thought I was mad.

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To the visitor from Europe it is a perpetual surprise to see the remarkable competence with which the American woman manages her own car. Many an English girl can drive; but her mother cannot compete with the middle-aged or elderly American lady who dashes about unassisted in a huge saloon. When we visited a women's college in California my companions and I were taken out for a drive one afternoon by a group of the senior students in three enormous throbbing monsters driven by three small college girls whose little feet could hardly reach the pedals. It was magnificent! Yet I felt that the rows of automobiles to be observed in American colleges and universities are bad for the soul in some ways, antithetic to the best interests of education, and destructive to an atmosphere of contemplative thought. But the only objection that I heard was based on the desirability of avoiding a demonstration of the inequalities of wealth among students.

Yet after all this, I confess that the proudest moment of my life in the United States was when I showed an American college man how to start up a Ford on a frosty morning, when all his own expedients had failed!

Cocktails and Courtesans

By Horace Shipp

Fallen Angels, by Noel Coward. (Globe.)
On with the Dance. (London Pavilion.)
Sun Up, by Lula Vollmer. (Vaudeville.)

SOMETIME towards the end of the eighteen nineties the Woman with a Past came back into English literature and drama after her banishment under the frown of good Queen Victoria. Perhaps it was not so much that she came back as that she was presented by serious authors and received by serious people with sympathy and understanding, and no longer as a joke for the smoking-room or a subject for scornful charity. So *The Woman Who Did*, and *Esther Waters*, and *Tess* shocked our grandparents and broadened our parents' minds, *The Second Mrs. Tanqueray* arrived on the English stage and built her success on the newly-discovered toleration, and the outrageously Fabian Shaw went to the economic root of the matter by presenting *Mrs. Warren's Profession*. At the present moment the beginnings of this movement are interesting, because the wave has carried us to a point where the London stage threatens to become exclusively populated by ladies with Pasts or in process of manufacturing them; every heroine, wed or unwed, is given to lovers and cocktails, and a cynicism which echoes the Reformation is rapidly becoming the keynote of British drama.

I confess that I write on this matter more in boredom than in moral anger, for the theme has reached the *ad nauseam* state in my case, and mere repetition has blunted my interest in the destinies and devotions of these daughters of joy who so monopolize the stage. If one is morally concerned at all, it is that this drama of naughtiness should be assumed to reflect the manners of our time when in fact, it reflects those of a very minor section of society. There is probably an interesting field of sociological research in the reactions caused by these plays, both in the legitimate theatre and on the screen, among the

working people to whom "our betters" are thus presented, but that is outside my province, which has already almost unpardonably extended its borders by adding a social and moral consideration to an æsthetic one.

Mr. Noel Coward's much-discussed comedies might stand for this type of play. He is acclaimed on all hands as the presenter *par excellence* of the post-war jazz mind. His people live in a world where champagne and cigarettes, drugs and light love are the essentials of living, to which gramophone music and cynical epigrams add a brilliant veneer. In *The Vortex* he aimed at, and achieved, a picture of that life which should have fulfilled the Aristotelian function of purging by pity and terror, and perhaps it is not his fault that the success of his dramatic manner has lured him to artificial comedy for its own sake. So *Fallen Angels;* so the playlets in *On with the Dance*. It may be that we should only be concerned with his own virtuosity as a writer of dialogue and a creator of stage situation, and with the histrionic brilliance of Tallulah Bankhead and Edna Best in the play, and that of Delysia in the revue; indeed, perhaps the laws of pure æsthetics demand that a critic should discuss only whether Miss Bankhead or Delysia is the more perfect tipsy lady; and on the same ground the revue sketch, *Travelling Light*, should only be open to the objection that the quite sordid ending is out of key with the subtlety of the rest.

Mr. Coward in his sentimental moments, as in *The Poor Little Rich Girl*, in the same revue suggests that he is probably on the side of the angels as well as the fallen angels, but it must be admitted that there is a nasty taste left behind by much of his work. It is so much a matter of approach. The revue mind seems to demand eternal sketches about men picking up with their promiscuous loves, and it is a compliment to Mr. Coward that those of us who admire his technique and his wit should be sorry that he is devoting it to this dramatization of smoking-room anecdotes. One comes away from the revue at the London Pavilion trying to keep in mind the fascination of the Massine Ballets with their *décor* and dancing, and endeavouring to forget the cynicism and ugliness of these other scenes.

To include in this article an appreciation of Miss Lula Vollmer's *Sun Up* is to offer a corrective to the tendency towards unpleasantness which marks so much contemporary drama. The play deals with a people as simple and unsophisticated, as inarticulate and uninstructed, as Mr. Noel Coward's types are sophisticated and witty. These peasants of the Carolina mountains, slow of speech and movement, might be regarded as the last folk from whom any drama could be abstracted. Miss Vollmer has proved otherwise. When the war, which they understand so little, brings them up against problems, when love and death, hate and revenge and forgiveness move among them these simple lives become as beautiful as they are intensely dramatic. The drama comes entirely from the facing of those problems by a peasant folk, and the magnificent loyalty to their own standards. Widow Cagle, as Lucille La Verne presents her, is not only one of the finest pieces of acting I have seen, but is besides a literary creation and conception of supreme power. She is absolutely convincing from start to finish, and in the subtlety of her dry-eyed inarticulate farewell to her son, when only the trembling of her lip and the fallen pipe reveal the depths of her passion, as well as in her great scene when she tries to kill the son of her enemy, she keeps one breathless. The humour—thank heaven it is not wit—is as exquisite as the pathos, and Miss Vollmer is not ashamed to give her play a moral.

I wondered why it was that I would rather meet and know any one of the characters from Miss Vollmer's play than those brilliant young people from Mr. Noel Coward's or those deafeningly witty people who moved through Princess Bibesco's *The Painted Swan*, another play of this cocktail and courtesan genre, and I concluded that the answer lay in the phrase I have just used: "loyalty to standards." If as human beings we add one inch to our stature it is because of that; if, indeed, there is any drama in life it comes from that, even though the standard be that of keeping up appearances. Mere license means the end of drama, if not the end of humanity, and one cannot but think that Miss Vollmer's peasants are of considerably more importance than the current fashionable misrepresentation of the upper ten.

Castlereagh the Pacificator

A Reputation Vindicated

By G. Le Grys Norgate

The second Marquis of Londonderry, who until the last year of his life was Viscount Castlereagh, has been one of the most cruelly misjudged of British statesmen. He has suffered alike from the calumnies of political opponents and the denigrations of the friends of his Tory rival Canning, and has scarcely benefited from the undiscriminating praises of partisans such as Alison. Lord Sumner's article in the *Dictionary of National Biography*, it is true, did justice to his merits, and the author of *British History in the Nineteenth Century* has drawn attention to his important services in smoothing the strained relations of his country with the United States; but till the recent publications of Professor C. K. Webster, of which the work before us* is the most complete, Castlereagh's importance as a European statesman has been more truly appreciated abroad than in Great Britain.

The closing years of a political career which had included valuable contributions to Irish and Indian policy as well as to the conduct of the war against Napoleon are handled in masterly style by our author. Detailed as is the treatment—" perhaps three or four hundred thousand letters, dispatches and memoranda have been consulted "—the result is eminently readable; the book is, in fact, a triumph of mind over matter. If the minutiæ of diplomacy are not for everyone, special departments of it, such as the Eastern question and the relations of Britain and America, will appeal to many as being of permanent interest, whilst to any reader at all attracted by modern history may be commended the introductory chapter headed " The Factors

* " The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh," 1815-1822, by C. K. Webster, M.A., Professor of International Politics, University of Wales. Bell and Sons. 25s.

of Foreign Policy," and the final estimate of the subject of the book and his work.

Two points which are emphasised are Castlereagh's experiment in what afterwards became known as the Concert of Europe and his preference for personal intercourse over written dispatches as a method of diplomacy. He believed in constant conferences of the Great Powers to continue the association which had begun for war purposes and was now to be used for the checking of national jealousies; but he steadfastly opposed their utilisation for interference in the internal policy of separate States. Canning, with his brilliant phrases and Parliamentary gifts, has received almost all the credit which was largely due to the diligent spade work of his predecessor in opposing the specious schemes of the Tsar Alexander and his Holy Alliance, which the Whigs industriously laboured to confound with Castlereagh's own system. The latter's object was peace on the basis of the settlement of the treaties of 1815, with France as a consenting and co-operating factor; but though he abhorred revolution he was equally opposed to reaction in the form of a bolstering up of despotic dynasties. So long as he could use his personal influence he was able to make head against Alexander and his allies; but the strain of the double load of conducting foreign affairs and leading the House of Commons proved in the end too much for his strength, with the result of a tragic death by his own hand.

Professor Webster convincingly defends Castlereagh from the charge of having been the dupe of Metternich, and of having unduly subordinated English to European interests; and he shows that he was by no means neglectful of the rights of the smaller States. The Foreign Secretary's personal influence was supplemented by some masterly dispatches, such as the circular of January 1st, 1816, printed in the appendix, and that of January 16th, 1821, on Eastern policy, by means of which he instructed his ambassadors. He was not always as perspicuous in his language as in these documents: in one communication he writes of "extinguishing cobwebs"!

Castlereagh had little support from his colleagues except Wellington, and was often much hampered by King George IV's domestic disputes and the latter's hostility

to his own Prime Minister. Had he not been as loyal as he was patriotic, the Foreign Secretary might easily have supplanted Liverpool, who had given the King dire offence on the divorce question. Despite his oratorical deficiencies, he was an admirable leader of the House, though Professor Webster finds his preference for keeping Parliament in the dark on foreign affairs to have been the great defect in his career. In the question of the Sicilian Constitution he even "deliberately deceived" it. Castlereagh is condemned also for failing to appreciate "the fact that nationality and self-government were the master forces of the nineteenth century."

Yet, making all allowances for defects in vision, Castlereagh must be given credit for having kept the European machine in the main steady in spite of tremendous difficulties; and the author sums up the record of a man who has been constantly vilified as a cold-blooded and brainless despot in these words: "No statesman ever gave himself more completely to the public service. He sacrificed to it not only his comfort and his health, but all those intimate emotions which are the greatest part of the lives of most men." That, despite his baffling reserve, Castlereagh was very human, the touching attachment of his subordinates amply testifies, not less than Wellington's concern for him and the distress of Metternich at his loss.

The book has a good portrait and a full index.

Books

ESSAYS AND GENERAL LITERATURE.

MAINLY VICTORIAN. By STEWART M. ELLIS. Hutchinson. 21s.

As a vindication of Victorian literature this book is to be welcomed. Of the few items which justify the qualification in the title, the reprinted "Saturday Review" article on "Byron and His Sister," which is the best short statement we have seen of the truth about the "Byron Mystery," is the only one that really merits attention. But the essays on R. H. Barham, Thackeray's Illustrations, "Phiz," Surtees, Lefanu, and, more especially, those on the once popular but now forgotten novelists G. P. R. James and Frank Smedley, are really useful contributions to critical biography. The author propounds a more than plausible theory that Lord Steyne was a composite portrait founded on three originals, and recalls an interesting allusion of Oscar Wilde to the living model from which Becky Sharp was drawn. He shows statistically that the prolific G. P. R. James has been calumniated in the matter of his "solitary horseman" and "two cavaliers," and that he not only took note of Thackeray's "Punch" parody, but himself indited a humorous defence of these much-ridiculed figures. The truth is that James's history was better than his literature, though he has had illustrious admirers. The relation between Lefanu's curious methods of work and the nature of his output is well brought out, as also the contrast between Smedley's frail physique and the robustness of his compositions. There is interesting matter in the article on "Dickens and Forster," but Mr. Ellis effectually demolishes, as he proceeds, his own preposterous assertion that the latter's life of the former is generally acknowledged to be amongst the few great English biographies. In the essays dealing with De Morgan and Austin Dobson, among more recently deceased Victorians, Mr. Ellis is able to impart an intimate touch due to personal acquaintance; and he shines as an expert in literary topography. The only women whom he has taken as subjects are Agnes Strickland, Adah Menken, Mrs. Asquith, Mary L. Pendered, and Miss Sheila Kaye-Smith (whom he claims to have discovered before the critics); but, except in the first case, these are among the themes of ordinary brief reviews, of which the volume is to a great extent made up. The preface should be studied by those disparagers of a great age who found their censures largely upon pure ignorance. They will learn from it that not a few of their own idols were themselves among the despised Victorians.

THE LIFE, DIPLOMATIC CAREER, AND LITERARY ACTIVITIES OF NICOLAS GERMAIN LÉONARD. By WILLIAM MOSELEY KERBY. Librairie Ancienne Edouard Champion. 45 francs.

As Mr. Kerby points out, the works of Nicolas Germain Léonard are, in general, but little known even to experts in French literature. The righteousness of this relegation to obscurity will, it is to be feared, not be called in question by the publication of Mr. Kerby's elaborate

volume of 470 pages; for Léonard was undoubtedly what Dr. Johnson would have called a "dull dog." His life and diplomatic career are adequately summed up by stating that he was Secretary to the French Embassy at Li ge from 1773 to 1782, during which period he acted frequently as *chargé d'affaires*. His literary activities resulted in a fair-sized mass of poems, three of four novels, an account of a journey to Guadeloupe, one tragedy and one comedy in verse (neither of which was ever acted)—but none of them animated by a single spark of originality. The contemporary criticism of the "Mercure de France" and his "Idylles et Poëmes Champêtres" applies, indeed, to all his work: "Le plus grand défaut de tout son Receuil, c'est qu'il est vide de poésie et d'idées." In his verse, he was the chief French imitator of the German idyll or pastoral poem of the school of Gessner; in his novels, he was a faithful disciple of the author of "La Nouvelle Héloïse," and his "Lettres de deux Amants" (which was also greatly influenced by Richardson's "Clarissa Harlowe") was described by Saint-Beuve as a *succès de larmes*. It remains only to say that Mr. Kerby has done his self-imposed task with admirable thoroughness; it is an example of painstaking research.

THE NOVELS OF HENRY FIELDING. By AURELIEN DIGEON. Routledge. 10s. 6d. net.

M. AURELIEN DIGEON's admirable volume on the "Novels of Henry Fielding" naturally emphasizes the marked contrasts between "Clarissa Harlowe" and "Tom Jones"; but he cannot conceal the fact that both were expressly directed against the falseness and artificiality of their predecessors. Richardson's aim was primarily moral, Fielding's artistic, but both were determined to work from real life—one by the conscientious analysis of sentiment, the other by humorous and dramatic characterization. By intention, at least, Richardson's moral conventions are in advance of what Fielding simply accepted as frankly "a gentleman's code": the robust "wild oats" formula that is peculiarly England's own.

Though in art a zealous reformer, proudly proclaiming that he had created "a new thing," Fielding remains emotionally *the* eighteenth-century type. But in calling "Tom Jones" a Comic Prose Epic, and insisting that it is a "history," not a "romance," Fielding means precisely what he says, and achieved what he meant to accomplish. M. Digeon shrewdly defines an epic as "the complete expression of collective life . . . the soul of a generation, in all its fullness and all its depth, perhaps in all the dimness of its hidden dream." He is no less suggestive and illuminating upon the picturesque variant, "Jonathan Wild"; the parody that forgot itself for something far bigger, "Joseph Andrews"; or that tender feminine perfection, at once perfect and utterly human, "Amelia"—most wisely declared as capable, under happier circumstances, of equal courage and spirit with Sophia Weston herself. Fielding understood woman in the best, if not the only, way by loving his wife, and if M. Digeon might hesitate thus to generalize, he plainly accepts the explanation of the "truth to life" in these heroines.

NOTES ON THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE SHAKESPEARE PLAYS AND POEMS. By BASIL E. LAWRENCE. Gay and Hancock. 15s. net.

IF there may be some excuse for guessing that Bacon wrote the plays, there is none for asserting that Shakespeare did not. To call the "accepted" authorship "impossible" is to ignore the "miracle" of genius: itself far greater than any "the Shakesperian has to believe."

Dr. Lawrence, indeed, does not exactly claim that Bacon *wrote* the plays. He *produced* them, as also some half-dozen important unacknowledged prose works, by setting a group of poets and playwrights to patch up old plays, allowing "Shaksper of Stratford" to put in "tags for the groundlings," and flavouring with the "Bacon touch." The small part thus generously left for "Shaksper" explains the "stage-craft," which might otherwise bother Baconians.

These ingenious conjectures, certainly well contrived to meet some of the strongest arguments against Bacon-authorship, are supported by a wealth of learning and allusion, plentiful quotation, and a fine conception of Bacon's lordly determination to "educate mankind." The innumerable applications of phrase or thought to incidents in Bacon's life or the ideas expressed in his acknowledged writings only prove the supreme humanity and stupendous intellect of the plays. Had equal industry been applied to associate them with any other of the great Elizabethans, very similar results would have emerged.

It is, finally, unthinkable that *Hamlet* or *Romeo and Juliet* were produced by a company of back-stairs courtiers. The problem is one of psychology, not biography. Is such genius more likely to have sprung from the "Forest of Arden" or from the ambitions of a politician? There can surely be no doubt. Will Shakespeare was not a myth, but a man.

FICTION.

SANDITON: A FRAGMENT OF A NOVEL. By JANE AUSTEN. Clarendon Press. 7s. 6d.

IT is an open question whether the publication of unfinished, unrevised work can be just to an author, or desirable for the reader. But we have only welcome for anything new from so rare a genius as Jane Austen, whose output, moreover, was tantalizingly small. This last "fragment" offers delightful reading in itself, with many examples of her subtle and polished humour, while the critic will learn much from such evidence of her methods in working up the artistic perfection of phrase and character in everything she herself considered worthy of print.

Here the characters are introduced with many a clear, firm touch. We can see how they will face life, and are already longing to know what life has in store for them. The "hero" does not seem to have appeared, but Charlotte Heywood's lightly satirical observation of her first "visit from home" indicates that she, and not Clara, the villain's victim, will probably play heroine. Once more the accomplished wickedness of "Sir Edward" is playfully borrowed from the popular novels of her day, which Jane Austen delighted to expose.

The plot is also comfortably on the way to arrange itself according to one of her favourite plans, although the neat handling of a "commercial speculation" is new material for her to attempt; and, for the first time, one of the "characters" is developed from an exotic, mixed race.

LOVE. By the Author of "Elizabeth and her German Garden." Macmillan. 7s. 6d. net.

THE COUNTESS RUSSELL treats her great theme from the point of view of disparity of age in the lovers concerned; two sets, elderly husband and girl-wife, and middle-aged woman with a young adorer. Romance in both cases is at fever heat, the very disparity accentuating the belated passion, and giving a tinge of sunset glory and autumn richness to phenomena associated with dawn and spring. The sun sets and the leaves fall, to continue the figure, and there is an undertone of depth and tenderness of comprehension beneath the charming malice and delightful fun of family complications—daring even for the author of "Elizabeth"—for the elderly parson, who is erotic even in his sermons, is the son-in-law of the sweet little widow so hotly pursued by her young lover; a terribly self-righteous, disapproving son-in-law, too, with a mother of equally stern reserve, both figures of anger and mirth who dominate the pliant girl-wife and bring grave unhappiness upon the innocent. The story is told with that brilliant expertness which is the writer's personal secret. It gallops, it is full of little unexpected happenings, it is full of fun near tears and indignation leaning towards laughter; it is, in short, a gay embroidery upon the fringe of love with just enough of the darker thread to leave a little ache in retrospect.

CARAVAN. By JOHN GALSWORTHY. Heinemann. 7s. 6d. net.

NINE hundred and fifty pages of Galsworthy stories and sketches, covering the years between 1900 and 1923, at the price of an ordinary novel, is a bargain to rejoice in—remainder price, but not remainder biscuit, though there is a Galsworthian dryness, comparable to that of the best sort of English biscuits. Your Bath Olive or your Thin Captain—nothing sugared. Mr. Galsworthy does not gesticulate, and it is this Englishry of his which has won for him his great place in public estimation capable of discrimination. The short story of commerce has so run away from artistry into pyrotechnics of psychology and sensation that stories in a level tone, by one who knows that it is the way and not the end that should delight, come with peculiar appositeness into a competitive stream of brilliancies. As Galsworthy slyly points out in his prologue, the sting in the tail of the scorpion sometimes kills the scorpion itself; a condensed criticism well worth pondering of editors. In this one-man show Mr. Galsworthy has coupled up his fifty-six stories, an older and a newer, of related theme, in the manner of an intelligent editor, so it is impossible to escape comparison, though to tell the truth these two decades have marked small change in a mind already matured. There is, perhaps, a certain gain in what playfulness the writer allows himself, a crisper perfection of touch, e.g. the trainer in "Had a Horse," a portrait as economical and swift as a drawing by Phil May; but the point of view, detached, appreciative, and sober as the Bank of England,

in spite of deeply comprehended character, and drama, in which a lesser writer would tear a passion to tatters, remains pure Galsworthy, whom only a badly-treated animal can move to excitement. An admirable and admirably-presented collection.

THE GEORGE AND THE CROWN. By SHEILA KAYE-SMITH. Cassell. 7s. 6d. net.

THIS story of Sussex and Sark gives us the whole gamut of Miss Sheila Kaye-Smith's quality: her territorial aptitudes, her delight in a well-moving tale, and her insight into the depths behind the surface gestures of inarticulate folks. "Dan Sheather," the wholesome son of the adventurous "George," which faces the prosperous "Crown" across the village street, combines the stolid decency of the South Saxon with a tinge of romance derived from his Sarkoise mother. By slow but sure processes he disentangles the complexities of choice suddenly presented to him in pregnant moments. Sweet-bloodedness and horse-sense are his heritage, and fate fits the burden to his broad back rather remorselessly. Dan's is a character to delight one with his honest Englishry, and yet there is a touch in him which responds to the rock-strewn seas of Sark. The author's sureness of touch gives us the island atmosphere and its contrasts with the quiet Down county, when Dan flees from a broken love to take refuge with his French-speaking cousins and stumbles grandly upon an idyll; but Belle Shackford, the full-blown Sussex rose, is the eternal feminine for his poetic side, and she tries his manhood to the limit of endurance. Belle is another fine full-length in a gallery of life-like sketches. She is the Crown of this fine piece of work, and Dan the George—almost the Saint George.

THE ROMANTIC TRADITION. By BEATRICE KEAN SEYMOUR. Chapman and Hall. 7s. 6d.

MRS. SEYMOUR'S novel has to be regarded in its dual capacity of a story, and of a story with a thesis. In the first category it is an indisputable success, justifying the editions into which it is climbing. Its authoress has made her own task difficult, and incidentally given her book much more form than the average loosely woven novel, by telling her complex story from the viewpoint of one actor in the drama; her sense of characterization is infallible; and her prose style, though it tends to lose the humorous minor touches which added a delight to her first books, has become more sure. This combination ensures an interesting story worked out by live people, and presented in a style and manner which justify the optimistic prophecies of Beatrice Seymour's writing. As a thesis novel "The Romantic Tradition" is rather a boomerang. If its business is to attack that "treacle-tub" philosophy of life which makes it 75 per cent. romantic sex interest, its actual effect is to show that life is roughly 95 per cent. of that ingredient. Nor can it be said that the tragedies came from the characters who were imbued with the romantic tradition; examination reveals that it was the hard-headed lady with a mistaken theory of the science of heredity who laid the foundations. But this is a problem for fireside discussion after the book has completed the family circle.

BOOKS

SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

CURIOUS SURVIVALS. By DR. GEORGE C. WILLIAMSON. Herbert Jenkins. 12s. 6d. net.

FROM time to time one reads in the daily Press of quaint, old-world charities and customs that are still maintained in various parts of the country. There is our old friend the Biddendon cakes, for instance, with the quinquennial dancing festivities at St. Ives, and the Helston "Furry Dance." These and a host of others are all chronicled in Dr. Williamson's account of curious survivals. The book, indeed, is a very encyclopædia of ancient rights and privileges, and will prove a mine of information to the student for many years to come. The City of London, which is especially rich in jealously guarded customs, receives full attention; thence, after considering the privileges of the Houses of Parliament, we study manorial courts, tenures, and customs. Legal and ecclesiastical ceremonies provide most interesting reading, and in this connection we should note the chapter on the Norman-French survivals in the Channel Islands. The temptation is great to quote at large from so varied a selection, but lack of space forbids the inclusion of more than one reference. Who has heard, we wonder, of the custom which demands the presence of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and his principal clerk at the Ascot races? For over a hundred years it has been the practice for London's chief magistrate (or, failing him, another magistrate) to attend this race meeting in order to be at hand to punish any offenders. There is even a small guard-room provided on the grand stand for the confinement of any prisoners. As a matter of fact, Sir Chartres Biron or his representative is rarely, if ever, called upon to exercise his powers, but a London magistrate must be in evidence at Ascot during the days of racing in accordance with a regulation made by George III. His Majesty on one occasion was annoyed by a disturbance at the meeting and by the delay that ensued in punishing the offenders. Dr. Williamson's book will be found vastly entertaining to the general reader; by the student it will be welcomed as a work of reference.

VERSE.

THE BEST POEMS OF 1924. Selected by THOMAS MOULT and decorated by PHILIP HAGREEN. Jonathan Cape. 6s. net.

THIS fascinatingly produced and decorated volume is the successor of similar collections for the years 1922 and 1923. Its title is perhaps unduly ambitious, especially as Mr. Moult's field of choice has been limited to English and American periodicals, whilst other obvious sources of the "best" contemporary poetry have not been drawn upon. He has certainly rescued some beautiful things from the oblivion of the journals. It would be difficult to find poems more perfect in their several kinds that Wilfrid Wilson Gibson's "The Fowler," Francis Cornford's "Provence," A. E. Coppard's "Stay, O Stay," of the seven brief lyrics of Sara Teasdale, to name only a few where many are of high quality. These truly might claim in any year the inalienable superlative.

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Delightful Tours in South Africa

South Africa is alluring all the year round. The intricate beauty of the Cape Peninsula, that land of fruit and flowers, with its noble panoramas of tinted peaks, sunny woodlands and bright blue bays; the austere grandeur of the drier inland mountain regions; the splendour of Victoria Falls, supreme river of wonders; and the spell-binding veld, so various in form and mood, will prove a revelation to the visitor travelling for change.

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Write for a copy

With the Prince in South Africa

By A. M. Adams

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Empire Notes

East African Commission's Report

It will be interesting to see whether the principal recommendations contained in the report of the East African Commission are adopted by the Imperial Government. These cover a wide field but those of most immediate importance relate to the improvement of transport facilities. The commission urges consideration of an East African Transport Loan Guarantee Bill to authorize the issue of a loan for £10,000,000, guaranteed as to principal and interest by the Imperial Government and ranking as a trustee security. It is proposed that for the first five years interest should be payable by the Imperial Exchequer, the charges thereafter falling upon the transport services or, if these are still unable to meet the full service of the loan, upon the revenues of the various East African territories. After ten years it is contemplated that the

repayment of the interest advanced during the first five years could be begun. The report recommends construction of three railways in Tanganyika territory to link the north end of Lake Nyasa and the south end of Lake Victoria with the Tanganyika Central Line and to connect the Central and Tanga Railways via Kondoa Irangi and Arusha. The absolute necessity of the Zambezi bridge to the development of Southern Nyasaland is stressed and a future connection between the Uganda Railway and the Upper Nile north of Lake Albert is outlined. It may be doubted whether the extensive mileage of new line in Tanganyika territory proposed will be in a position to pay its way within ten years but it is probable that the commission was not uninfluenced by considerations of a politico-strategical nature. Opinion is certainly by no means unanimous as to the wisdom of committing the sparsely populated Tanganyika territory to the heavy expenditure that will be involved if this programme is adopted. The report recognizes that the commission's proposals make some demand on the British taxpayer for the initial period but it maintains that the indirect benefits of increased trade and production within the Empire will more than counterbalance any initial sacrifice and that half the capital sum would be spent in Great Britain on material which would provide work for the engineering industries and thereby lessen unemployment.

Hudson Bay Railway

AFTER a long period of inactivity work is to be resumed this year on the Hudson Bay Railway, an undertaking which for more than a decade has aroused much controversy in Canada between the Western grain growers and the Eastern interests concerned with the transport and storage of wheat via the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence and Atlantic ports. It is stated that £4,000,000 has already been spent on this railway and the earthworks are practically complete to Fort Nelson on Hudson Bay, although about a hundred miles of track have still to be laid. Mr. Graham, the Dominion Minister of Railways, stated in Parliament that $180,000 to $200,000 would be spent this year on rehabilitating the existing portion of the line and that ultimately it would be completed. Whatever value

the railway may have as a colonization line to open up Northern Manitoba to settlement and to bring a region believed to contain valuable minerals into touch with the outside world it is difficult to take it seriously as a means of exporting grain from the prairies to Europe. Hudson Strait is only open to navigation from the middle of July to October, so that shipment of wheat by this route would only be possible for a few weeks after the beginning of harvesting. Moreover considerable expenditure on lighting and ice patrols would be required to make this strait reasonably safe for shipping. It has been suggested that as an alternative to the export of grain via Hudson Strait it should be carried by water across to James Bay at the south end of Hudson Bay and railed thence to Montreal but even this modification of the original plan has serious disadvantages. Indeed it is political pressure from the West rather than economic considerations that has caused different Ottawa governments to lend more or less half-hearted countenance to the project. It is interesting to note that Mr. Meighen, the Conservative leader, in the course of the recent debate in the Dominion Parliament, expressed the view that it would be wise to complete the railway.

New Zealand's Loss

THE death of Mr. Massey, who had been Prime Minister of New Zealand for nearly thirteen years and was within a few months of eclipsing the record set up by his famous forerunner, Richard Seddon, is a great loss not only to the Dominion, whose destinies he had guided with so much sagacity through the war and the difficult period of reconstruction which followed, but to the Empire, to whose interests he was equally devoted. That New Zealand has emerged so successfully from the post-war depression and has regained a position of great prosperity, is very largely due to the courageous policy followed by Mr. Massey. An Ulsterman and intensely proud of his native land, Mr. Massey spent all his working life in the Pacific Britain of his adoption and, although he retained all the solid characteristics of his race, the dourness which is not the least prominent of them had been mellowed by his lifetime's residence in the more genial climate of the Southern seas.

With the Prince in South Africa

By A. M. Adams

If there were any doubts as to the welcome awaiting the Prince of Wales on his arrival in South Africa those doubts have been dispelled long since, for from end to end of the Union the popularity of "the Empire's Ambassador" is assured. From the moment he set foot on South African soil at Capetown—that golden portal to a glorious land—the Prince of Wales has received nothing but the most ardent expressions of loyalty and enthusiasm from the South African people of all ranks and of all classes. Racial differences have been completely forgotten since his advent, judging by the triumphal progress which he has made on the first part of his tour.

Since his arrival in the Union he has travelled many hundreds of miles over veldt and mountain passes, and he seems to have fallen under that extraordinary spell which South Africa casts upon those who come to her. On the few occasions when he has had an opportunity to rest he has enjoyed to the full riding across the vast open spaces of the veldt under the winter sunshine, invigorated by the tonic air which just now has that "tang" in it which makes one feel rejuvenated in mind and body.

At Capetown, one of the most beautifully situated cities in the world, built under the shadow of majestic Table Mountain, he has seen the links with the historic past, which surround the "mother city" with a romantic atmosphere which few other places in the world possess. He has visited such national landmarks as the Castle (the oldest building in South Africa, dating from 1666) and other relics of the early days of settlement at the Cape by Dutch and Huguenots, and has been able to contrast them with the fine new buildings which lend such an air of dignity to the city—visible signs of the progress which this new, yet old, country has made and is making year by year. He saw young South Africa afloat at Simonstown, the naval base, when he visited the training

ship *General Botha*, where, thanks to the generosity of Mr. T. B. F. Davies, South African boys are learning seamanship to join the British mercantile marine. Many of them may pass into the Royal Navy and perhaps some day form the nucleus of a South African Navy.

This naval station, surrounded with such magnificent scenery, is near the end of the most wonderful motor drive in the world—to Cape Point—which His Royal Highness included in his Capetown itinerary. The drive, 100 miles, is a complete tour of the Peninsula, with all its magnificent scenic effects of sea, mountain and sky, and is a remarkable feat of engineering skill. At many points the road skirts steep precipices, as it winds in and out around the mountain which rises sheer above the road, with the blue waters of the ocean sparkling hundreds of feet below in the land-locked little bays which come into view as the motor purrs along.

On this delightful motor expedition the Prince will have seen the South African "Chequers," otherwise, Groote Schuur, the home of Cecil Rhodes, bequeathed by him to the Prime Ministers of the Union as a residence. It is a dignified specimen of Dutch architecture, standing alone on the slope of the mountain Rhodes loved so well, amidst beautiful surroundings, with the national memorial to Cecil Rhodes not far away. From the steps of this one has a magnificent panoramic view of the bay, with the fairy-like Hottentots Holland mountains in the dim distance. The slopes of the mountain during the autumn and winter are covered with the beautiful heaths and the more opulent protea for which the Cape is famed, while the silver trees rustle in the breeze giving an impression, under the direct white light of the South African sunshine, of silver plating. On his return towards Capetown the Prince will also have seen the fine old Dutch homestead, Groot Constantia (of which the South African Pavilion at Wembley is a replica), now the Government wine farm, but over two centuries ago the home of Governor Van der Staal, to whom the Cape owes the avenue of oaks (Government Avenue, Capetown, and that other and finer avenue at Stellenbosch), where the two-hundred-year-old oak trees cast such grateful shadows during the noonday heat.

In this quaint and delightful old town, the second oldest in the Cape, the Prince had a wonderful demonstration of the warm-hearted and spontaneous loyalty of the people of this mountain-girt and fertile district, renowned for its wine and fruit farms.

South Africa is very proud of the fact that the royal saloons used by the Prince during his travels by train in the Union and in Rhodesia were made entirely in the Union, and that the wood used was grown in the country. As a matter of fact, the first piece of timber was only cut in the middle of last October, so that the work has been remarkably speedy. There are two coaches, one for the use of the Prince and the other for the members of his staff. His Royal Highness has a main saloon, study, bedroom and bathroom in his coach, the saloon having long windows at one end and a glass-panelled door, so that it can be used as an observation car from which an unobstructed view of the country through which he is travelling can be obtained. All the appointments in the coach are in excellent taste and up to date in every particular, including electric fans, telephone and communicating bells connecting with the staff coach, also a service of hot and cold water. During the cold weather the coaches are steam heated, and while passing through sub-tropical belts the train is perfectly ventilated and cooled. A special chef is in charge of the culinary department of the royal train during the tour.

Already His Royal Highness has visited Durban, which, at this period of the year, is the most fashionable coastal resort. Being sub-tropical, the winter season is the most pleasant time at Durban, when the hotels are filled with gay crowds of visitors from all over the Union, who come to enjoy the delights of surf bathing, which is one of the features of the season, moonlight bathing parties being very popular. As the Prince is so interested in racing it is a pity that he could not remain for the race for the July Handicap, which is one of the leading racing events in South Africa, and the principal social event of the season. He will stay at the King's House, Durban, the residence of the Governor-General, when he is visiting that beautiful city which, apart from being the leading

port in the Union, is rapidly growing to an equally important place as a commercial and manufacturing centre.

Much of his tour will be devoted to visits to the native territories—Zululand, Swaziland, Basutoland, the Transkei, Pondoland, and Bechuanaland, and it is also arranged that he will hold "indabas" in Rhodesia with the Chiefs of the Matabele, Mashona and Barotse tribes. Thus he will be able to judge of the wonderful loyalty of the natives and their eagerness to pay homage to "the son of the Great White Chief." At Umtata in the Transkei (Cape Province), the Prince met representatives of the native "Bunga," or Council, which meets annually to discuss the administration of the Province. Although they have self-government to a certain extent, the members of the "Bunga" cannot pass any resolutions, which have not been ratified by the Union Government. In this territory alone there are about one million natives (the white population of the Union is only about one and a half millions), who are peaceful and law abiding, engaged extensively in agriculture, stock raising, and wool production, the wool from the Transkei being one of the main exports of the territory.

His visit to Basutoland is now a thing of the past, as he stayed at Maseru, the capital, towards the end of May, and enjoyed some excellent polo. The Basutoland Council (which is composed entirely of natives) is quite different from the "Bunga" in its constitution, the Resident Magistrate holding the office of President of the Council. The Basutos are a fine people. They still live as their forefathers did, recognizing their chief as the visible embodiment of their communal existence, all their life being centred in the tribal organization in which they live. It is difficult for any white man to realize the depth and the sincerity of the native's devotion to his chief and his tribe, which is complete and absolute. The native is prepared, at a moment's notice, to forsake everything, home and family, when his chief calls, and to obey his behest blindly, without question. Where the native in South Africa is concerned that is the main thing which must be understood, and in every tribe it is exactly the same. Self is completely forgotten where clan and chief

call. Of the charm of Basutoland much might be written were space available; the country is packed with unexpected and splendid beauties. The Maluti Mountains, with their snow-capped rocky buttresses and unexplored peaks seem to stand guard over this land where Nature has been so bountiful.

Eshowe in Zululand is another Nature-favoured spot, where the Prince will stay at the commencement of June for a two days' rest before visiting Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal. From there he continues his journey into Swaziland and the Transvaal, staying en route at Mbabane, the chief town of Swaziland, which is on the main motor road to Lourenço Marques, Portuguese East Africa.

Big game shooting will claim some days when the Prince will shoot in the Sabie Game Reserve in the north-eastern Transvaal, and in the reserve of the Central Estates, Umvuma, South Rhodesia. At the Sabie Reserve all the royal game, including lions and elephants, are preserved, shooting being prohibited. This reserve is regarded as a sanctuary for some of South Africa's indigenous fauna, and is situate in what is known as the bushveld or low veld, the climate being sub-tropical. When the Prince goes to the Sabie—about the middle of this month—the grass, which grows to four feet high or more during the rains, will have turned brown under the fierce sunshine, so that a bush fire may be added to the excitements of the chase, these fires being not unknown during the dry season. The weather will be delightful throughout his three days' stay, with cool mornings and nights, and even, perhaps, a touch of frost, the thermometer never soaring too high in the noonday heat, while the word rain can be eliminated from his vocabulary. It is hoped to form a gigantic National Park in this region. The matter is at present under discussion by the Union Government, a Bill being ready to submit to Parliament affirming the establishment of the National Park and the code of regulations for its proper control. This would be, I think, somewhat on the plan of the American national parks, which are pleasure resorts.

Two years ago the South African railways conceived the excellent idea of running excursions through the

Sabie during the winter months. Visitors are allowed to see the wild animals, as the excursion train remains one night in the game reserve, when a camp fire is lit and an impromptu concert is usually held. During the day visitors are allowed to take walks with the guides into the surrounding bush. Should the Bill referred to be passed, it is not impossible that in the near future rest houses or camps may be established at various points in the reserve where tourists could stay, and where official guides would be detailed to accompany visitors on expeditions and preserve them from dangerous contact with the wild inhabitants of the reserve. In this connection it is also possible that combined motor and rail trips would be organized, and that a hotel, on the lines of the hotels which are established in the American National Parks (at Yellowstone Park for instance) would be erected and run by the railway authorities for the accommodation of tourists from all parts of the world who would be attracted to South Africa by the wonders of this animal paradise from May to September when weather conditions are perfect.

His Royal Highness will motor to Tzaneen and Pietersburg when he leaves the Sabie and will thus have an opportunity of seeing some of the most beautiful "alpine" scenery which South Africa possesses, which is startingly unlike anything which one expects to see at such a comparatively short distance from Johannesburg. In this part of the northern Transvaal, including the Waterburg and Zoutpansberg, are situated some of the most fertile, and, potentially, the most flourishing regions in the Empire where settlers are rapidly taking over tracts of land. Of this more may be said anon. Later the Prince will come to Pretoria where he will make Government House his headquarters for three days. As Parliament will be in session at the Cape most of the members of the Government will be at Cape Town, as there is a general exodus to the Cape from Pretoria during the sitting of Parliament. From the capital he may explore some of the surrounding districts such as Rustenburg, a citrus-growing centre, and he is due at Potchefstroom on June 22, where he will probably motor from Pretoria.

Potchefstroom is important as an agricultural centre, having one of the leading agricultural colleges in the Union and a large Government experimental farm. Incidentally, it possesses the best and largest grass golf links in the country, so that the Prince may manage to squeeze in a game or two of golf between his round of official engagements. Had the Prince come to Pretoria during the summer he would have been captivated by the fairylike jacaranda trees then in full blossom which line the streets of the capital, but he will be impressed by the magnificent pile, the Union Buildings, which occupies such a commanding position above the town with a beautiful view over the city and its environs, including the distant Magaliesburg mountains.

From Potchefstroom he comes to the Reef where he will stay at Johannesburg, "the golden city," the Rand Club having been placed at his disposal during his stay, as there is no Government House in Johannesburg. He is due there on his birthday and he will receive a wonderful gift in the form of a golden trophy, to make which each of the mines has contributed a certain quantity of pure gold. Possibly he will visit the Crown Mines, the principal gold mine on the Reef, and no doubt will be taken down to see how the gold is extracted from the rock three thousand feet or more below the surface. During his stay on the Rand his days and nights will be crowded with engagements, as the inhabitants of Joburg (as it is familiarly called) are renowned for their hospitality and their loyalty. The children of the Reef are taking a very big part in the ceremonies connected with the Prince's visit; 40,000 school children are to receive commemoration mugs, each mug having a photograph of the Prince of Wales. What will—most probably—strike the Prince most forcibly during his visit to Johannesburg is the marvellous growth of the city, which less than forty years ago was a collection of tin shanties on the veldt, while to-day it is a London in miniature with fine public buildings, beautiful residences, well arranged streets, and shops and stores, many of which compare favourably with some of our best London shops.

From Johannesburg the Prince goes on to Bechuana

land Protectorate where he will have a camp for a few days' rest. Probably he will receive King Khama's son (who succeeded his father in 1923), as part of the Protectorate is known as Khama's country. In this territory the natives wear European dress. Therefore when the Chief goes to pay his homage to the Prince of Wales, it is possible that he may wear khaki uniform, while his aide-de-camps may appear in the same rather bizarre attire which they wore when they were received by Prince Arthur of Connaught when he was Governor General. On that occasion one of the members of the Chief's staff appeared in an old uniform which had belonged to an officer of the Blues (probably found after the Boer war) while others wore vivid yellow uniforms of a rather quaint pattern. In Khama's country, of which Serowe is the capital, and possibly the largest native town in the country, the natives (the Bamangwato tribe) are not allowed to drink European liquors, and at no place in his territory can such drinks be obtained even by white travellers, except at railway refreshment rooms. Khama, it will be recalled, was a most ardent Christian and built churches in his villages. He was respected by the Government for his fine character and upright conduct. The Bechuana natives show traces of Bushmen blood in quickness, vivacity, and good humour, and as a people they are more eager to cover their bodies than those of the Zulu type. They are wonderfully clever at making curios out of the roughest materials.

Travellers by train are surprised to see "raw" natives selling excellent models of aeroplanes and motor cars, the originals of which they may have never seen, the models being cut out of ordinary wood with a simple knife, with which the native will also do the ornamental carving. He usually paints his curios black, leaving the carved portions white, or he may burn a design into the wood. For a few shillings one can buy a number of these quaint curios. At Mahalapye and Palapye Road, on the way to Buluwayo, natives bring karosses to the train side for sale to the passengers. It is extraordinary how well the natives dress the skins and with what dexterity they join them together. No doubt

His Royal Highness will be presented with some beautiful skins by the native chiefs, which will be amongst the most interesting souvenirs of his tour.

Seventeen days will be spent in Southern and Northern Rhodesia. He will visit Buluwayo, which is the largest European community in S. Rhodesia (our youngest colony) and also Salisbury, the capital, while Livingstone, the capital of Northern Rhodesia, will be included in this part of his itinerary, and during the four days there he will visit some of the farming districts and receive homage from the native chiefs. While at Buluwayo he will motor to the lonely grandeur of the Matopos where Cecil Rhodes and his friend "Dr. Jim" repose on the crest of the boulder-crowned hill from which one can see what Rhodes called "World's View," a panorama which should remain long in the memory of the royal visitor. No doubt when at Government House (built on the spot where the old royal kraal used to stand) the Prince will be shown the "indaba" tree under which Lobengula, the famous chief, used to dispense justice. And at the Victoria Falls he will see one of the most magnificent sights in the world. He will be able to compare them with the Niagara Falls and, no doubt, will concede the honours to the Victoria Falls, which are to-day quite unspoiled by the advent of commercialism. To demonstrate the depth of the chasm into which the waters of the Zambesi fall, if St. Paul's Cathedral were placed in this chasm only the gold cross on the Dome would reach the lip of the Falls. The famous and imposing Zimbabwe Ruins, whose origin is surrounded in mystery, will also be visited during the Rhodesian tour before the Prince sets his face southward for Capetown where he will bid "au revoir" to the land of sunshine, for is it not written "that those who drink of the waters of the Nile ever return"?

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